


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# THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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NUMBER I

## ON THE ANTIQUITY AND THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE.

The fundamental assertion of the Biblical doctrine of the origin of man is that he owes his being to a creative act of God. Subsidiary questions growing out of this fundamental assertion, however, have been thrown from time to time into great prominence, as the changing forms of current anthropological speculation have seemed to press on this or that element in, or corollary from, the Biblical teaching. The most important of these subsidiary questions has concerned the method of the Divine procedure in creating man. Discussion of this question became acute on the publication of Charles Darwin's treatise on the *Origin of Species* in 1859, and can never sink again into rest until it is thoroughly understood in all quarters that "evolution" cannot act as a substitute for creation, but at best can supply only a theory of the method of the Divine providence. Closely connected with this discussion of the mode of origination of man, has been the discussion of two further questions, both older than the Darwinian theory, to one of which it gave however a new impulse, while it has well-nigh destroyed all interest in the other. These are the questions of the Antiquity of Man and the Unity of the Human Race, to both of which a large historical interest attaches, though neither of them can be said to be burning questions of to-day.

The question of the antiquity of man has of itself no theological significance. It is to theology, as such, a matter of entire indifference how long man has existed on earth.

It is only because of the contrast which has been drawn between the short period which seems to be allotted to human history in the Biblical narrative, and the tremendously long period which certain schools of scientific speculation have assigned to the duration of human life on earth, that theology has become interested in the topic at all. There was thus created the appearance of a conflict between the Biblical statements and the findings of scientific investigators, and it became the duty of theologians to investigate the matter. The asserted conflict proves, however, to be entirely factitious. The Bible does not assign a brief span to human history: this is done only by a particular mode of interpreting the Biblical data, which is found on examination to rest on no solid basis. Science does not demand an inordinate period for the life of human beings on earth: this is done only by a particular school of speculative theorizers, the validity of whose demands on time exact investigators are more and more chary of allowing. As the real state of the case has become better understood the problem has therefore tended to disappear from theological discussion, till now it is pretty well understood that theology as such has no interest in it.

It must be confessed, indeed, that the impression is readily taken from a *prima facie* view of the Biblical record of the course of human history, that the human race is of comparatively recent origin. It has been the usual supposition of simple Bible readers, therefore, that the Biblical data allow for the duration of the life of the human race on earth only a paltry six thousand years or so: and this supposition has become fixed in formal chronological schemes which have become traditional and have even been given a place in the margins of our Bibles to supply the chronological framework of the Scriptural narrative. The most influential of these chronological schemes is that which was worked out by Archbishop Usher in his *Annales Veteri et Novi Testamenti* (1650-54), and it is this scheme which has found a place in the margin of the Authorized English Version of



the Bible since 1701. According to it the creation of the world is assigned to the year 4004 B. C. (Usher's own dating was 4188 B. C.); while according to the calculation of Petau (in his *Rationarium Temporum*), the most influential rival scheme, it is assigned to the year 3983 B. C. On a more careful scrutiny of the data on which these calculations rest, however, they are found not to supply a satisfactory basis for the constitution of a definite chronological scheme. These data consist largely, and at the crucial points solely, of genealogical tables; and nothing can be clearer than that it is precarious in the highest degree to draw chronological inferences from genealogical tables.

For the period from Abraham down we have, indeed, in addition to somewhat minute genealogical records, the combined evidence of such so-called "long-dates" as those of 1 Kings vi.1; Gal. iii.17, and several precise statements concerning the duration of definite shorter periods, together with whatever aid it may be possible to derive from a certain amount of contemporary extra-Biblical data. For the length of this period there is no difficulty, therefore, in reaching an entirely satisfactory general estimate. But for the whole space of time before Abraham, we are dependent entirely on inferences drawn from the genealogies recorded in the fifth and eleventh chapters of Genesis. And if the Scriptural genealogies supply no solid basis for chronological inferences, it is clear that we are left without Scriptural data for forming an estimate of the duration of these ages. For aught we know they may have been of immense length.

The general fact that the genealogies of Scripture were not constructed for a chronological purpose and lend themselves ill to employment as a basis for chronological calculations has been repeatedly shown very fully; but perhaps by no one more thoroughly than by Dr. William Henry Green in an illuminating article published in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for April, 1890. These genealogies must be esteemed trustworthy for the purposes for which they are

recorded; but they cannot safely be pressed into use for other purposes for which they were not intended, and for which they are not adapted. In particular, it is clear that the genealogical purposes for which the genealogies were given, did not require a complete record of all the generations through which the descent of the persons to whom they are assigned runs; but only an adequate indication of the particular line through which the descent in question comes. Accordingly it is found on examination that the genealogies of Scripture are freely compressed for all sorts of purposes; and that it can seldom be confidently affirmed that they contain a complete record of the whole series of generations, while it is often obvious that a very large number are omitted. There is no reason inherent in the nature of the Scriptural genealogies why a genealogy of ten recorded links, as each of those in Genesis v and xi is, may not represent an actual descent of a hundred or a thousand or ten thousand links. The point established by the table is not that these are all the links which intervened between the beginning and the closing names, but that this is the line of descent through which one traces back to or down to the other.

A sufficient illustration of the freedom with which the links in the genealogies are dealt with in the Biblical usage, is afforded by the two genealogies of our Lord which are given in the first chapter of the Gospel of Matthew. For, it is to be noted that there are two genealogies of Jesus given in this chapter, differing greatly from one another in fulness of record, no doubt, but in no respect either in trustworthiness or in principle of record. The one is found in the first verse, and traces Jesus back to Abraham in just two steps: "Jesus Christ, the son of David, the son of Abraham". The other is found in verses 2-17, and expands this same genealogy into forty-two links, divided for purposes of symmetrical record and easy memorizing into a threefold scheme of fourteen generations each. And not even is this longer record a complete one. A compari-

son with the parallel records in the Old Testament, will quickly reveal the fact that the three kings, Ahaziah, Joash and Amaziah are passed over and Joram is said to have begotten Uzziah, his great-great-grandson. The other genealogies of Scripture present similar phenomena; and as they are carefully scrutinized, it becomes ever clearer that as they do not pretend to give complete lists of generations, they cannot be intended to supply a basis for chronological calculation, and it is illegitimate and misleading to attempt to use them for that purpose. The reduction for extraneous reasons of the genealogy of Christ in the first chapter of Matthew into three tables of fourteen generations each, may warn us that the reduction of the patriarchal genealogies in Genesis v and xi into two tables of ten generations each may equally be due to extraneous considerations; and that there may be represented by each of these ten generations—adequately for the purposes for which the genealogy is recorded—a very much longer actual series of links.

It must not be permitted to drop out of sight, to be sure, that the appearance of supplying data for a chronological calculation is in these particular genealogies not due entirely to the mere fact that these lists are genealogies. It is due to a peculiarity of these special genealogies by which they are differentiated from all other genealogies in Scripture. We refer to the regular attachment to each name in the lists, of the age of the father at the birth of his son. The effect of this is to provide what seems to be a continuous series of precisely measured generations, the numbers having only to be added together to supply an exact measure of the time consumed in their sequence. We do not read merely that "Adam begat Seth; and Seth begat Enosh; and Enosh begat Kenan". We read rather that "Adam lived an hundred and thirty years and begat Seth; and Seth lived an hundred and five years and begat Enosh; and Enosh lived ninety years and begat Kenan". It certainly looks, at first sight, as if we needed only to add these one hundred and thirty, one hundred and five, and ninety years together in order to ob-

tain the whole time which elapsed from the creation of Adam to the birth of Kenan; and accordingly as if we needed only to add together the similar numbers throughout the lists in order to obtain an accurate measure of the whole period from the Creation to the Deluge. Plausible as this procedure seems, however, it appears on a closer scrutiny unjustified; and it is the especial service which Dr. William Henry Green in the article already mentioned has rendered to the cause of truth in this matter that he has shown this clearly.

For, if we will look at these lists again, we shall find that we have not yet got them in their entirety before us. Not only is there attached to each name in them a statement of the age at which the father begot his son, but also a statement of how long the father lived after he had begotten his son, and how many years his life-span counted up altogether. If we do not read merely, "Adam begat Seth; and Seth begat Enosh; and Enosh begat Kenan"; neither do we read merely, "Adam lived one hundred and thirty years and begat Seth; and Seth lived one hundred and five years and begat Enosh; and Enosh lived ninety years and begat Kenan". What we read is: "Adam lived an hundred and thirty years, and begat a son in his own likeness, after his image; and called his name Seth: and the days of Adam after he begat Seth were eight hundred years: and he begat sons and daughters: and all the days that Adam lived were nine hundred and thirty years: and he died. And Seth lived an hundred and five years, and begat Enosh: and Seth lived after he begat Enosh eight hundred and seven years, and begat sons and daughters: and all the days of Seth were nine hundred and twelve years: and he died. And Enosh lived ninety years, and begat Kenan: and Enosh lived after he begat Kenan eight hundred and fifteen years and begat sons and daughters: and all the days of Enosh were nine hundred and five years: and he died". There is, in a word, much more information furnished with respect to each link in the chain

than merely the age to which each father had attained when his son was begotten; and all this information is of the same order and obviously belongs together. It is clear that a single motive has determined the insertion of all of it; and we must seek a reason for its insertion which will account for all of it. This reason cannot have been a chronological one: for all the items of information furnished do not serve a chronological purpose. Only the first item in each case can be made to yield a chronological result; and therefore not even it was intended to yield a chronological result, since all these items of information are too closely bound together in their common character to be separated in their intention. They too readily explain themselves moreover as serving an obvious common end which was clearly in the mind of the writer to justify the ascription of a different end to any one of them. When we are told of any man that he was an hundred and thirty years old when he begat his heir, and lived after that eight hundred years begetting sons and daughters, dying only at the age of nine hundred and thirty years, all these items co-operate to make a vivid impression upon us of the vigour and grandeur of humanity in those old days of the world's prime. In a sense different indeed from that which the words bear in Genesis vi, but full of meaning to us, we exclaim, "Surely there were giants in those days"! This is the impression which the items of information inevitably make on us; and it is the impression they were intended to make on us, as is proved by the simple fact that they are adapted in all their items to make this impression, while only a small portion of them can be utilized for the purpose of chronological calculation. Having thus found a reason which will account for the insertion of all the items of information which are given us, we have no right to assume another reason to account for the insertion of some of them. And that means that we must decline to look upon the first item of information given in each instance as intended to give us chronological information.



The conclusion which we thus reach is greatly strengthened when we observe another fact with regard to these items of information. This is that the appearance that we have in them of a chronological scheme does not reside in the nature of the items themselves, but purely in their sequence. If we read the items of information attached to each name, apart from their fellows attached to the succeeding names, we shall have simply a set of facts about each name, which in their combination make a strong impression of the vigor and greatness of humanity in those days, and which suggest no chronological inference. It is only when the names, with the accompanying comments, are put together, one after the other, that a chronological inference is suggested. The chronological suggestion is thus purely the effect of the arrangement of the names in immediate sequence; and is not intrinsically resident in the items of information themselves.

And now we must call attention to a characteristic of Scripture genealogies in general which seems to find a specially striking illustration in these comments. This is the habit of interposing into the structure of the genealogies, here and there, a short note, attached to this name or that, telling some important or interesting fact about the person represented by it. A simple genealogy would run thus: "Adam begat Seth; and Seth begat Enosh; and Enosh begat Kenan" and the like. But it would be quite in the Biblical manner if there were attached to some, or even to each, of these names, parenthetical remarks, calling attention to something of interest regarding the several persons. For example, it would be quite after the Biblical fashion should we have rather had this: "Adam, who was the first man, begat Seth; and Seth, he it was who was appointed as another seed in the stead of Abel whom Cain slew, begat Enosh; and Enosh, at his birth men began to call on the name of Jehovah, begat Kenan." The insertion of such items of information does not in the least change the character of the genealogy as in itself a simple genealogy, sub-

ject to all the laws which governed the formation and record of the Scriptural genealogies, including the right of free compression, with the omission of any number of links. It is strictly parenthetical in nature.

Several examples of such parenthetical insertions occur in the genealogy of Jesus recorded in the first chapter of Matthew to which we have already referred for illustration. Thus in verse 2, the fact that Judah had "brethren" is interposed in the genealogy, a fact which is noted also with respect to two others of the names which occur in the list (verses 3 and 11): it is noted here doubtless because of the significance of the twelve sons of Jacob as tribe-fathers of Israel. Again we find in four instances a notification of the mother interposed (Tamar, verse 3; Rahab, verse 5; Ruth, verse 5; her of Uriah, verse 6). The introduction of the names of these notable women, which prepares the way for the introduction of that of Mary in verse 16, constitutes a very remarkable feature of this particular genealogy. Another feature of it is suggested by the attachment to the name of David (verse 6) the statement that he was "the King"; and to the name of Jechoniah the statement that his life-span fell at the time of the carrying away to Babylon: the account of these insertions being found, doubtless in the artificial arrangement of the genealogy in three symmetrical tables. The habit of inserting parenthetical notes giving items of interest connected with the names which enter into the genealogies is doubtless sufficiently illustrated by these instances. The only point in which the genealogies of Genesis v and xi differ in this respect from this one in Matt. i is that such items of information are inserted with reference to every name in those genealogies, while they are inserted only occasionally in the genealogy of our Lord. This is, however, a difference of detail, not of principle. Clearly if these notes had been constant in the genealogy in Matt. i instead of merely occasional, its nature as a genealogy would not have been affected: it would still have remained a simple genealogy subject to all the customary

laws of simple genealogies. That they are constant in the genealogies of Genesis v and xi does not, then, alter their character as simple genealogies. These additions are in their nature parenthetical, and are to be read in each instance strictly as such and with sole reference to the names to which they are attached, and cannot determine whether or not links have been omitted in these genealogies as they are freely omitted in other genealogies.

It is quite true that, when brought together in sequence, name after name, these notes assume the appearance of a concatenated chronological scheme. But this is pure illusion, due wholly to the nature of the parenthetical insertions which are made. When placed one after the other they seem to play into one another, whereas they are set down here for an entirely different purpose and cannot without violence be read with reference to one another. If the items of information were of a different character we should never think of reading them otherwise than each with sole reference to its own name. Thus, if they were given to show us how nobly developed primitive men were in their physical frames and read something as follows: "Adam was eight cubits in height and begat Seth; and Seth was seven cubits in height and begat Enosh; and Enosh was six cubits in height, and begat Kenan", we should have no difficulty in understanding that these remarks are purely parenthetical and in no way argue that no links have been omitted. The case is not altered by the mere fact that other items than these are chosen for notice, with the same general intent, and we actually read: "Adam lived an hundred and thirty years and begat Seth; and Seth lived an hundred and five years and begat Enosh; and Enosh lived ninety years and begat Kenan". The circumstance that the actual items chosen for parenthetical notice are such that when the names are arranged one after the other they produce the illusion of a chronological scheme is a mere accident, arising from the nature of the items chosen, and must not blind us to the fact that we have before us here



nothing but ordinary genealogies, accompanied by parenthetical notes which are inserted for other than chronological purposes; and that therefore these genealogies must be treated like other genealogies, and interpreted on the same principles. But if this be so, then these genealogies too not only may be, but probably are, much compressed, and merely record the line of descent of Noah from Adam and of Abraham from Noah. Their symmetrical arrangement in groups of ten is indicative of their compression; and for aught we know instead of twenty generations and some two thousand years measuring the interval between the creation and the birth of Abraham, two hundred generations, and something like twenty thousand years, or even two thousand generations and something like two hundred thousand years may have intervened. In a word, the Scriptural data leave us wholly without guidance in estimating the time which elapsed between the creation of the world and the deluge and between the deluge and the call of Abraham. So far as the Scripture assertions are concerned, we may suppose any length of time to have intervened between these events which may otherwise appear reasonable.

The question of the antiquity of man is accordingly a purely scientific one, in which the theologian as such has no concern. As an interested spectator, however, he looks on as the various schools of scientific speculation debate the question among themselves; and he can scarcely fail to take away as the result of his observation two well-grounded convictions. The first is that science has as yet in its hands no solid data for a definite estimate of the time during which the human race has existed on earth. The second is, that the tremendous drafts on time which were accustomed to be made by the geologists about the middle of the last century and which continue to be made by one school of speculative biology to-day have been definitively set aside, and it is becoming very generally understood that

man cannot have existed on the earth more than some ten thousand to twenty thousand years.

It was a result of the manner of looking at things inculcated by the Huttonian geology, that speculation during the first three quarters of the nineteenth century estimated the age of the habitable globe in terms of hundreds of millions of years. It was under the influence of this teaching, for example, that Charles Darwin, in 1859, supposed that three hundred million years were an under-estimate for the period which has elapsed since the latter part of the Secondary Age.<sup>1</sup> In reviewing Mr. Darwin's argument in his *Students' Manual of Geology*, Professor Jukes remarked on the vagueness of the data on which his estimates were formed, and suggested that the sum of years asserted might with equal reasonableness be reduced or multiplied a hundredfold: he proposed therefore three million and thirty billion years as the minimum and maximum limits of the period in question. From the same fundamental standpoint, Professor Poulton in his address as President of the Zoological Section of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (Liverpool, September, 1896) treats as too short from his biological point of view the longest time asked by the geologists for the duration of the habitable earth—say some four hundred millions of years. Dwelling on the number of distinct types of animal existence already found in the Lower Cambrian deposits, and on the necessarily (as he thinks) slow progress of evolution, he stretches out the time required for the advance of life to its present manifestation practically illimitably. Taking up the cudgels for his biological friends, Sir Archibald Geikie<sup>2</sup> chivalrously offers them all the time they desire, speaking on his own behalf, however, of one hundred million years as possibly sufficient for the period of the existence of life on the globe. These general estimates imply, of course, a

<sup>1</sup> *Origin of Species*, ed. I., p. 287.

<sup>2</sup> Address as President of the Geological Section of the British Association, Dover, 1899.

very generous allowance for the duration of human life on earth; but many anthropologists demand for this period even more than they allow. Thus, for example, Professor Gabriel de Mortillet<sup>3</sup> reiterates his conviction that the appearance of man on earth cannot be dated less than two hundred and thirty thousand years ago, and Professor A. Penck<sup>3a</sup> would agree with this estimate, while Dr. A. R. Wallace has been accustomed to ask more than double that period.<sup>4</sup>

These tremendously long estimates of the duration of life on earth and particularly of the duration of human life, are, however, speculative, and, indeed, largely the creation of a special type of evolutionary speculation—a type which is rapidly losing ground among recent scientific workers. This type is that which owes its origin to the brooding mind of Charles Darwin; and up to recent times it has been the regnant type of evolutionary philosophy. Its characteristic contention is that the entire development of animate forms has been the product of selection, by the pressure of the environment, of infinitesimal variations in an almost infinite series of successive generations; or to put it rather brusquely, but not unfairly, that chance plus time are the true causes which account for the whole body of differentiated forms which animate nature presents to our observation. Naturally therefore heavy draughts have been made on time to account for whatever it seemed hard to attribute to brute chance, as if you could admit the issuing of any effect out of any conditions, if you only conceived the process of production as slow enough. James Hutton had duly warned his followers against the temptation to appeal to time as if it were itself an efficient cause of effects. “With regard to the effects of time”, he said,<sup>5</sup> “though the continuance of time may do much in those operations which are extremely slow, where no change to our observation had

<sup>3</sup> *Revue Mensuelle* of the Paris School of Anthropology, for January 15, 1897.

<sup>3a</sup> Silliman Lectures at Yale, for 1908.

<sup>4</sup> *Nature*, October 2, 1873, pp. 462-463; *Darwiniana*, p. 456.

<sup>5</sup> *Theory of the Earth*, II. 205.

appeared to take place, yet where it is not in the nature of things to produce the change in question, the unlimited course of time would be no more effectual than the moment by which we measure events in our observation". The warning was not heeded: men seemed to imagine that, if only time enough were given for it, effects, for which no adequate cause could be assigned, might be supposed to come gradually of themselves. Aimless movement was supposed, if time enough were allowed for it, to produce an ordered world. It might as well be supposed that if a box full of printers' types were stirred up long enough with a stick, they could be counted on to arrange themselves in time in the order in which they stand, say, in Kant's *Critic of Pure Reason*. They will never do so, though they be stirred to eternity. Dr. J. W. Dawson<sup>6</sup> points out the exact difficulty, when he remarks that "the necessity for indefinitely protracted time does not arise from the facts, but from the attempt to explain the facts without any adequate cause, and to appeal to an infinite series of chance interactions apart from a designed plan, and without regard to the consideration that we know of no way in which, with any conceivable amount of time, the first living and organized being could be produced from dead matter". Nothing could be more certain than that what chance cannot begin the production of in a moment, chance cannot complete the production of in an eternity. The analysis of the complete effect into an infinite series of parts, and the distribution of these parts over an infinite series of years, leaves the effect as unaccounted for as ever. What is needed to account for it is not time in any extension, but an adequate cause. A mass of iron is made no more self-supporting by being forged into an illimitable chain formed of innumerable infinitesimal links. We may cast our dice to all eternity with no more likelihood than at the first throw of ever turning up double-sevens.

It is not, however, the force of such reasoning but the

<sup>6</sup> *Relics of Primaeval Life*, 1897, p. 323.

pressure of hard facts which is revolutionizing the conceptions of biologists to-day as to the length of the period during which man has existed on earth. It is not possible to enumerate here all the facts which are co-operating to produce a revised and greatly reduced estimate of this period. First among them may doubtless be placed the calculations of the life-period of the globe itself which have been made by the physicists with ever increasing confidence. Led by such investigators as Lord Kelvin, they have become ever more and more insistent that the time demanded by the old uniformitarian and new biological speculator is not at their disposal. The publication in the seventh decade of the past century of Lord Kelvin's calculations, going to show that the sun had not been shining sixty millions of years, already gave pause to the reckless draughts which had been accustomed to be made on time; and the situation was rendered more and more acute by subsequent revisions of Lord Kelvin's work, progressively diminishing this estimate. Sir Archibald Geikie complains that "Lord Kelvin has cut off slice after slice from the allowance of time he was at first prepared to grant for the evolution of geological history", until he has reduced it from forty to twenty millions of years, "and probably much nearer twenty than forty". This estimate of the period of the sun's light would allow only something like six millions of years for geological time, only some one-sixteenth of which would be available for the caenozoic period, of which only about one-eighth or forty thousand years or so could be allotted to the pleistocene age, in the course of which the remains of man first appear.<sup>6a</sup> Even this meagre allowance is cut in half by the calculation of Professor Tait;<sup>7</sup> while the general conclusions of these investigators have received the support of independent calculations by

<sup>6a</sup> Cf. the estimates of G. F. Wright, *Records of the Past*, vii, 1908, p. 24. He suggests for Post-Tertiary time, say 50,000 years; and adds that, even if this be doubled, there could be assigned to the post-glacial period only some 10,000 years.

<sup>7</sup> *Recent Advances in Physical Science*, pp. 167-168.



Dr. George H. Darwin and Professor Newcomb; and more recently still Mr. T. J. J. See of the Naval Observatory at Washington has published a very pretty speculation in which he determines the total longevity of the sun to be only thirty-six millions of years, thirty-two of which belong to its past history.<sup>8</sup>

It is not merely the physicists, however, with whom the biological speculators have to do: the geologists themselves have turned against them. Recent investigations may be taken as putting pre-Quaternary man out of the question (the evidence was reviewed by Sir John Evans, in his address at the Toronto meeting of the British Association, August 18, 1897). And revised estimates of the rate of denudation, erosion, deposition of alluvial matter in deltas, or of stalagmitic matter in the floors of caves have greatly reduced the exaggerated conception of its slowness, from which support was sought for the immensely long periods of time demanded. The post-glacial period, which will roughly estimate the age of man, it is now pretty generally agreed "cannot be more than ten thousand years or probably not more than seven thousand in length".<sup>9</sup> In this estimate, both Professor Winchell<sup>10</sup> and Professor Salisbury<sup>11</sup> agree, and to its establishment a great body of evidence derived from a variety of calculations concur. If man is of post-glacial origin, then, his advent upon earth need not be dated more than five or six thousand years ago; or if we suppose him to have appeared at some point in the later glacial period, as Professor G. F. Wright does, then certainly Professor Wright's estimate of sixteen thousand to twenty thousand years is an ample one.

<sup>8</sup> On the so-called "Planetesimal Hypothesis" of Professors Chamberlin and Moulton which does not presuppose a molten sun and earth, these calculations which proceed on the basis of the "cooling-globe hypothesis" are of course without validity. And in recent years a somewhat despairing appeal has been made to the behavior of radium to suggest that all calculations based on rate of waste are valueless.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. especially articles in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for July, 1903.

<sup>10</sup> *American Geologist*, September, 1902.

<sup>11</sup> *Final Report of the New Jersey State Geologist*, 1902.

The effect of these revised estimates of geological time has been greatly increased by growing uncertainty among biologists themselves, as to the soundness of the assumptions upon which was founded their demand for long periods of time. These assumptions were briefly those which underlie the doctrine of evolution in its specifically Darwinian form; in the form, that is to say, in which the evolution is supposed to be accomplished by the fixing through the pressure of the environment of minute favorable variations, arising accidentally in the midst of minute variations in every direction indifferently. But in the progress of biological research, the sufficiency of this "natural selection" to account for the development of organic forms has come first to be questioned, and then in large circles to be denied.<sup>12</sup> In proportion, however, as evolution is conceived as advancing in determined directions, come the determination from whatever source you choose;<sup>13</sup> and in proportion as it is conceived as advancing onwards by large increments instead of by insensible changes;<sup>14</sup> in that proportion the demand on time is lessened and even the evolutionary speculator feels that he can get along with less of it. He is no longer impelled to assume behind the high type of man whose remains in the post-glacial deposits are the first intimation of the presence of man on earth, an almost illimitable series of lower and ever lower types of man through which gradually the brute struggled up to the high humanity, records of whose existence alone have been preserved to us.<sup>14a</sup> And he no longer requires to

<sup>12</sup> Cf. V. L. Kellogg, *Darwinism To-day*, 1907; R. Otto, *Naturalism and Religion*, 1907; Wasmann, *Die moderne Biologie und die Entwicklungslehre*, ed. 3, 1906+; James Orr, *God's Image in Man*, 1905; Dennert, *Am Sterbelager des Darwinismus*, 1903.

<sup>13</sup> That "orthogenesis" is a fact is much more widely recognized than is the validity of Eimer's special mode of accounting for it.

<sup>14</sup> The recognition of the reality of these saltations, or "mutations" as De Vries inadequately terms them, is again largely independent of any particular theory with reference to them.

<sup>14a</sup> Cf. Hubrecht in *De Gids* for June 1896; Otto, *Naturalism and Religion*, 1897, p. 110; Orr, *God's Image in Man*, 1905, p. 134. E. D.

postulate immense stretches of time for the progress of this man through paleolithic, neolithic and metal-using periods, for the differentiation of the strongly marked characteristics of the several races of man, for the slow humanizing of human nature and the slower development of those powers within it from which at length what we call civilization emerged. Once allow the principle of modification by leaps, and the question of the length of time required for a given evolution passes out of the sphere of practical interest. The height of the leaps becomes a matter of detail, and there is readily transferred to the estimation of it the importance which was formerly attached to the estimation of the time involved. Thus it has come about, that, in the progress of scientific investigation, the motive for demanding illimitable stretches of time for the duration of life, and specifically for the duration of human life on earth, has gradually been passing away, and there seems now a very general tendency among scientific investigators to acquiesce in a moderate estimate—in an estimate which demands for the life of man on earth not more than, say, ten or twenty thousand years.

If the controversy upon the antiquity of man is thus rapidly losing all but a historical interest, that which once so violently raged upon the unity of the race may be said already to have reached this stage. The question of the unity of the human race differs from the question of its antiquity in that it is of indubitable theological importance.

Cope, *The Primary Factors of Organic Evolution*, 1896, thinks there is evidence enough to constitute two species of the genus *homo*—*Homo sapiens* and *Homo neanderthalensis*, to the latter of which he assigns a greater number of simian characteristics than exist in any of the known races of the *Homo sapiens*. But he requires to add (p. 171): "There is still, to use the language of Fraipont and Lohest, 'an abyss' between the man of Spy and the highest ape"—although, on his own account he adds, surely unwarrantably, "though, from a zoölogical point of view, it is not a wide one." In point of fact the earliest relics of man are relics of *men*, with all that is included in that, and there lies between them and all other known beings a hitherto unbridged "abyss".



It is not merely that the Bible certainly teaches it, while, as we have sought to show, it has no teaching upon the antiquity of the race. It is also the postulate of the entire body of the Bible's teaching—of its doctrine of Sin and Redemption alike: so that the whole structure of the Bible's teaching, including all that we know as its doctrine of salvation, rests on it and implicates it. There have been times, nevertheless, when it has been vigorously assailed, from various motives, from within as well as from without the Church, and the resources of Christian reasoning have been taxed to support it. These times have now, however, definitely passed away. The prevalence of the evolutionary hypotheses has removed all motive for denying a common origin to the human race, and rendered it natural to look upon the differences which exist among the various types of man as differentiations of a common stock. The motive for denying their conclusiveness having been thus removed, the convincing evidences of the unity of the race have had opportunity to assert their force. The result is that the unity of the race, in the sense of its common origin, is no longer a matter of debate; and although actually some erratic writers may still speak of it as open to discussion, they are not taken seriously, and practically it is universally treated as a fixed fact that mankind in all its varieties is one, as in fundamental characteristics, so also in origin.

In our natural satisfaction over this agreement between Scripture and modern science with respect to the unity of humanity, we must not permit ourselves to forget that there has always nevertheless existed among men a strong tendency to deny this unity in the interests of racial pride. Outside of the influence of the Biblical revelation, indeed, the sense of human unity has never been strong and has ordinarily been non-existent.<sup>15</sup> The Stoics seem to have been the first among the classical peoples to preach the unity of mankind and the duty of universal justice and philan-

<sup>15</sup> Cf. H. Bavinck, *The Philosophy of Revelation*, pp. 137 sq.

thropy founded upon it. With the revival of classical ideas which came in with what we call the Renaissance, there came in also a tendency to revive heathen polygenism, which was characteristically reproduced in the writings of Blount and others of the Deists. A more definite co-Adamitism, that is to say the attribution of the descent of the several chief racial types to separate original ancestors, has also been taught by occasional individuals such, for example, as Paracelsus. And the still more definite pre-Adamitism, which conceives man indeed as a single species, derived from one stock, but represents Adam not as the root of this stock, but as one of its products, the ancestor of the Jews and white races alone, has always found teachers, such as, for example, Zanini. The advocacy of this pre-Adamitic theory by Isaac de la Peyrère in the middle of the seventeenth century roused a great debate which soon however died out, although leaving echoes behind it in Bayle, Arnold, Swedenborg. A sort of pre-Adamitism has continued to be taught by a series of philosophical speculators from Schelling down, which looks upon Adam as the first real man, rising in developed humanity above the low, beast-like condition of his ancestors. In our own day George Catlin<sup>16</sup> and especially Alexander Winchell<sup>17</sup> have revived in its essentials the teaching of de la Peyrère. "Adam", says Professor Winchell, "is descended from a black race, not the black race from Adam". The advancing knowledge of the varied races of man produced in the latter part of the eighteenth and the earlier nineteenth century a revival of co-Adamitism (Sullivan, Crueger, Ballenstedt, Cordonière, Gobineau) which was even perverted into a defense of slavery (Dobbs, Morton, Nott and Gliddon). It was in connection with Nott and Gliddon's *Types of Mankind* that Aggasiz first published his theory of the diverse origin of the several types of man, the only

<sup>16</sup> *O-kee-pa*, London, 1866: he referred the North American Indians to an antediluvian species, which he called *Anthropus Americanus*.

<sup>17</sup> *Pre-Adamites*, Boston, 1880.

one of these theories of abiding interest because the only one arising from a genuinely scientific impulse and possessing a really scientific basis. Agassiz's theory was the product of a serious study of the geographical distribution of animate life, and one of the results of Agassiz's classification of the whole of animate creation into eight well-marked types of fauna involving, so he thought, eight separate centers of origin. Pursuant to this classification he sought to distribute mankind also into eight types, to each of which he ascribed a separate origin, corresponding with the type of fauna with which each is associated. But even Agassiz could not deny that men are, despite their eightfold separate creation, all of one kind: he could not erect specific differences between the several types of man.<sup>18</sup> The evidence which compelled him to recognize the oneness of man in kind remains in its full validity, after advancing knowledge of the animal kingdom and its geographical distribution<sup>19</sup> has rendered Agassiz's assumption of eight centers of origination (not merely distribution) a violent hypothesis; and the entrance into the field of the evolutionary hypothesis has consigned all theories formed without reference to it to oblivion. Even some early evolutionists it is true played for a time with theories of multiplex times and places where similar lines of development culminated alike in man (Haeckel, Schaffhausen, Caspari, Vogt, Buchner), and perhaps there is now some sign of the revival of this view; but it is now agreed with practical unanimity that the unity of the human race, in the sense of its common origin, is a necessary corollary of the evolutionary hypothesis, and no voice raised in contradiction of it stands much chance to be heard.

It is, however, only for its universal allowance at the hands of speculative science that the fact of the unity of

<sup>18</sup> Similarly Heinrich Schurtz while leaving the descent of men from a single pair an open question, affirms that it is a fact that "humanity forms one great unity."

<sup>19</sup> It was Wallace's *Geographical Distribution of Animals* which struck the first crushing blow.

the human race has to thank the evolutionary hypothesis. The evidence by which it is solidly established is of course independent of all such hypotheses. This evidence is drawn almost equally from every department of human manifestation, physiological, psychological, philological, and even historical. The physiological unity of the race is illustrated by the nice gradations by which the several so-called races into which it is divided pass into one another; and by their undiminished natural fertility when intercrossed; by which Professor Owen was led to remark that "man forms but one species, and differences are but indications of varieties" which "merge into one another by easy gradations".<sup>20</sup> It is emphasized by the contrast which exists between the structural characteristics, osteological, cranial, dental, common to the entire race of human beings of every variety and those of the nearest animal types; which led Professor Huxley to assert that "every bone of a gorilla bears marks by which it might be distinguished from the corresponding bones of a man; and that, in the present creation at any rate, no intermediate link bridges over the gap between *Homo* and *Troglodytes*".<sup>21</sup> The psychological unity of the race is still more manifest. All men of all varieties are psychologically men and prove themselves possessors of the same mental nature and furniture. Under the same influences they function mentally and spiritually in the same fashion, and prove capable of the same mental reactions. They, they all, and they alone, in the whole realm of animal existences manifest themselves as rational and moral natures; so that Mr. Fiske was fully justified when he declared that though for zoological man the erection of a distinct family from the chimpanzee and orang might suffice, "on the other hand for psychological man you must erect a distinct kingdom: nay you must even dichotomize the universe, putting man on one side and all things else on the other".<sup>22</sup> Among the manifestations of

<sup>20</sup> Burgess, *Antiquity and Unity of the Race*, p. 185.

<sup>21</sup> *Man's Place in Nature*, p. 104.

<sup>22</sup> *Through Nature to God*, p. 82.

the psychological peculiarities of mankind, as distinguished from all other animate existences, is the great gift of speech which he shares with no other being: if all human languages cannot be reduced to a single root, they all exhibit a uniquely human faculty working under similar laws, and bear the most striking testimony to the unity of the race which alone has language at its command. The possession of common traditions by numerous widely separated peoples is only a single one of many indications of a historical inter-communion between the several peoples through which their essential unity is evinced, and by which the Biblical account of the origination of the various families of man in a single center from which they have spread out in all directions is powerfully supported.<sup>23</sup>

The assertion of the unity of the human race is imbedded in the very structure of the Biblical narrative. The Biblical account of the origin of man (Gen. i. 26-28) is an account of his origination in a single pair, who constituted humanity in its germ, and from whose fruitfulness and multiplication all the earth has been replenished. Therefore the first man was called Adam, Man, and the first woman, Eve, "because she was the mother of all living" (Gen. iii, 20); and all men are currently spoken of as the "sons of Adam" or "Man" (Deut. xxxii.8; Ps. xi.4; 1 Sam. xxvi.19; 1 Kings viii.39; Ps. cxlv.12, etc.). The absolute restriction of the human race within the descendants of this single pair is emphasized by the history of the Flood in which all flesh is destroyed, and the race given a new beginning in its second father, Noah, by whose descendants again "the whole earth was overspread" (Gen. ix.19), as is illustrated in detail by the table of nations recorded in Genesis x. A profound religious-ethical significance is given to the differentiations of the peoples, in the story of the tower of Babel in the eleventh chapter of Genesis, in which the divergences and separations which divide man-

<sup>23</sup> Cf. the discussion in the seventh lecture of Bavinck's *Philosophy of Revelation*, 1908.



kind are represented as the product of sin: what God had joined together men themselves pulled asunder. Throughout the Scriptures therefore all mankind is treated as, from the Divine point of view, a unit, and shares not only in a common nature but in a common sinfulness, not only in a common need but in a common redemption.

Accordingly although Israel was taught to glory in its exaltation by the choice of the Lord to be His peculiar people, Israel was not permitted to believe there was anything in itself which differentiated it from other peoples; and by the laws concerning aliens and slaves was required to recognize the common humanity of all sorts and conditions of men; what they had to distinguish them from others was not of nature but of the free gift of God, in the mysterious working out of His purpose of good not only to Israel but to the whole world. This universalism in the divine purposes of mercy, already inherent in the Old Covenant and often proclaimed in it, and made the very keynote of the New—for which the Old was the preparation—is the most emphatic possible assertion of the unity of the race. Accordingly not only do we find our Lord Himself setting His seal upon the origination of the race in a single pair, and drawing from that fact the law of life for men at large (Matt. xix. 4); and Paul explicitly declaring that "God has made of one every nation of men" and having for His own good ends appointed to each its separate habitation, is now dealing with them all alike in offering them a common salvation (Acts xvii. 26 sq.); but the whole New Testament is instinct with the brotherhood of mankind as one in origin and in nature, one in need and one in the provision of redemption. The fact of racial sin is basal to the whole Pauline system (Rom. v.12 sq.; 1 Cor. xv.21 sq.), and beneath the fact of racial sin lies the fact of racial unity. It is only because all men were in Adam as their first head that all men share in Adam's sin and with his sin in his punishment. And it is only because the sin of man is thus one in origin and therefore of the same nature and quality,

that the redemption which is suitable and may be made available for one is equally suitable and may be made available for all. It is because the race is one and its need one, Jew and Gentile are alike under sin, that there is no difference between Jew and Gentile in the matter of salvation either, but as the same God is Lord of all, so He is rich in Christ Jesus unto all that call upon Him, and will justify the uncircumcision through faith alone, even as He justifies the circumcision only by faith (Rom. ix. 22-23, 28 sq.; x.12). Jesus Christ therefore, as the last Adam, is the Saviour not of the Jews only but of the world (John iv. 42; 1 Tim. iv.10; 1 Jno. iv.14), having been given to this His great work only by the love of the Father for the world (Jno. iii.16). The unity of the human race is therefore made in Scripture not merely the basis of a demand that we shall recognize the dignity of humanity in all its representatives, of however lowly estate or family, since all bear alike the image of God in which man was created and the image of God is deeper than sin and cannot be eradicated by sin (Gen. v.3; ix.6; 1 Cor. xi.7; Heb. ii. 5 sq.); but the basis also of the entire scheme of restoration devised by the divine love for the salvation of a lost race.

So far is it from being of no concern to theology, therefore, that it would be truer to say that the whole doctrinal structure of the Bible account of redemption is founded on its assumption that the race of man is one organic whole, and may be dealt with as such. It is because all are one in Adam that in the matter of sin there is no difference, but all have fallen short of the glory of God (Rom. iii.22), and as well that in the new man there cannot be Greek and Jew, circumcision and uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bondman, freeman; but Christ is all and in all (Col. iii.11). The unity of the old man in Adam is the postulate of the unity of the new man in Christ.

*Princeton.*

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## THE PAULINE ESCHATOLOGY AND CHILIASM.

The division of the eschatological future into two distinct stages, the one of a temporary, provisional, the other of an eternal, absolute character, is probably of pre-Christian Jewish origin. It is first met with in the Book of Enoch, Chaps. 91 and 93, the "vision of weeks", so called because it divides the entire course of the world into ten weeks. The eighth of these stands for the Messianic period, the ninth and the tenth bring the final judgment, and it is not until the close of the tenth week that the new creation appears. In the third book of the Jewish Sibyl (vss. 652-660) the Messianic kingdom is represented as subject to attack and destruction by the assembled nations, and after these are destroyed in turn, the kingdom of God begins. The dating of these two apocalyptic documents is somewhat uncertain, but a great preponderance of authorities places them in the pre-Christian period.<sup>1</sup> The same distinction between a preliminary Messianic and a final kingdom has been found in the Psalms of Solomon. Here in Psalms xvii and xviii the Messianic reign seems to be described as something transitory, for the Psalmist speaks not only of "his days", "those days" (xvii. 32, xviii. 6) but also of "his lifetime" (xvii. 37). On the other hand in Psalm iii. 12, we read of a resurrection to eternal life. It is not absolutely certain, however, that all the Psalms in this collection are of one author, in which case, to be sure, the idea of two successive kingdoms would offer the only explanation of the two varying descriptions of the future. If the authorship should not be the same, the necessity or warrant for introducing this

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes*,<sup>4</sup> III, 279 (uncertain about the vision of weeks), 555-592, Sibyl of the third book ab. 140 B. C. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judenthums*,<sup>2</sup> p. 13, who dates the entire Enoch-literature between 164 and 80 B. C. Charles, *The Book of Enoch*, p. 28, Chaps. xci-civ, between 134-94 B. C., or possibly 104-94 B. C.



distinction here, would, it is urged, fall away, since the outlook of one author might be entirely confined to the Messianic era *sub specie temporis*, whilst another might contemplate the same era as of eternal duration.<sup>2</sup> Even so, however, it seems unlikely that the former writer should have consciously regarded the Messianic era as something temporal and temporary without putting the question to himself, what was to come beyond it. As in all other cases the idea of an endless, eternal kingdom of God is the correlate of the ascription of a limited duration to the Messianic kingdom, so it was probably in the mind of the writer of Psalms xvii and xviii in this collection.<sup>3</sup> Coming down into the Christian period we meet the twofold kingdom in the Slavic Enoch and the great apocalypses of Ezra and Baruch, and here a definite number of years is fixed for the duration of the provisional Messianic reign. The Christ reigns according to 4 Ezra vii. 28 ff. four hundred years, then he, together with all other earthly creatures, dies, after which the dead awake and the eternal judgment begins. Similarly in xii. 34, where the reign of the Messiah lasts till the end of the world and the day of judgment. In the Slavic Enoch and Baruch the limited duration of the Messianic era is connected with the system of world-periods. In the latter apocalypse, after the description of the Messianic kingdom in Chap. xxix, the opening verse of the following chapter states that when the period of the arrival of the Messiah has been completed he will return in glory into heaven,<sup>4</sup> which return will be the signal for the resurrection of those who are fallen asleep in hoping for him. While Chap. xl. 3 represents the reign of the Messiah as "permanent for ever", this is immediately qualified by the subjoined clause "until the world devoted to destruction

<sup>2</sup> So Bousset, *Die Religion des Judenthums*,<sup>2</sup> p. 331, Note 1.

<sup>3</sup> It does not, of course, follow that the author of Psalm iii held the same distinction. He might have conceived the Messianic reign as eternal or his conception of "eternal life" might have been un-Messianic. Only if we identify him with the author of Psalms xvii and xviii, can we affirm that the eschatology of the latter was also his.

<sup>4</sup> Literally: "will turn himself back." Cf. Kautzsch, *Die Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen des Alten Testaments*, II, p. 423.

comes to a close, and the times named above fulfill themselves". Finally according to Chap. lxxiv. 2 the Messianic age is "the end of that which is transitory. and the beginning of that which is non-transitory".

In regard to the motive underlying the development of this conception of a provisional Messianic kingdom it has been suggested by recent writers that it is of the nature of a compromise between two heterogeneous eschatological schemes, the ancient national-political, terrestrial scheme, which revolves around the destiny of Israel, and the later transcendental, cosmical scheme, which has in view the consummation of the world as such and the introduction of altogether new conditions on a super-mundane plane. At first the ideas and expectations connected with these two schemes formed an orderless mass, a conglomerate without adjustment or correlation. The most varying elements lay unreconciled and unreconcilable in close proximity to each other. Such is the case in the older parts of the Book of Enoch and in the Book of Jubilees. Or the semblance of coherence was saved by bringing into the foreground only one of these two aspects of the eschatological hope, leaving the other in obscurity, while not denying its right of existence. Thus in the Similitudes of the Book of Enoch, and in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs the prevailing atmosphere is of the transcendental, super-terrestrial kind, although not to the entire exclusion of the earthly, national, political prospects. On the other hand in such writings as the Psalter of Solomon<sup>5</sup> and the Assumption of Moses the eschatological drama plays itself out mainly on the stage of this world and under temporal conditions, the interest being centered on Israel. Rarely, as in the Slavic Book of Enoch, does the spirit of other-worldliness become so dominant as to expel all the heterogeneous elements belonging to the other and lower plane. In most cases the contradictions were not actually removed but only covered up by the distribution of emphasis. And for this reason, it was inevit-

<sup>5</sup> This on the old interpretation of the Psalms, according to which they do not contain the doctrine of a provisional Messianic Kingdom. See above.

able, it is thought, that a more systematic attempt should in course of time be made to bring not only apparent but real order into the confusion. This was done through the distribution of the various elements over two successive periods. The older, national, political, earthly hopes, it was now believed, would first go into fulfilment and thus have full justice done to them. But this would last for a time only. Then, after this tribute to the ancient hopes of Israel had been paid, the new order of things could assume its eternal, cosmical sway, no longer hindered in the unfolding of its transcendental character by the intrusion of interests or forces of a less exalted type.

Sometimes, as notably in the case of Bousset, this view with regard to the origin of the Chiliastic hope is coupled with the hypothesis according to which the whole higher, transcendental eschatology of Judaism, the specific apocalyptic ideas about the future, are not a native growth on the soil of the Old Testament, but an importation from Babylonian, or ultimately Persian sources. But this peculiar assumption, so grave and far-reaching in its consequences,<sup>6</sup> is by no means essential to the theory. Whether the latter shall be accepted or rejected is a question to be decided on its own merits. The cleavage and heterogeneity which mark the Jewish eschatology, would, if actually present to the contemporary consciousness, invite attempts at readjustment and reduction to system quite as much in case the disharmony was due to indigenous development as if it was due to the intrusion of foreign influence. But apart from this, and considering the problem altogether by itself, we are not convinced that the solution offered, attractive though it may seem, is borne out by the facts. The origin of a scheme does not always coincide with the uses to which

<sup>6</sup>It carries with it the inference that the basis and background of the entire Christian doctrine of salvation are of pagan origin. The question about the origin of the apocalyptic eschatology resolves itself into a question of the antecedents of the specifically soteriological element in Christianity. For the soteriology rests throughout on the eschatology.

it may subsequently be put. When as far back as the period of canonical prophetism we find the twofold representation, on the one hand that the eschatological order of things will be called into being by the appearance of a Messianic king, on the other hand that this order will be brought into existence by the appearance and kingly interposition of God Himself, so that the new conceptions of a kingdom of the Messiah and a kingdom of God appear at this early stage side by side without any attempt at adjustment, then it would seem that in this primitive, prophetic diversity we have a fully adequate explanation of the origin of the idea of the two successive kingdoms. Where once the problem inherent in this twofold perspective had made itself felt, it certainly required no profound reflection to perceive that the easiest way of solving the difficulty lay in making the two forms of the future state follow each other, in which case the first in order would be naturally the kingdom of the Messiah, to be followed by the kingdom of God as the absolute consummation of all things. Chiliasts, who should want to resent the charge of the dependence of their favorite idea on the dualism and disorder created in the eschatology of the Old Testament by the streaming in of a pagan system of ideas, can make out a good case for themselves on the ground indicated. Whether the New Testament stamps with its approval the solution, which on such a view, the early Jewish theology brought to bear on the old problem, or has a different solution of its own, may remain an open question. But a charge of being rooted in paganism rather than in study of the Old Testament need not lie against Chiliasm.

From the presumable origin of the distinction we must, however, keep separated the use to which in course of time it came to be put. In itself the distinction between a preliminary Messianic and a subsequent divine kingdom is indifferent to eschatological tone or atmosphere.<sup>6a</sup> In the earlier

<sup>6a</sup> This may be seen most clearly from the Slavic Enoch, in which, as Bousset observes, the atmosphere is pervasively transcendental, and which yet (for the first time) limits the Messianic kingdom to a thousand years.



sources the Messianic kingdom is not depicted in particularly glowing sensualistic colors, as though a conscious effort had been made to save in it realistic hopes and dreams for which it was felt the transcendental outlook left no room, nor, on the other hand, is the final state described in such super-sensual terms as to carry the impression, that an order of things so constituted is utterly incommensurable with the substance of the old, earthly, national expectations. It is not in Enoch, and not in the well known verses from the third book of the Sibyl, nor in the Psalter of Solomon that the picture of the provisional Messianic kingdom assumes the complexion which is usually called "chiliastic" in the specific sense of the word, but first in the great apocalypses of Ezra and Baruch this is the case. According to 4 Ezra vii. 28, God's son, the Christ, when he is revealed will "dis-pense joy to those that remain for four hundred years". The same prospect of "joy" for those "left in the land" recurs in xii. 24. The most typical passage is Baruch xxix. 1-8: When the Messiah begins to reveal himself, Behemoth and Leviathan likewise appear and are given as food to the remnant; the earth produces ten thousandfold; a vine will have one thousand branches, every branch one thousand clusters, every cluster one thousand grapes, and every grape will yield one kor of wine; winds will proceed from God and will carry to the people the fragrance of the aromatic fruit and every night clouds will distill healing dew; the heavenly supplies of manna will be let down and they will eat of them in those years because they have reached the end of the ages.<sup>7</sup> Characteristic also is lxxiv. 1: "In these days the reapers will not have to exert themselves, and those that build will not have to toil, for of themselves all works will have progress together with those who labor thereon with much rest." And it is precisely in these latest apocalypses that the final state appears at the farthest remove from the conditions of earthly existence even in an idealized form.

<sup>7</sup>This is the passage from which Papias is believed to have borrowed his well-known description of the Chiliastic state, quoted in Irenaeus V, 33, 3.

It is not a perfection of the present life, but a transposal of life into the supernatural that is expected. There can be little doubt that a sense of the incompatibility of such a state with the Messianic joys as ordinarily conceived, contributed to sharpen the distinction between the two successive kingdoms and to make it one not merely of chronology but chiefly of character.

The Pauline eschatology in point of date lies between the older documents in which the Chiliastic view appears and this later efflorescence of it in 4 Ezra and Baruch. It is not surprising, therefore, that attempts should have been made to bring Paul in line with the general apocalyptic development on this point, by making him teach the future coming of some such temporary kingdom of the Christ as the Jewish sources assume.<sup>8</sup> The traces of this,—for at the best it is only traces of such teaching that have supposedly been found—are all connected with the Apostle's doctrine of the resurrection. The analogy of the well-known passage in Rev. xx. has undoubtedly led interpreters to look for the idea by preference in that quarter. It is affirmed that Paul expects a double resurrection, one of a certain class of dead at the Parousia, and that of the remaining dead at the consummation of the world before the judgment, and that he places the glorious reign of Christ between these two resurrections.<sup>9</sup> Now it will be observed, that the idea of Chiliasm, when introduced in this concrete form, which is, as a

<sup>8</sup>So Grimm, *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1873, pp. 380-411; Schmiedel in Holtzmann's *Handkommentar*,<sup>2</sup> II, p. 196, Kabisch, *Die Paulinischen Vorstellungen von Auferstehung und Gericht und ihre Beziehung zur jüdischen Apokalyphe*, pp. 111, 112; Bousset, *Die Religion des Judenthums*,<sup>2</sup> p. 331. Among more recent writers the presence of Chiliasm in Paul is denied by Titius, *Die Neutestamentliche Lehre von der Seligkeit, Der Paulinismus*, p. 47; Charles, *A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life in Israel, in Judaism and in Christianity*, p. 386, and Kennedy, *St. Paul's Conceptions of the Last Things*, pp. 322-324.

<sup>9</sup>Where the doctrine of a universal resurrection is denied to Paul, the judgment alone would have to mark the close of the provisional kingdom, and the resurrection, in its form of a resurrection of believers only, would fall at the beginning of the kingdom.



matter of fact, the only form for which any semblance of support can be found in the Pauline Epistles, does not particularly fit into the development of the doctrine in Jewish Apocalyptic. It would represent a more advanced form of the idea than is met with in 4 Ezra and Baruch, inasmuch as the differentiation between the two kingdoms has been carried through to the point of a distinction between two resurrections. In the two above-named apocalypses the resurrection is not yet divided, but remains fixed to its accustomed place immediately before the final judgment.<sup>10</sup> The Pauline teaching then would in this respect not be in continuity with the apocalyptic development of doctrine, but overtake and pass on beyond it. Still it might be urged, that this particular departure can be explained from the specifically Christian premise, that the Messiah has already come, and that in him, that is at a central point, the resurrection has already become an accomplished fact, so that naturally, when between this fundamental resurrection and the final resurrection the Chiliastic kingdom as a separate future stage is inserted, this intermediate stage must also, like the first and the last epoch, have a resurrection connected with itself. In some such way at least the strangeness of such a departure from the more prevalent apocalyptic tradition could be softened down and the theory of a real connection on the main point be upheld.

It must be admitted, however, that the likelihood of finding Chiliasm in Paul is not favored by the trend of the Apostle's teaching as a whole. Not merely does his general concatenation of eschatological events, in which the Parousia and the resurrection of believers are directly combined with the judgment, exclude any intermediate stage of protracted duration.<sup>11</sup> It is of even more importance

<sup>10</sup>The passage quoted above from 4 Ezra vii. 28: "My Son the Messiah will reveal himself with all those that are with him" does not refer to a provisional resurrection but to the appearance of certain eminent saints with the Christ from heaven.

<sup>11</sup>Cf. 1 Thess. i. 10; ii. 17; iii. 13; v. 9, 23; 2 Thess. i. 10; ii. 12, 13. In point of fact the Chiliastic doctrine runs so contrary to the Apostle's teaching as a whole that its assumed appearance in 1 Cor. xv. 24 and

to note that Paul conceives of the present Christian state on so high a plane, that nothing less or lower than the absolute state of the eternal consummate kingdom appears worthy to be its sequel. To represent it as followed by some intermediate condition falling short of the perfect heavenly life would be in the nature of an anti-climax.

More and more it begins to be recognized that according to the Apostle's teaching the Christian life is semi-eschatological. It partakes in principle of the powers and privileges of the world to come. The most fundamental way of affirming this is by ascribing to the Christian a "spiritual" state of existence, for the *πνεῦμα* is the characteristic element of the heavenly life of the *αἰῶν μέλλον*. The principle in question has nothing to do with the nearness or remoteness of what we call the second coming of our Lord. It is not chronological contiguity, but causal nexus and identity of religious privilege that most closely link together the present and the life of eternity. Along many lines the influence of this idea as determinative of the Apostle's thought can be clearly shown. We must not forget that in the Apostle's view the resurrection, an integral part of the eschatological process, had already taken place in principle, viz., in the resurrection of Christ. Christ was the "first-fruits" of the resurrection that belongs to the end. And, though not as regards the body, yet as regards the spirit, this resurrection of Christ as a beginning of eternal life, already works in believers. The Christian has in principle been raised with Christ. And as the resurrection is anticipated in the springing up of new life in the believer, so the other great eschatological act, the judgment is in a sense anticipated in justification, since the latter partakes of all the comprehensiveness and absoluteness that pertain to the final sentence of God in the last

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Phil. iii. has been construed by some writers as *prima facie* evidence of the interpolated character of the former passage (So Michelsen, *Theol. Tydschr.* 1877, pp. 215-221 and Bruins, *ibid.* 1892, pp. 381-415) and of spuriousness of the Epistle to the Philippians (So Hoekstra, *Theol. Tydschr.* 1875, pp. 442-450).

day. Even the death of Christ means to Paul, among other things, the judgment in that more realistic Old Testament sense of the destruction of the powers arrayed against God, and in so far is another act of the eschatological drama already performed.<sup>12</sup> The idea of *σωτηρία* is with Paul originally an eschatological idea: it denotes salvation in the day of judgment, salvation from the wrath to come, and from this it is transferred to the present state, inasmuch as the believer receives this immunity, this deliverance in principle now.<sup>13</sup> It is thus of the very essence of salvation that it correlates the Christian's standing with the great issues of the last day and the world to come. Hence also the *καινή κτίσις* spoken of in 2 Cor. v. 17, undoubtedly means to the Apostle the personal beginning of that world-renewal in which all eschatology culminates: "If any one is in Christ, he is a new creation".

The point we wish to emphasize in all this is, that Paul throughout represents the present Christian life as so directly leading up to, so thoroughly pre-fashioning the life of the eternal world, that the assumption of a *tertium quid* separating the one from the other must be regarded as destructive of the inner organism of his eschatology. For it will be observed that what the Christian life anticipates is according to the above survey, in each case something of an absolute nature, something pertaining to the consummate state. No matter with what concrete elements or colors the conception of a Chiliastic state may be filled out, to a mind thus nourished upon the first-fruits of eternal life itself, it can, for the very reason that it must fall short of eternal life, have neither significance nor attraction.

Still such general considerations do not absolve us from the duty of testing the exegetical evidence adduced in support of the view in question. There are not lacking those who fully agree with us as to the general structure of the

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Col. ii. 15; Rom. viii. 3; 1 Cor. ii. 6, where notice the Partic. Pres. *καταργουμένων*: the rulers of this world are already coming to nought.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. 1 Thess. v. 9; Rom. v. 9.

Pauline eschatology but who, on exegetical grounds, feel constrained to assume that by the introduction of a Chiliastic element the Apostle has involved himself in a palpable contradiction. The passages in which Chiliasm has been found are chiefly four, 1 Cor. xv. 23-28; 1 Thess. iv. 13-18; 2 Thess. i. 5-12; and Phil. iii. 10-14. We will examine these in succession. In connection with the passage in 1 Corinthians the argument for the Chiliastic interpretation may be briefly stated as follows: It is urged, first of all, that in the statement of vs. 22 "As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive", the πάντες must be taken without restriction, of all men: "As in Adam all men die, so also in Christ all men shall be made alive". This necessitates, it is further said, since οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ of vs. 23 does not exhaust the πάντες, the assumption that vs. 24 speaks of a subsequent stage in the resurrection. The words εἶτα τὸ τέλος are therefore taken to mean: "Then comes the end (the final stage) of the resurrection". It is with reference to these successive stages that the Apostle writes in vs. 23: "Each in his own order". There are two orders, τάγματα: *first* those that are Christ's at His Parousia, *secondly* the end of the resurrection (that is the raising of the remainder of men) when He delivers up the kingdom to God, even the Father. And, as in the first statement the words "at his Parousia" are added to designate the time when this first act will occur, so in the second the words "when he delivers up the kingdom" are added to fix the point of time for the last act.

The first resurrection takes place at the Parousia, the second when Christ abdicates His kingdom. This, of course, involves that the two points of time referred to do not coincide but are separated by an interval of shorter or longer duration. Just as between the ἀπαρχὴ Χριστός and the ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ there lies a period marked by ἔπειτα, so between ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ and τὸ τέλος Paul places a period and marks this by εἶτα (εἶτα τὸ τέλος.). That there are three successive acts to be distinguished in the resurrection, follows also, it is believed, from the use of the

term *τάγμα* "each in his own *τάγμα*". This distributive way of speaking implies that there is more than one *τάγμα*, and, since Christ in His resurrection stands alone and cannot form a *τάγμα* by Himself, it is plain that there must be two *τάγματα* besides Him. The one is the *τάγμα* of those that are Christ's at His coming, the other the *τάγμα* at the end. That the time elapsing between the resurrection of believers and the final resurrection must be a protracted period is said to be implied by the second *ὅταν* in vs. 24. The first *ὅταν* merely names in the Present Subjunctive the *point* of time *when* the final resurrection takes place, *ὅταν παραδιδῶ τὴν βασιλείαν τῷ θεῷ* "when he *delivers* up the kingdom to God"; the second *ὅταν* names in the Aorist Subjunctive the *period after* which the final resurrection will occur, *ὅταν κατηργήσῃ πᾶσαν ἀρχήν* "when he *shall have abolished* all rule." In other words Paul not merely implies that there will be a period between the resurrection of believers and that of the others, but also conceives of this period as the kingdom of Christ specifically, in distinction from the kingdom of God, which is to follow after, and he moreover affirms that this specific future, inter-resurrection kingdom of Christ will have for its concrete content the progressive subjugation of the enemies described as *ἀρχαί*, *ἐξουσίαι* and *δυνάμεις*.

Having now the proposed exegesis before us we perceive at a glance, that it seems to commend itself by that most popular of credentials, surface simplicity. But, as is frequently the case, the difficulties lie beneath the surface. To begin with the argument derived from *πάντες* in vs. 22. There is an insurmountable obstacle to understanding this of "all men" in the fact that the *ζωοποιεῖσθαι* of the *πάντες* is represented as taking place *ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ*. How can this apply to the second resurrection at the end? There are two answers offered us, but they are both equally unacceptable on the basis of the general teaching of Paul. The one is that offered by Meyer and Godet. They propose to give to *ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ* such a weakened sense as to make



it equally applicable to the resurrection of the lost and of believers. Thus Meyer interprets the phrase in question to mean that "in Christ lies the ground and cause why at the final historical completion of His redemptive work death . . . shall be removed again and all shall be made alive." And Godet asks: "May it not be said of those who shall rise to condemnation, that they also shall rise in Christ? . . . The Saviour having once appeared, it is on their relation to Him that the lot of all depends for weal or woe; it is this relation consequently which determines their return to life, either to glory or to condemnation." We submit that this is an utterly un-Pauline interpretation of the phrase *ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ*. Wherever this occurs in Paul's Epistles it is always meant in the full sense of a soteriological, if not always pneumatic, in-being in Christ. Especially a *ζωοποιεῖν* which takes place in Christ, must needs be mediated by the Spirit, just as the *ἀποθνήσκειν ἐν τῷ Ἀδάμ* implies a real union between him and the *πάντες* who die. This road therefore is impassable. The other way of relieving the difficulty, that after those who are Christ's have been raised, still others shall be raised *ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ*, is to assume that Paul here rises to the height of belief in an *ἀποκατάστασις πάντων* i. e., to the height of absolute universalism. At the second resurrection those will be raised, who at the time of the first resurrection, at the moment of the Parousia, were not yet "of Christ", but in the meantime have been converted and thus become proper subjects of a saving resurrection.<sup>14</sup> But such an assumption, no less than the proposal of Meyer and Godet, is too palpably inconsistent with the most explicit teaching of the Apostle elsewhere to deserve serious consideration. The eternal destruction of the wicked is taught not only in the earlier epistles but in this very same epistle to the Corinthians and in the later letters, so that the difference cannot be placed to the account of a development in Paul's mind in

<sup>14</sup> This is the view of Grimm, *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1873, pp. 380-411, and of Schmiedel, *Handkommentar*, II, p. 196.



the direction of universalism. Nor do the words *ἵνα ἢ ὁ θεὸς πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν* in vs. 28 require an absolutely universalistic interpretation. For these words refer to the bringing to nought of the enemies spoken of in vss. 24, 25 of whom the last is death. These enemies are designated *ἀρχαί, ἐξουσίαι, δυνάμεις, θάνατος*. They prevent until the end that God should be *τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν*, that is, they interfere with the complete victorious sway of God over the universe; *ἐν πᾶσιν* is neuter "in all things" = "in the universe". Full justice is done to these words when we interpret them of the breaking of the power of these enemies in the world. To be sure, it might be replied that, so long as any wicked men remain, the power of these superhuman enemies is not wholly broken, because the very existence of moral evil in part of mankind would prove its continuance; and that therefore, although *ἐν πᾶσιν* be neuter, and do not affirm directly the conversion of all men, yet indirectly the unqualified subjection of the universe to God, and the total *καταργεῖσθαι* of these powers warrant the same conclusion. In answer to this we would say that, if the phrase *τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν* is to be pressed to this extent, then Paul must have combined with it the idea either of the conversion or of the extinction of the superhuman enemies of God also. If moral evil cannot continue to exist in man, no more can it continue to exist outside of man. In the passage before us, however, the Apostle does not speak of either the conversion or the extinction of these spirit-forces, but simply of their *καταργεῖσθαι*. This word means not, as a rule, to reduce to non-existence but to render inoperative, to strip of power, *ἀεργὸν ποιεῖσθαι*.<sup>15</sup> And in the case of *ὁ θάνατος* we have a concrete example of how it is meant. *Ὁ θάνατος καταργεῖται* when death is no longer permitted to slay men. This will happen no more after the resurrection. Assuming that *ὁ θάνατος* is not a mere personification but a real daemon-power, one of a genus divided into *ἀρχαί, ἐξουσίαι, δυνάμεις*, and assuming that as such Death is assigned to

<sup>15</sup> Cf. 2 Thess. ii. 8; 1 Cor. i. 28; ii. 6; Hebr. ii. 14.

eternal condemnation, there would be nothing inconsistent in all this with the state of the universe in which God is *τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν*. And, assuming still further that the wicked of mankind are likewise given up by God to eternal perdition; there is nothing inconsistent in their continuing evil either with the *καταργεῖσθαι* of death or with the *εἶναι τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν* of God. In the Apocalypse it is said that Death and Hades are to be cast into the lake of fire. Yet nobody infers from this that the Apocalypse teaches absolute universalism.

If these two proposals be unacceptable, what is the true interpretation of "all shall be made alive" in vs. 22? Two possibilities offer themselves. The one is to assume that *πάντες* is qualified by *ἐν τῷ Ἀδάμ* and by *ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ*. Charles believes that this construction is indicated by the position of the words. The rendering according to him should be: "As all who are in Adam die, so all who are in Christ shall be made alive". This is a possible view. For analogies Charles refers to 1 Cor. xv. 18, "Those who fell asleep in Christ were lost"; 1 Thess. iv. 16, "the dead in Christ shall rise first"; Col. i. 4, "your faith in Christ Jesus"; Rom. ix. 3, "accursed from Christ". On this view the whole succeeding context deals avowedly with the resurrection of believers only. It is, of course, quite possible to adopt this construction of the words in vs. 22 and its corollary, that the passage confines itself to the resurrection of believers, without endorsing Charles' further inference that Paul taught a resurrection of believers only. There is, however, still a second way in which the same understanding of the passage may be had, and yet the more usual construction of "in Adam" and "in Christ" retained. For even if construing with the verb, we are quite at liberty to assume that Paul made the mental qualification "all (who were in Adam)"—"all (who are in Christ)". We believe this to be the most plausible interpretation of the verse. What the Apostle means to say is not that there is no exception to the dying in Adam and no exception to the being made alive in

Christ, that it involves all individuals, but simply that there is no variation to the mode of these two processes described as "in Adam", "in Christ". In other words, not the universality of the law, but its absolute restriction to one mode of operation is what is affirmed. Vs. 22 serves to elucidate vs. 21 and in the latter verse the point of the statement is, that both death and resurrection are *through a man*. Consequently in vs. 23 not πάντες by itself but πάντες jointly with "in Adam" and "in Christ" has the emphasis: there is no dying outside of Adam, there is no quickening outside of Christ. With absolute universalism this has nothing to do.

The next point raised was that Paul's use of τάγμα implies two stages in the resurrection separated by an interval. This would seem to be the case if the primary meaning of τάγμα must be adhered to. Primarily it stands for "division", "troupe", "group", being used largely as a military term. "Each in his own division" would then imply that there are two "groups" of the raised at least. Now, it is urged, that Christ could not have been conceived by the Apostle as forming a τάγμα by Himself, that consequently the "divisions" implied must exist apart from Christ, in other words that there must be two resurrections following that of Christ. On this view the ἕκαστος does not include Christ but covers only the πάντες of vs. 22, of whom it is said that they will be made alive "in Christ", which latter affirmation could not, of course, apply to Christ Himself. Against the validity of this argumentation we submit, that it is impossible to exclude Christ from the scope of the ἕκαστος. Christ is the ἀπαρχή and ἀπαρχή stands coördinated with ἕπειτα. No plausible reason can be assigned why Paul should have written the clause "the first-fruits Christ" at all. unless he meant to give Christ a place in the order of the resurrection. On the other hand, if we assume that Christ has a τάγμα the reason why His resurrection is introduced here becomes immediately apparent. Probably the circumstance had been urged against the Apostle's doctrine of the

resurrection, that the resurrection of believers ought to take place immediately after their death, at least with no longer delay than intervened between Christ's death and His resurrection. To this the Apostle replies: "Each in his own order": Christ has a prerogative, He is the ἀπαρχή, the source of the whole process, therefore His resurrection had to follow without delay, but it is only natural that that of the others should be postponed till His coming, precisely because He is the ἀπαρχή. The Apostle, it seems to us, does not use τάγμα with any conscious emphasis upon its primary, military meaning, for ἀπαρχή belongs to a totally different line of figurative representation, that of the first-fruits and the harvest. Obviously the only point of comparison in the use of τάγμα is that of order, sequence of appearance. This leaves it probable that Paul employs the word in its secondary sense of "order": "each in his own order", "each in his own place of succession".<sup>16</sup> This also obviates the difficulty that Christ cannot form a τάγμα by Himself. To adhere to the primary sense of "division" and yet include Christ, would be possible only by throwing strong emphasis on the military meaning of the word, so as to represent Christ as "a host in Himself", forming a τάγμα, an entire division by His own strength. This might fit the rôle Christ plays in the eschatological process, since in the sequel also He appears as the conqueror over God's enemies. But, as already observed, it is not favored by the characterization of Christ as ἀπαρχή rather than as ἀρχηγός or some such term. And it certainly does not fit the case of those who form the other τάγμα, for believers in their resurrection do not appear in any military capacity.

If then τάγμα be given the sense of "order", "rank", and Christ comes in the first τάγμα, every necessity falls away for inferring from the mode of statement, that there must be a further τάγμα besides that of Christ and that of be-

<sup>16</sup> Cf. 1 Clem xxxvii. 3 Οὐ πάντες εἰσὶν ἑπαρχοὶ οὐδὲ χιλιάρχοι οὐδὲ ἐκατόνταρχοι οὐδὲ πεντηκόνταρχοι οὐδὲ τὸ καθεξῆς, ἀλλ' ἕκαστος ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ τάγματι τὰ ἐπιτασσόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τῶν ἡγουμένων ἐπιτελεῖ. Here τάγμα = "rank", "position".

lievers, and consequently for finding here the doctrine of a double resurrection, before and after the Millennium.

Much is made of the argument that *εἴτα* at the beginning of vs. 24 proves an interval between the Parousia and "the end". It must be granted that *εἴτα* would be entirely in place, if the Apostle had meant to express such a thought. The contention of Titius, that in that case *ἐπειτα* ought to have been repeated is not borne out by analogy. But it is not true that *εἴτα* is out of place on the other view, *viz.*, if Paul means to affirm mere succession without any protracted interval. *Ἐπειτα* can be used just as well as *τότε* to denote momentary sequence of action, as will be seen from a comparison of vss. 5, 6, 7 in this same chapter, Jno. xiii. 4, 5; xix. 26, 27. Of course a brief interval, in logical conception at least, must be assumed; *τὸ τέλος* comes, strictly speaking, after the rising of *οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*.

The absolute phrase *τὸ τέλος* does not favor the view that "the end of the resurrection" is meant by it. In its absoluteness the simple *τὸ τέλος* is too weighty for this: it must have a more comprehensive meaning. To interpret it of the end of the present aeon is scarcely admissible, for that coincides with the Parousia and by means of *εἴτα* "the end" is represented as a step subsequent to the Parousia. We have the choice between taking it in its strict teleological signification as "the goal" to which the whole process of redemption has been moving, or, if the time-element be retained, understanding it of "the close" of the great eschatological events, which lead over from this aeon into the coming one. The latter is favored by the time-sense of *ὅταν* and the clauses which this conjunction introduces. That which forms as it were the concrete content of the *τέλος* is the giving up of the kingship by Christ to God, the Father. And this "giving up" is nothing else but the culminating result of the eschatological process of subduing the enemies, whence also the second *ὅταν* describes it as taking place after these enemies have been all reduced to subjection. Taking *τέλος* in this sense as marking the con-



summation-point of Christ's eschatological reign, we cannot find in it the proof for a millennium, which it would contain, if it meant "the end of the resurrection". But the question remains, where Paul makes this eschatological reign of Christ, which comes to a close after the resurrection of believers, begin. It is on the answer to this question that the understanding of *εἴτα*, which in itself may mean sequence with or without a chronological interval, in the present case depends. If Paul made this reign of Christ begin at the Parousia then there must be a period between the Parousia and *τὸ τέλος* because the beginning and the end of a thing must be separated in time. If on the other hand the reign dates from a point back of the Parousia, then the *τέλος* of it can follow close upon the Parousia. Here the second *ὅταν*-clause might help us to a decision. It affirms that the giving up of the kingdom will happen after Christ has brought to nought the various powers enumerated. The question resolves itself into this: Is there anything in the conception of these hostile powers and of their subjection which compels us to think of Christ's warfare against and conquest of them as not antedating the Parousia? Plainly the conquest is of such a nature that it covers a period of some duration; this is implied in the *ἄχρῃς οὖ* and in "the last enemy". But the question is, where we shall make the period begin, at the Parousia or at some earlier point. *Ὅταν* is retrospective, but the point to which the retrospect extends is uncertain. All we can say is, that there is nothing in the words of the passage itself, or in Paul's general teaching to hinder us in dating this period of eschatological conquest from the Saviour's death and resurrection. Paul regards these last-named events in an eschatological light. In Col. ii. 15 he speaks of the conquest of the *ἀρχαί* and *ἐξουσίαι* as having been in principle accomplished in the cross of Christ. In Rom. viii. 38, 39 he assumes that even now Christ so reigns over and controls death and life and principalities and powers, that nothing is able any longer to separate believers from the love of God in Him.



But, while the words of the second ὅταν-clause will fit into either view, this clause, when taken in connection with the statement of vs. 26, positively favors an earlier beginning of the kingdom of Christ than at the Parousia. "The last enemy that is brought to nought is Death". The conquering of the other enemies, and consequently the reign of Christ, which consists in this, precedes the conquest of Death. Now Paul makes the conquest of Death coincide with the Parousia and the resurrection of believers. According to vss. 50-58, when the dead are raised incorruptible, and the living are changed, (*i. e.* according to vs. 23 at the Parousia) Death is swallowed up in victory. And still further, apart from this specific argument derived from the swallowing up of Death in victory at the Parousia, a more general argument can be built on vss. 50-58, because the resurrection of the righteous and the very last "end" must fall together. In vss. 50-58 the Apostle speaks throughout in terms of absolute consummation. When the righteous dead are raised, this is the moment of their inheriting "the kingdom of God", vs. 50. Notice that the Apostle does not say "the kingdom of Christ", as he ought to have said according to the Chiliastic exegesis of vss. 24-28, for this exegesis makes Paul distinguish between a kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of God in this way, that the former extends from the Parousia till "the end", the latter begins with "the end". Vs. 50 proves that the kingdom of God begins with the Parousia and the resurrection of the righteous, therefore the kingdom of Christ must, so far as it is chronologically distinguished from the kingdom of God, lie before the Parousia; it begins, as already stated, with Christ's own resurrection. This also follows from the equivalence of the *κυριότης* of Christ and the *βασιλεία* of Christ. The *κυριότης* begins with the resurrection of the Saviour, therefore His *βασιλεία* cannot begin at a later point. Phil. ii. 9-11 connects with the exaltation of Christ to the *κυριότης*, the same things that 1 Cor. xv. 24-28 connects with His reign as king. The trump blown for the resurrection of

the righteous is according to vs. 52 "the last trump", which excludes the prospect of any further crisis. Elsewhere also the Apostle joins together, as we have seen, the resurrection of believers, the change of the living, and the judgment of the world.<sup>17</sup> Finally, Paul expects that the renewal of the entire creation will accompany the resurrection of the saints, Rom. viii. 18-22. When the creation is delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God, this of itself must mark the consummation of all things and excludes the further activity of enemies, who would still have to be subjected.

Two other passages sometimes quoted as carrying Chiliastic implications are 1 Thess. iv. 13-18, and 2 Thess. i. 5-12. In regard to the former passage, it is argued that the Thessalonians appear to have been doubtful whether those who had died among them would be raised from the dead at the Parousia. But they cannot have been ignorant of or non-believers in the resurrection of the saints as such, since this latter doctrine holds a central place in Paul's gospel, and he must have preached it to them emphatically. They could not have been Christians without knowing and accepting it. The situation, it is believed, becomes conceivable only, if we understand the doubt or unbelief of the Thessalonians to have had reference not to the resurrection of believers in general, but to the question whether the departed believers would have a resurrection of their own at the Parousia to enable them to share in the provisional kingdom of Christ together with those whom the Lord would find alive at His coming, or whether they would have to wait for their resurrection and glory until the end of this kingdom. It was to them not a question of resurrection or non-resurrection, but a question of earlier or later, and on this question of earlier or later hinged the question of sharing in or missing the blessedness of the millennial kingdom. And that such was the real situation, it is urged, follows not merely from the impossibility of otherwise conceiving it,

<sup>17</sup> Cf. 1 Thess. ii. 19; 2 Thess. i. 7; 1 Cor. i. 7, 8; 2 Tim. iv. 1.

but also from the manner in which Paul meets it. He does not affirm in general that there is a resurrection of the dead as he does in 1 Cor. xv., but says "those that are fallen asleep, God will through Jesus bring with him". And "we that are alive, that are left unto the coming of the Lord, shall in no wise *precede* them that are fallen asleep". The use of the verb *πρᾶναι* "precede" is taken as proof that the question was a question of precedence. Paul denies the precedence in the peculiar form in which the Thessalonians had imagined it. There will be no earlier or later as regards believers, no discrimination between living and dead as to share in the provisional Messianic kingdom. All will be brought by God to be with Jesus at His coming. But, while denying this, and in the very act of denying this, Paul implies that the general scheme of the resurrection admitted of the possibility of doubt on this point, because there is room for precedence, there are successive stages in it, there will be a dual resurrection, one at the Parousia, another at the close of Christ's millennial reign. The Apostle virtually assures the Thessalonians that their dead will be at the first meeting of the saints with Christ, which distinctly presupposes that there will be a second meeting at a later point.

Here as in the case of 1 Cor. xv. the argument seems to be a very plausible and convincing one. But, when we look more closely at the actual words of the passage, the matter becomes somewhat more complicated and considerably less certain. First of all it should be observed that not much can be built on the *a priori* assumption of the impossibility of the Thessalonians' doubting the resurrection as such after the preaching of Paul. To the Church in Corinth Paul had also preached the resurrection, still some of the members of that church were disbelievers of the doctrine. It is true the doubt of the Thessalonians, if it existed, must have been of a different character, more naïve, less theoretical than that of the Corinthians, otherwise Paul would have met it systematically as he does in 1 Cor. xv. But, if theoretical reasons made the Corinthians skeptical, notwithstanding the explicit

preaching of Paul, then some more primitive or instinctive form of the same Hellenic unbelief may have kept the Thessalonians from assimilating this part of Paul's gospel, of course in a more innocent way, for Paul does not blame, he simply comforts and reassures them. It is not *a priori* impossible that there were those among the Thessalonians who believed the glory of the end to be destined for those only who would be living at the coming of Christ and expected nothing for the dead, neither at the Parousia nor thereafter, neither in the body nor as to the spirit,—in a word, who judged of the dead after a pagan, Hellenic fashion, while taking a Christian view of those whom Christ at His coming would find living in the body.

But the decisive question is: What does the passage itself imply? The very words in which the Apostle introduces the subject seem to us to make it plain that the Thessalonians did not take into account, as a ground for relative disappointment, or relative comfort, a resurrection of their dead at a point later than the Parousia, separated from the latter by an intervening reign of Christ. Vs. 13 indicates that the readers were given to sorrowing over their dead as the pagans do who have no hope. The question has been raised, it is true, whether this necessarily means that they sorrowed for the same reason for which the pagans sorrow, *viz.*, that they had no hope whatever, not even of ultimate belated resurrection, or whether justice be not done to the words when we merely make them mean, that the Thessalonians sorrowed in the same excessive manner as the Gentiles do, although each for a different reason, the Gentiles because they have no hope, the Thessalonians because they feared that their dead would not return to life until after the Messianic reign of Christ, with all its possibilities for enjoyment, was hopelessly past. It has been argued that Paul distinguishes the case of the Thessalonians from that of the *λοιποί*; the *λοιποί* are *οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα*; they, therefore, must be *ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα*; consequently Paul does not class them with disbelievers concerning the resurrection; the manner or

excess of their sorrow only was the same as that of the pagans, not the reason was the same. This argumentation, however, overlooks the fact that the *ἐλπίδα ἔχειν*, which certainly is implied with reference to the readers, is not an *ἐλπίδα ἔχειν* in their subjective consciousness, but in the objective conviction of Paul. The Apostle does not mean to say: You need not *have* sorrowed, because you *knew* you had hope. What he means to say is: You *need* not sorrow, because I know there is hope for you. These words, therefore, do not help us in any way to determine the subjective state of mind of the Thessalonians, whether they doubted merely the raising of their dead at the Parousia or the raising of their dead at any time. Decisive, however, are the following considerations: (1) The *καί* before *οἱ λοιποί* indicates that the Thessalonians in their own mind *also* belonged to the class of those who had no hope; if the mere manner or degree of sorrowing formed the point of comparison, Paul would have written *καθὼς οἱ λοιποί*. (2) The way in which Paul explains himself in vs. 14 shows how he conceived of the subjective state of mind of the Thessalonians. It will be noticed that in this verse he really gives two assurances: (a) that the *κοιμηθέντες* will be raised; (b) that they will be brought by God into the presence of Jesus at the Parousia. This sounds as if both points had been in doubt. If only the latter had been in doubt, Paul would have said: The resurrection will take place not later but at the Parousia. What he says is: There will be a resurrection of the dead, and the dead will be present at the Parousia. Especially the protasis of vs. 14, "For if we believe that Jesus died and rose" make this very clear, because logically it requires the apodosis: "then also those that are fallen asleep will rise in Christ". That Jesus rose Paul would not have mentioned at all, if there had not been doubt concerning the fact of the resurrection. The apodosis which Paul actually wrote does not show our point so clearly, because it contracts into a single clause two distinct propositions: *ὁ θεὸς τοὺς κοιμηθέντας ἐγερεῖ διὰ τοῦ*



Ἰησοῦ and ὁ θεὸς τοὺς κοιμηθέντας ἄξει σὺν αὐτῷ. (3)

If the Thessalonians had been merely concerned about a belated participation of their dead in the blessings of the future, and Paul had wished to call attention to the relative hopefulness of even this state of mind as contrasted with the utter hopelessness of the pagan attitude on the subject, then the Apostle would as a matter of fact have given the Thessalonians two distinct grounds of comfort; in the *first* place that even so their doubt did not call for such excessive sorrow, since they themselves continued to believe in an ultimate resurrection; in the *second* place that the actual situation was far better than they imagined, since they could count on an immediate resurrection coinciding with the Parousia. But in reality there is no trace that Paul had two such distinct thoughts in mind; vs. 14 by means of γάρ attaches itself to vs. 13, but it makes no reflection upon the main thought which would according to the Chiliastic exegesis find expression in vs. 13, viz., that the Thessalonians had at any rate the final resurrection to fall back upon.

On the ground of these three considerations it may be confidently affirmed that the sorrow of the Thessalonians had no Chiliastic background, but was caused by more fundamental misconceptions. Still this yields no more than a negative result. It cannot be proved from their state of mind that they were Chiliasts and that Paul had taught them such doctrine. Notwithstanding this the possibility exists that in the answer which Paul gives in order to instruct or relieve them, there might be Chiliastic implications. The general doubt of the Thessalonians, whether their dead would be present at the Parousia, Paul might have met in the more precise form of implying that they would not only participate in the resurrection but would obtain a first resurrection restricted to believers. In other words, the writing of this very passage might have been the first occasion on which Paul broached the subject of the provisional kingdom to the Thessalonian converts. This brings us to



the question how the *φθάσωμεν* in vs. 15 is to be understood. The verb expresses the thought of arriving earlier at the goal than somebody else. How is this to be understood in the connection? Did Paul have in mind when he used this figure that there were two distinct arrivals at the presence of the Lord and at the resurrection-state, the earlier and the later, and does he assure the Thessalonians that those who remained alive would not have the earlier one and the dead in Christ only the later of these two arrivals? In that case the background is that of Chiliasm with its double resurrection. Or did Paul simply employ the figure to assure the readers that in gaining the presence of the Lord the dead would not be *a moment* behind the living? In that case the representation has nothing to do with Chiliasm. It seems to us that everything is in favor of the latter exegesis. The Chiliastic scheme distinguishes between two resurrections, but not between two resurrections to glory, so that it really does not explain the mode of expression: those that are left will not anticipate the dead. Of an anticipation in glory the Chiliastic scheme knows only where the first resurrection is confined to the martyrs, and that could not be the case here, since Paul speaks of all the dead in Christ.<sup>18</sup>

In 2 Thess. i. 5-12 there occur two expressions which have been construed in a Chiliastic sense. In vss. 5ff. the Apostle says that the persecutions and afflictions which the

<sup>18</sup> It is a question in dispute which will probably never be settled to satisfaction how much of vss. 15-17 belongs to the *λόγος κυρίου* which Paul quotes and with what degree of literalness it is quoted by him. If we were sure that the words in v. 15 *οἱ περιλειπόμενοι οὐ μὴ φθάσωμεν τοὺς κοιμηθέντας* (with the change, of course, from the 1st to the 3rd person) were literally Christ's words, either orally transmitted or by revelation delivered to Paul, then it would be plain, that to draw the inference of Chiliasm from *φθάσωμεν* would involve not merely the ascription of this doctrine to Paul but likewise to Jesus. But it is scarcely worth while for our present purpose to pursue this any further, because we have no data to determine the extent and the literalness of the quotation. The words of Jesus might merely have affirmed the resurrection of the believing dead at the Parousia, and Paul might have made use of this declaration in an argument with Chiliastic implications.

members of the Church endure are a manifest token of the righteous judgment of God, to the end that they may be counted worthy of the kingdom of God for which they also suffer, since it is a righteous thing with God to recompense affliction to them that afflict the readers and to those that are afflicted rest with Paul at the revelation of the Lord Jesus from heaven. In vs. 11 we have the more general idea, that God may count the Thessalonians worthy of their calling (*κλησις* here in the objective sense = "that to which one is called, as *ἐλπίς* elsewhere). There is, however, nothing in these statements that would go beyond the general thought that suffering and glory, sanctification and inheritance of the kingdom of God are linked together. The persecutions and afflictions of which the former passage speaks are not specifically those of martyrdom, and to think of a separate resurrection for all those that were persecuted and afflicted, would be without analogy. Besides this, the kingdom to which Paul refers is "the kingdom of God" (vs. 5), and this, according to 1 Cor. xv. 24, is the kingdom of the absolute end, not the intermediate kingdom preceding it.<sup>19</sup>

The last passage we must examine as to its bearings on the question of Chiliasm in Paul is Phil. iii. 10-14. The Apostle it is said, here expresses the desire to become conformed into the death of Christ, that is to suffer martyrdom. The motive for this desire is expressed in the words "if by any means I may attain unto the resurrection from the dead". Paul according to this interpretation expected a resurrection in which only those who had died for Christ's sake would share, whereas the others would have to be content with the

<sup>19</sup> Cf. 1 Thess. ii. 12 "to the end that ye should walk worthily of God, who calleth you into his own kingdom and glory". It will be observed that if the passage from 1 Thess. iv. discussed above, and the expressions in 2 Thess. i. both taught Chiliasm, they would disagree as to the type of Chiliasm taught, since the First Epistle implies that all believers who have died share in the resurrection at the Parousia, whereas the Second Epistle would restrict this privilege to those who have endured persecution. This might be construed as a reflection on the genuineness of the Second Epistle.

general resurrection at a later time. This, it will be observed, would yield a conception far more analogous to what Chiliastic interpreters find in the well-known passage of the Apocalypse than the statements of 1 Cor. xv. 22ff, Chiliastically interpreted, for here in Philippians we should actually have the idea that the martyrs receive as a special reward a resurrection preceding that of the others, whereas, according to 1 Cor., all those that are of Christ would at His coming share in the resurrection.<sup>20</sup>

Unfortunately in the Epistle to the Philippians it is more impossible than anywhere else to reconcile the alleged Chiliastic elements with the fundamental structure of the writer's eschatology. According to Chap. iii. 20, 21 Paul makes the Parousia coincident with the change of body not merely for himself but for all: "For our commonwealth is in heaven, from whence also we wait for a Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall fashion anew the body of our humiliation that it may be conformed to the body of his glory, according to the working whereby he is able even to subject all things unto himself". If Paul expected any special privilege for himself and other martyrs as regards the time and order of resurrection it cannot have been in connection with the Parousia. We should then have to assume that he looked forward to an earlier resurrection, perhaps immediately after death. On such a view it would perhaps be

<sup>20</sup> The difference between the Chiliasm found in Apoc. xx. 4 and that found in 1 Cor. xv. 22ff. relates to several other points: The Apocalypse makes the reign of Christ last one thousand years, Paul in 1 Cor. would speak of an indefinitely protracted period. According to the Apocalypse at the close of the one thousand years during which Satan is bound he is let loose again previously to his final conquest by Christ; in 1 Cor. the close of the millennial period signifies the conquering of the last enemy. In the Apocalypse the conflict between Christ and the enemies is concentrated in the crisis at the end, with Paul it would cover the whole period of Christ's kingdom. The millennial reign which according to the Apocalypse would be a reign of peace, Satan being bound, would be a reign of war on the interpretation put on Paul's words. It is usually assumed that the millennial reign of which the Apocalypse is believed to speak, is a reign to be exercised by Christ on earth, the process of which Paul speaks plays itself out in the transcendental sphere.

possible to explain the plural of vss. 20, 21 rhetorically so as not to include Paul himself, and confirmation might be found for that in the first chapter, where "to depart" is equivalent to "being with Christ". Thus at least a degree of consistency could be saved for the Epistle. But even such a modified form of the anticipated-resurrection theory would not be plausible enough to deserve serious consideration. On the one hand it is unnatural to exclude Paul from the *ἡμεῖς* of iii. 20, 21; on the other hand there is nothing in i. 20-24 to suggest that the Apostle conceived of the "being with Christ", to which his death would immediately introduce him, as an embodied life in heaven. It is true the phrase *σὺν κυρίῳ εἶναι* designates in 1 Thess. iv. 17 the presence with Christ in the body after the resurrection, but in that passage it receives its special meaning from the context, as is indicated by the word *οὕτως* "and thus we shall be forever with the Lord". In our passage the *σὺν Χριστῷ εἶναι* does not have its meaning contextually determined in this way. The phrase in itself decides nothing as to the form which the presence with Christ will assume. Nothing hinders and everything favors giving it the same meaning as the *ἐνδημῆσαι πρὸς τὸν Κύριον* of 2 Cor. v. 8.

Another serious objection to the Chiliastic interpretation lies in the expressions of vs. 12. Here Paul speaks of that which would enable him to *καταντᾶν εἰς τὴν ἐξανάστασιν τὴν ἐκ νεκρῶν* as an "apprehending" a "having been made perfect", and denies his having attained to this: "Not that I have already apprehended or am already made perfect: but I press on, if so be that I may apprehend that for which also I was apprehended by Christ Jesus". It is plain from this that the condition on which the Apostle suspends his attaining unto the resurrection cannot be martyrdom, for it would have no sense for him to assure the readers, that he had not yet attained this, nor was as yet in this way made perfect. Some internal process of attainment and perfecting must be referred to. As soon as we understand the words describing the condition of attaining unto the resur-

rection of an internal process, they appear to be identical in meaning with other statements of the Apostle which affirm the causal nexus between suffering here on earth with Christ and glorification with Him hereafter, and in which it is recognized by all that the reference is not to any special privilege granted to a class of believers, but to the general grace of the resurrection-glory in store for all believers.<sup>21</sup>

Now the difficulty arises that on this interpretation Paul seems to make his participation in the resurrection of believers, which elsewhere appears as an assured possession of every Christian, contingent upon a certain process which he is undergoing here on earth. How could he speak, one naturally asks, of his resurrection with the dubiousness implied in the words: "If by any means I might attain unto the resurrection of the dead"? In order to relieve this difficulty Van Hengel in his Commentary on the Epistle proposes the following interpretation.<sup>22</sup> The word *ἐξανάστασις*, he thinks, does not mean here Paul's own resurrection, but is a designation for the time when the Parousia takes place, equivalent to "the hour of the resurrection". Paul would then with a degree of dubiousness express the hope or wish, that, as a result of his striving after conformity with Christ, he might be permitted by God to attain unto, that is to survive until the day of the resurrection. But this is an impossible exegesis for several reasons. Why should Paul call the day of the Parousia by this name "the resurrection from the dead", if he himself wishes or hopes to survive, so that to him personally it would not be a day of resurrection? Going outside of his usual terminology to give it a strange name, he would at least have chosen a name that had some application to his own personal case. And

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Rom. viii. 17 "If so be that we suffer with him, that we may also be glorified with him"; 2 Cor. iv. 10 "Bearing always about in the body the dying of the Lord Jesus, that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest in our mortal flesh"; 2 Tim. ii. 12 "If we suffer, we shall also reign with him."

<sup>22</sup> *Commentarius perpetuus in Ep. Pauli ad Philippenses*, 1838, pp. 234ff.



in the first chapter of the Epistle Paul shows very plainly that survival until the Parousia did no longer at the time of writing appear to him so desirable a thing as to be the supreme goal of his aspiration. He there declares "to depart and be with Christ very far better" than "to abide in the flesh".<sup>23</sup>

We are thus compelled to face the fact that *ἐξανάστασις* means Paul's own resurrection at the Parousia, and that the Apostle represents this by means of *εἷ πως καταντήσω* as in a sense dependent on the outcome of his whole Christian striving and living as it revolved around the apprehension of Christ and the conformation to His death. This may be an unusual representation, but we have no right to declare it impossible. From one point of view, of course, the resurrection was absolutely certain to the Apostle, *viz.*, from the point of view of the divine purpose as reflected in the believer's assurance of salvation. But from another point of view the same resurrection could appear none the less as the ethically and religiously conditioned acme of the believer's progress in grace and conformity to Christ. The best way to make this plain to ourselves is to keep in mind the two-fold attitude in which the Apostle places himself towards the other great eschatological fact, that of the judgment. On the one hand in the doctrine of justification he posits the absolute certainty that this judgment must be one of complete absolution and vindication on the basis of the merit of Christ. On the other hand he looks forward to the final judgment with a strong sense of accountability and fear, such as makes the thought of it a potent factor in his daily conduct. The sanctification of the believer is to him the *sine qua non* of the divine approval in that day. This throws light upon the analogous representation of the resurrection as the goal of a process of ever-growing apprehension and reproduction of Christ. As no one can expect to

<sup>23</sup> Van Hengel thinks that the verb *καταντᾶν* requires the interpretation of "pervenire ad tempus hujus eventi". But he overlooks the fact that the choice of the verb is determined by the figure of "striving", as in the sequel *διώκειν*. It is obviously metaphorical.

stand in the last day who has not practiced holiness in the fear of God, so no one can hope to attain unto the resurrection of life who has not learned to know Christ and the power of His resurrection and fellowship of His sufferings, being conformed unto His death. Such a mode of viewing the resurrection need not do away with the other mode of viewing it as a gift of free grace, bestowed for the sake of the merit of Christ. The first relation in which Paul stands to Christ is expressed in vss. 8, 9: "That I may win Christ and be found in him, not having my own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith". This is the forensic relation of justification and it is fundamental. But this is followed by a second, that of the apprehension of Christ subjectively in sanctification. And that it is not impossible for Paul to represent the resurrection as a goal to be striven after, appears from the fact that he here plainly so represents the present spiritual resurrection, which elsewhere he views quite as much as the bodily resurrection under the aspect of an absolute act or gift of God. The process of "knowing Christ", particularly of "knowing the power of his resurrection", is subject to a *διώκειν* on the Apostle's part. It is at one and the same time a divine grace and a Christian attainment. It is a *γνώσις* in which Paul takes an active part, in which there is place for a *καταλαβεῖν*, just as there is a *καταντᾶν* with reference to the eschatological resurrection. It is not necessary here to explain, and may not be easy to explain in the concrete, precisely how the Apostle conceived of this. The only point we desire to make is that if the terms of effort are appropriate terms to be used in connection with the spiritual resurrection, then we have no right to say that *καταντᾶν εἰς* used with *εἰ πως* involves an impossible representation from Paul's point of view as regards the resurrection of the body at the last day. Possibly in vs. 14 "the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus" likewise designates the resurrection-experience or the resurrection-state as something to which God will

call at the end, or as something which lies ready in heaven as the goal to which the believer has been called. Now of this prize Paul affirms that he presses on towards it as towards a goal, and of all mature Christians (τέλειοι) he expects that they will be "thus minded", that is assume the same attitude of pursuit.

We have completed our exegetical survey, and the conclusion is that in none of the passages adduced in favor of the hypothesis is the alleged Chiliasm borne out by the facts, while in not a few points it is positively irreconcilable with the Apostle's representation. It ought to be remembered, however, that this result of our investigation concerns only the idea of a provisional Messianic kingdom as *future*, strictly eschatological from Paul's own standpoint, beginning with the Parousia of the Lord. The argument in no wise precludes Paul's having regarded the *present* reign of Christ with its semi-eschatological character, beginning with the Saviour's resurrection and exaltation to the *κυριότης* in the light of a provisional kingdom to be succeeded by the absolute kingdom at the Parousia. In point of fact such a representation is found in the passage of 1 Cor. xv., for here we are told in so many words that at "the end" Christ will deliver up the kingdom to God, the Father, which implies plainly a distinction between the kingdom of Christ as a present and the kingdom of God as a future reality. Here then we have a form in which the Apostle has incorporated into his eschatology the idea of the two-fold kingdom, just as in the teaching of our Lord there is something analogous to this idea in the distinction between the present kingdom and the eschatological kingdom. And it will be observed that in this form and in this form only is the distinction exempt from the objection we had above to urge against the theory of a future millennial kingdom separating the present state of believers from their absolute consummation in heaven, *viz.*, that it would represent an anti-climax and interpose something where the whole tenor of the Pauline teaching requires absolute continuity. On

our interpretation the Messianic provisional kingdom and the present *σωτηρία* are identical and coextensive, so that what the Christian now possesses and enjoys is the first-fruits and pledge of the life eternal. If a future Messianic kingdom were to be assumed, we should have to say that to the eschatological aspiration of the Christian, as Paul everywhere depicts it, it is a negligible quantity, for this aspiration everywhere fastens, without any intermediate resting-point, on the eternal state. This is immediately explained, if the blessings and joys of the Messianic reign have already arrived, so that the Christian hope can with undivided intensity project itself into the world to come.

On the other hand it cannot be said that Paul carries through this distinction between the kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of God with uniformity. While to a larger extent an eschatological conception with Paul than with Jesus, the kingdom of God is not exclusively so in the Pauline teaching. The Apostle speaks of "inheriting" the kingdom of God, 1 Cor. vi. 9; xv. 50; Gal. v. 21; Eph. v. 5; believers are called to God's kingdom and glory, 1 Thess. ii. 12; they suffer that they may be counted worthy of the kingdom of God, 2 Thess. i. 5, 7. But the kingdom of God also appears as a present reality, thus in Rom. xiv. 17, where it is said not to consist in eating and drinking but in righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit, and in 1 Cor. iv. 20, where its essence is placed not in word, but in power.<sup>24</sup> Here accordingly the kingdom of God and the present reign of Christ are identified. And if the present kingdom can be called the kingdom of God, it is also to be noticed that the future kingdom can be called the kingdom of Christ. This occurs in Eph. v. 5, where Paul speaks of an "inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God", and in 2 Tim. iv. 1, where we read of the *ἐπιφανεῖα* and the *βασιλεία* of the Lord Jesus Christ as coinciding with the judgment. This has been brought into connection with the

<sup>24</sup> Cf. also 1 Cor. iv. 8 and Col. iv. 11.

advanced doctrine of the later Epistles, where Christ is distinctly represented as the goal of the world-movement.<sup>25</sup>

The above observations show that a hard and fast distinction between a Messianic kingdom and the kingdom of God is not found in Paul. Obviously what has invited the distinction in 1 Cor. xv. is the fact that here the reign of Christ appears in one specific aspect, *viz.*, as a reign of conquest. The βασιλεύειν of Christ here virtually consists in the process of subduing one enemy after the other. As such it naturally enters into contrast with the absolute, eternal reign of God at the end, of which it is characteristic that from it all enemies and warfare have been eliminated. It may lend confirmation to this that Col. i. 13, the one passage besides 1 Cor. xv. 24, which explicitly calls the present order of things the kingdom of Christ, has the same militant background: God has delivered us out of the power of darkness and translated us into the kingdom of the Son of His love, although here the conqueror, who rescues from the enemy, is rather God than Christ.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Cf. *Enc. Bibl.* ii, 1386.

<sup>26</sup> If one were to look for analogies to the Pauline conception among the apocalyptic references to the provisional kingdom, the vision of weeks of Enoch could be most easily compared, for here the Messianic period is characterized as "the period of the sword". Of course this is meant in quite a different sense from that which Paul puts upon the warfare of Christ.



## THE SHEPHERD OF HERMAS. APOCALYPSE OR ALLEGORY\*?

A book professedly written for the edification of the church which does not contain the word Jesus, or Christ, or gospel, or baptism; which makes no mention of our Lord's birth, baptism, death, or resurrection, or of the Lord's Day; which moreover does not quote a single saying of the Lord's nor indeed from a single book either of the Old or the New Testament may well occasion surprise; and we may have sympathy with those who would doubt its Christian origin.<sup>1</sup> But when it is affirmed that such a work not only is Christian, but also was at one time part of the Christian Scriptures, indeed that it was one of the earliest books to be admitted to this honor, that it was canonical before the Gospels or Epistles, that it is part of the foundation of the New Testament, and that it was ousted from this high position only after a sharp struggle about the end of the second century,<sup>2</sup> the duty of investigating its claims and early history becomes apparent. The work I refer to is the so called *Shepherd* of Hermas, a book which needs no introduction to those of you who have gleaned even lightly in the fields of early Christian literature. Opinions may differ as to its meaning and value for the early Christians or for ourselves, but no one has read it, I venture to say, without being at least im-

\* An address delivered at the opening of the ninety-ninth session of Princeton Theological Seminary, on Friday, September 16, 1910.

<sup>1</sup> Among recent writers Spitta (*Zur Geschichte und Literatur des Urchristentums*. Vol. ii), regards the *Shepherd* of Hermas as a Christian revision of a Jewish work: Von Soden (*Theol. Literaturzeitung*, 1897, Sp. 586), adopts his conclusions with several modifications; Völter (*Die Apostolischen Väter* Vol. I) thinks it springs from a community of Jewish proselytes. For the views of earlier writers see Gebhardt und Harnack, *Patrum Apostolicorum Opera*, Vol. III, p. lxxxiii. n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Leipoldt, *Entstehung des neutestamentlichen Kanons*. Vol. i. pp. 33, 37f., 39, Zusatz 2, 41ff.

pressed with its evident seriousness, entertained with its quaint *naïveté*, and amused with the atmosphere of romance that pervades it all.

If it be taken literally, there can be no doubt that the *Shepherd* claims to be a revelation. The visions, commandments and similitudes, of which it is composed, are said to be given and explained by divine messengers—at one time by the spirit of Hermas' deceased mistress, at others by the Church in the form of a heavenly being, most generally by the angel of repentance, called also the "pastor" or "shepherd" from whom the book takes its name. But is it not possible that we would do the author an injustice by taking his words literally? The allegory has always been a popular literary dress with which to clothe moral and religious truths, and may it not be that the *Shepherd* of Hermas is to be classed with such works as Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, which also, taken literally, would claim to be supernatural, but which we all know to have been the product of the brain and the pen of John Bunyan the tinker in Bedford jail? This then is the question which I propose for our consideration this morning: Is the *Shepherd* of Hermas an apocalypse or an allegory?

Nor do I need to apologize for choosing what may appear to some of you an unimportant and petty problem in the history of the church. It is not such. Its solution will affect considerably our estimate of the church of the second century, especially in respect to its literary activity, its dogmatic conceptions, and the part played in it by Christian prophecy. Moreover it has a direct bearing on the question of the origin and growth of the New Testament Canon. For there is a number of scholars to-day who affirm that the idea of a New Testament Canon as we now have it does not appear in the church until toward the end of the second century: that up to that time the Old Testament (including the Apocrypha and Jewish Apocalypses) had been the "Bible" of the church, and the words of the Lord and the

utterances of Christian prophets had been closely associated with it as authoritative; that this condition continued until about the close of the second century, when, out of the struggle with Gnosticism and Montanism the church emerged with a new standard of canonicity namely *apostolicity*.<sup>3</sup> That is to say it is asserted that Christian prophecies even when reduced to writing were regarded as authoritative in the church just because they were prophecies and without any regard to their date or the person of the prophets, and this continued until the exigencies of the church demanded that a new test be erected, at which time those prophecies which had hitherto been regarded as authoritative were deposed from their high dignity unless they could establish a claim to apostolic origin.<sup>4</sup>

The Shepherd of Hermas has always played a part in the discussion attending this theory for it is one of the so called prophecies which are said to have been degraded, but it has not, I think, played the part it should have or will when its unique position is understood. For not only can its date be approximately fixed in the first half of the second century, but it is the only one of the so-called prophecies which does not claim for itself apostolic origin. In connection with its history therefore, can the test of prophecy versus apostolicity in the middle and third quarter of the second century be brought to the clearest issue. If it be found that the book was published and accepted as a prophecy, we shall be able to tell from the nature of the reception accorded it what the opinion of the church then was regarding contemporaneous Christian prophecy. And if on the contrary it turns out that it was not published or accepted as a prophecy, the main problem will be to ascertain how such a work could in the course of say forty years claim equal rank with acknowledged inspired and authoritative books; and we shall incidentally have removed from the

<sup>3</sup> E. g. Leopoldt, *loc. cit.* Harnack *Hist. of Dogma*, Third ed. Eng. Trans. II. 38-66, *Das Neue Testament um 200*. B. Weiss *Einleitung in das Neue Testament*, 3 Aufl. Sec. 5, 4, n. 1; 8, 5; 9, 6.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. Trans. II. 47, n. 2.

discussion the only work, which at present can be pointed to in support of the theory that Christian prophecy *qua* prophecy, was authoritative in the second century.

I hope then that you see clearly what I propose to do. It is to examine the *Shepherd* of Hermas and its early history with a view to determining the author's intention regarding it, the nature of its reception and treatment by the early church, and how and why it is involved in the history of the canon of the New Testament.

It is strange that this subject has been comparatively neglected. The text of the *Shepherd* has recently received very careful attention, the questions of its origin and unity and date have been, and are still, warmly debated, and the material furnished by it is liberally drawn upon by all students of the early Christian church. But the question of the intention of the author in publishing his work in the form of an apocalypse has been on the whole much neglected. Most writers to-day seem to assume that its author and his contemporaries ingenuously believed that he had been the recipient of real and divine revelations. But little or no discussion is given to the matter. For the sake of completeness I shall enumerate the four hypotheses which to my mind exhaust the possibilities, any one of which might be regarded as satisfactory; and I may add that each of them has had its supporters. (1) The work may be regarded as a genuine revelation. This is the view taken by Wake<sup>5</sup> and some Irvingite scholars<sup>6</sup> in modern times. (2) It may be regarded as a deliberate though pious fraud.<sup>7</sup> (3) The visions and revelations may be regarded

<sup>5</sup> *Apostolical Fathers*, p. 187.

<sup>6</sup> E. g. Thiersch, *Die Kirche im Apostolischen Zeitalter*, p. 350ff.

<sup>7</sup> So apparently Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur* (1902), Vol. I. p. 563, "Der Verfasser schreibt auf Grund göttlicher Offenbarungen und infolge göttlichen Auftrags. Er tritt als ein vom Geiste Gottes inspirierter Prophet auf. Ohne Zweifel hat er damit seinen Mahnungen und Mitteilungen eine grössere Kraft, eine höhere Weihe geben wollen. Dass er Anstoss erregen würde, war kaum zu befürchten. Er schrieb zu einer Zeit, wo der Glaube an die Fortdauer des prophetischen Charismas noch Allgemein geteilt wurde".

as purely subjective. In this case Hermas may be regarded as a mystic, or a visionary, or epileptic, or be classed in a general way with the "prophets" of the second century, without inquiring particularly about the psychology of such "prophecy". Some such explanation as this is quite possible, being not infrequently paralleled in history, and we must give it the more consideration as it is the view most generally accepted by scholars to-day.<sup>8</sup> (4) We may regard it as fiction, pure and simple, and the visions and heavenly commands as a literary garb deliberately chosen by the author without any intention of deceit; in other words it may be an allegory.<sup>9</sup> Of these four possibilities we may dismiss the second with few words. The whole work bears such a stamp of artless simplicity, the author is so palpably straightforward and honest, that the charge of deliberate fraud should only be made on the basis of far stronger evidence than has yet been adduced, and after all other hypotheses have been shown to be insufficient. Moreover, as the first and third of the possible solutions mentioned above have certain points of contact and in the minds of some cannot be sharply sundered, we may state

Mosheim, *De rebus Christ. ante Constant.*, pp. 163, 166 inclines to a view of Hermas which makes him "*scientem volentemque fefellisse*".

Salmon, *Dict. Chr. Bio.*, Art. "Hermas", thinks Hermas "probably cannot be cleared from conscious deceit".

<sup>8</sup> Bigg, *Origins of Christianity*, p. 73f. Zahn (*Der Hirt des Hermas* pp. 365ff.) perceives the importance of the problem and laments the lack of interest shown in it to-day. He regards the visions as real experiences of the author and thinks the Roman Church was right in seeing in them a divine message, but refuses to discuss the question of their permanent worth (pp. 381f.) . Harnack, *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* III. p. 369, and elsewhere. Overbeck, *Theol. Literaturzeitung*, 1878, sp. 282f. (quoted by Harnack, *ibid.*). Leipoldt, *op. cit.*, p. 33, n. 2, and others.

<sup>9</sup> Donaldson, *The Apostolical Fathers*, p. 326ff. Lightfoot, *Bibl. Essays*, p. 96. Charteris, *Canonicity*, p. xxiv. Behm, *Ueber den Verfasser der Schrift, welche den Titel "Hirt" führt*.

How these views have received modification and been related to varying opinions concerning the date and authorship of the *Shepherd* may be seen in the table furnished by Harnack in Gebhardt und Harnack, *Patrum Apostolicorum Opera*, Fasc. III., p. lxxxiii, n. 2.



our problem in the question: *Is the Shepherd of Hermas an apocalypse or an allegory*,—using the word “apocalypse” as significant, not of the real nature of the contents of the work, but of its claims. And should it appear in the course of our examination that the *Shepherd* does indeed claim to be a revelation, then, and not till then, will emerge the question of the justification of such a claim. A full answer to this question, of course, demands a careful examination of both the contents of the work and its history. But our time is so limited to-day, that I shall confine myself just now to the latter part of the argument, and reserve the other for perhaps some other time. I shall therefore ask you now to follow me as I outline to you what we know of the publication of the *Shepherd*, of its reception by the Church, and of its fortunes until the end of the second century, or thereabouts.

There is no difficulty about determining the date of the *Shepherd* in a general way. Most scholars agree that it was written somewhere between 97 and 140 A.D., or thereabouts.<sup>10</sup> But when we seek to define the time more accurately, a difficulty presents itself. for we have, curiously, two excellent pieces of testimony, one internal and one external, which are hard to harmonize. In the early part of his work<sup>11</sup> Hermas refers in quite a natural unforced manner to a certain Clement as one to whom had been committed the duty of corresponding with foreign churches, and apparently as one of the presbyters of the church at Rome, of which Hermas was a member. Now there is one Clement well known to all antiquity as the author of the epistle of the Church of Rome to that at Corinth, to whom this seems undoubtedly to point. That would give a date somewhere about 100 A. D. The other piece of evidence is that contained in the so-called *Muratorian Fragment*, which dates from about the end of the second

<sup>10</sup> For the few who go outside these limits, see the table referred to in note 9.

<sup>11</sup> *Vis.* ii., 1.

century. This informs us that the *Shepherd* was written "very recently, in our own times," during the episcopate of Pius of Rome, by Pius's brother Hermas. This would give a date about 150 A. D.

Until quite recently scholars have been divided according as the first or the second of these testimonies seemed to them the more weighty, and ingenious conjectures have been proposed for explaining away the rejected evidence.<sup>12</sup> Lately, however, as an outcome of discussion concerning the unity of the work, the opinion has gained ground that the *Shepherd* was not produced at one time but piecemeal throughout a number of years. This and the uncertainty both of the date of Clement's death and of the years of Pius' episcopate have made it possible for Prof. Harnack to propose a compromise.<sup>13</sup> He thinks now that this earlier portion of the work was produced about 110 A. D. (possibly in the 3rd year of Trajan) when Clement may still have been living, and that the book was published in its completed form about 135-140 A. D., when Pius may have been bishop of Rome. For our purposes we need not enter into the details of the argument. We shall assume, that which is denied by very few, that the work was in existence in its finished form about the year 135 or 140—always remembering that it may have been known earlier.

Taking this, then, as the date when the *Shepherd* was given to the Church, we ask: how was it received? Remember, it is not a small book; it is about equal in size to our first two gospels together. Nor was it published in a corner, but at the center of the world, in the city of Rome. Such a work as this, if regarded as divinely inspired, must have made a considerable stir, and that immediately, and in the whole Church. And yet there is not one particle of

<sup>12</sup> Zahn, in *Der Hirt des Hermas* and elsewhere, has been strongest defender of the earlier date.

<sup>13</sup> *Geschichte d. altchristlichen Literatur* ii., i. pp. 257ff., where a brief review of the argument and the more important literature may be found.

evidence to show that it was regarded as Scripture or in any sense divine during the 30 or 40 years following its publication. Not until we come down to Irenaeus, the *Muratorian Fragment*, Clement of Alexandria, Origen and Tertullian is it quoted and referred to as Scripture or of divine inspiration. Nor can it be objected that this is merely an argument from silence and so of no cogency. For there were events in Rome at this time, and discussions in the Church concerning authoritative and non-authoritative writings, of which we are well informed, and into which the *Shepherd* undoubtedly would have been drawn had it occupied the exalted position that is claimed for it. The result is the same wherever we look—not only at Rome but throughout the whole of the Christian literature coming from or dealing with this period, there is not the slightest evidence that the *Shepherd* was regarded as of any special importance.

It was at this time, for instance, that Marcion founded his school at Rome and formed his canon. But in all the discussions about the books he rejected or received, there is no word of the *Shepherd*, although we are informed by Tertullian<sup>14</sup> that he rejected a work now frequently associated with it in discussions concerning the canon, *viz.*, the Apocalypse of John. This should be decisive alone. If the *Shepherd* were regarded by either party as divinely inspired, it is incomprehensible that it should not have been brought into the controversy by one side or the other.<sup>15</sup> The Gnostic Valentinus was also established in Rome at this time. He accepted all the Catholic Scriptures, as we are informed by Tertullian,<sup>16</sup> and turned them to suit his own ends by means of the allegorical method of interpretation. But there is no sign that he accepted, or so used the *Shepherd*; although its form and contents are admirably

<sup>14</sup> *Adv. Marc.* IV., 5.

<sup>15</sup> Harnack (*Gesch. d. altchrist. Lit.* I. i., p. 51), remarks without comment, and apparently without perceiving the import of his remark: "Bemerkt sei, dass sich bei den Gnostikern und Marcion keine Spur einer Benutzung unseres Buches findet".

<sup>16</sup> *Praescr.* c. 38.

adapted to his methods and results. We know that he so used the Apocalypse of John,<sup>17</sup> but neither Irenaeus, who gives us this information, and who was acquainted with the Shepherd, nor Tertullian, who would not have failed to attack the heretic for making use of a work which he himself regarded as apocryphal and false, contains the slightest indication that Valentinus knew anything about the *Shepherd*. Hegesippus was in Rome at this time—during the episcopate of Anicetus.<sup>18</sup> Unfortunately, the only piece of evidence we have from his pen is the statement preserved by Eusebius to the effect that some of the so-called apocrypha were composed in his (i. e. Hegesippus') day by heretics. And yet even this is important coming as it does through Eusebius, who used all diligence to discover the origin of the books disputed or rejected in his own time—one of which was the Shepherd of Hermas. For, on the one hand, as the Shepherd was certainly not regarded as heretical or apocryphal in the days of Anicetus, it cannot be assumed among those referred to by Hegesippus in this passage; and, on the other hand, as Eusebius records nothing from Hegesippus' writings concerning the *Shepherd*, the probable inference is that he found nothing to record; and this in turn means that, at the time this writer was in Rome, the *Shepherd* was not of sufficient importance to find a place in his memoirs; certainly it was not one of the authoritative books of the Church. Justin Martyr, too, was acquainted with the Rome of this period, and speaks in a general way of prophets being still known in the Church,<sup>19</sup> but in all his writings there is no mention of Hermas or any reference to his book. The answer is the same when we inquire of Celsus, the opponent of Christianity, who probably wrote during the period under review. He shows considerable acquaintance with Christianity and the Christian writings,

<sup>17</sup> Irenaeus, *Haer.* i., 15.

<sup>18</sup> Eusebius, *H. E.* iv, 22.

<sup>19</sup> *Trypho*, c. 82.

but there is no sign of Hermas or his *Shepherd*.<sup>20</sup> Nor does the early history of Montanism, although concerned with prophecy, afford any evidence. It is not until the time of Tertullian that it is brought into the discussion.<sup>21</sup> It is true that a relationship has been found or fancied between the *Shepherd* and the letters of Ignatius,<sup>22</sup> that of Polycarp,<sup>23</sup> the so-called Second Epistle of Clement,<sup>24</sup> the Preaching of Peter,<sup>25</sup> Theophilus of Antioch<sup>26</sup> and Melito of Sardis,<sup>27</sup> but these are mere resemblances<sup>28</sup> and prove at most only acquaintance with it. None of them rises to the rank of citation, much less is there anything to show that the *Shepherd* was regarded as on an equality with the Old Testament or divinely inspired. In short, there is nothing in the literature of this period to show that the *Shepherd* of Hermas commanded any more respect than might be given to any work suitable for edification.<sup>29</sup>

In and after the last quarter of the second century we

<sup>20</sup> A definite reference could hardly be expected. Celsus knows of Christian prophecy in his own time, but the description he gives of it does not tally with the contents of the *Shepherd*. See Origen, *contra Cels.* vi., 34f., vii., 11.

<sup>21</sup> The Anti-montanist of Eusebius (*H. E.*, v., 17), gives a list of those who prophesied under the new covenant. Two names are added to those known in Scripture, but Hermas is not one of them. This writer is later however than the period we are discussing; Bonwetsch (*Art. Montanismus in Herzog, Realencycl.*, third ed.) and McGiffert (*Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers*, Vol. I., p. 233, n. 32), put him about 192 A. D.

<sup>22</sup> Zahn, *Ignatius von Antioch*, pp. 618f.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 620.

<sup>24</sup> Harnack, *Theol. Literaturzeitung*, 1876, Col. 104. Cf. Overbeck, *Ibid.* 1877, Col. 287f.

<sup>25</sup> Hilgenfeld, *Hermae Pastor*, pp. 1f., 35.

<sup>26</sup> Harnack *Patr. Apostol. Op.*, Fasc. iii., note to Vis. 1, 6.

<sup>27</sup> Harnack, *Sitzungsbericht d. Berliner Akademie d. Wissenschaft*, 1898, p. 517ff.

<sup>28</sup> For still more doubtful resemblances to other works, see Gebhardt and Harnack, *Patr. Apostol. Op.*, Fasc. iii., p. xlvf., n. 2.

<sup>29</sup> Leipoldt, *op cit.*, pp. 33ff., p. 38, Zusatz 1, gives the earliest references to the Apocalypses. A convenient list of early citations of the *Shepherd* may be found in Harnack's *Geschichte d. altchristl. Literatur*, I. i., pp. 51ff., and a fuller discussion of them in the various editions of the text, particularly that of Gebhardt and Harnack.



find a change of attitude toward the *Shepherd*. In Gaul Irenaeus quotes it as "Scripture"<sup>30</sup> (γραφή), thus apparently putting it on a par with the other canonical works. And yet scholars are by no means agreed that this is his intention. It is difficult to reconcile Irenaeus' usage elsewhere, and his emphasis upon apostolicity as a prerequisite of canonicity, with such an explanation. It is noted that the *Shepherd* is not named in this quotation,<sup>31</sup> nor is it quoted anywhere else in Irenaeus' works as far as we know them, although some resemblances are found;<sup>32</sup> moreover, when he is confessedly marshalling the scriptural arguments against the Valentinians,<sup>33</sup> though he quotes freely from most of the books of the New Testament (as we know it), he has no reference to, or proof drawn from, the *Shepherd*. In view of these facts some scholars have thought that Irenaeus regarded the book as of apostolic origin,<sup>34</sup> others have supposed that he may have used the term "Scripture" in this place in the general sense of "writing", or that he made a mistake, fancying that the passage he quoted was Scripture;<sup>35</sup> others again are of the opinion that Irenaeus, while not ascribing the same honor to the *Shepherd* as to the prophetic and apostolic writings, regarded it nevertheless as authoritative.<sup>36</sup> It is not necessary for the pur-

<sup>30</sup> *Haer.* IV. 20, 2, quoting *Mand.* I., 1.

<sup>31</sup> It is a possible but not necessary inference that Harnack (*Patr. Apostol. Op.*, Fasc. iii. p. xlv, n. 1, c.) draws from this fact, viz. that the book was so well known that its name might be omitted.

<sup>32</sup> Harnack, *Geschichte d. altchr. Lit.*, I, i., p. 52, gives the following passages: *Haer.* I, 13, 3 = *Mand.* xi, 3; I, 21, 1 = *Mand.* I, 1; II, 30, 9 = *Sim.* IX, 12, 8; *Frag. Gr.* 29 (Harvey II, p. 494) = *Sim.* VIII, 3, 2, and perhaps *Haer.* IV, 30, 1 = *Sim.* I. Cf. Zahn, *Der Hirt des Hermas*, p. 267, n. 2. None of these are more than resemblances.

<sup>33</sup> *Haer.* Book III.

<sup>34</sup> Hilgenfeld, *Apostolische Väter*, p. 180. Zahn, *Geschichte des neutest. Kanons*, i., p. 335.

<sup>35</sup> Donaldson, *The Apostolic Fathers*, p. 319, though not committing himself to this view. Gregory, *Canon and Text of N. T.*, p. 241f. But he treats the evidence too cavalierly.

<sup>36</sup> Harnack, *Geschichte d. altchristl. Literatur*, I, i., p. 52; *Patr. Apostol. Op.*, Fasc. III, p. xlv. A fuller discussion of the matter may be found in this latter place, or, where a different conclusion is reached, in Zahn, *Geschichte d. neutest. Kanons*, I, p. 333f.

poses of this investigation to decide between the merits of these differing views, but I may be allowed to say in passing that neither the view that Irenaeus regarded the *Shepherd* as fully canonical and of apostolic origin, nor that which asserts that he regarded it as authoritative, but not canonical in the strict sense of the word, accounts for the fact that he quotes the *Shepherd* only once when he might have used it many times to his advantage, unless it be assumed that he was not well acquainted with the contents of the work. Again to say that he was mistakenly of the impression that he was quoting from some canonical book is to take refuge in a conjecture which is incapable of proof; and to take *γραφή* in any other than its usual technical sense of "Scripture", while permitted by the usage of this author in a few places,<sup>37</sup> is contrary to general custom of the time, and unsuitable in the passage before us, where the passage from Hermas is used for the purpose of proving a doctrine and inserted between two passages from the Old Testament. All the facts of the case would be accounted for if we might assume that the *Shepherd* had only lately come into Irenaeus' hands, that he regarded it as canonical and of apostolic origin, but had not been able to acquaint himself intimately with its contents.

In North Africa, Tertullian, in his treatise *De oratione*, not only shows acquaintance with the *Shepherd*, but also informs us indirectly that the book was well known in the Church<sup>38</sup> and that some Christians regarded it as normative in matters of devotional conduct. Whether or not he shared their views may not be clear; but certainly he was not concerned to argue the matter at this time.<sup>39</sup> In another work,

<sup>37</sup> *Haer.* III, 6, 4; III, 17, 4; V Preface.

<sup>38</sup> Harnack in *Patr. Apostol. Op.*, Fasc. iii. p. xlviii, n. 1, a. e. agreeing with Zahn (*Gött. Gel. Anz.* 1873, st. 29, s. 1155), concludes that in Tertullian's time the *Shepherd* was known to the North Africans in a Latin Translation. Since then Zahn has changed his opinion and affirms that it was not translated until later, (*Gesch. d. neutest. Kanons* I, 345). Cf. also Harnack, *Das Neue Testament um 200*, p. 87.

<sup>39</sup> Tertullian, *de orat.* 16.

however, after he had been converted to Montanism, and found the *Shepherd* in conflict with his rigoristic views, he calls it "that apocryphal *Shepherd* of adulterers,"<sup>40</sup> and reminds his opponents that it had been condemned as "apocryphal and false by every council of the churches, even your own,"<sup>41</sup> and that the Epistle of Barnabas (the canonical Hebrews) was more received among the churches than it was.<sup>42</sup> It is sometimes said that in the period which elapsed between these two references to the *Shepherd* the attitude of the Church generally toward the work had undergone a change; the first coming from a time when it was universally regarded as authoritative and inspired, the second from a later time when the apocalypses were being excluded from the canon. Such a sweeping inference is, of course, unjustifiable; we cannot say that Tertullian speaks for a larger section of the Church than that with which he was familiar. But we are bound to ascertain, if we can, Tertullian's attitude toward the *Shepherd*, and whether he changed it, and, if so, why. There can be no doubt of his later attitude. He then considered the work "apocryphal and false" and so unworthy of a place in the "divine instrument". We cannot be altogether sure what he meant by "apocryphal" here. The word has been variously understood in different periods. The earliest meaning<sup>43</sup> appears to have been "excluded from public use in the Church," without reference either to origin or contents of the book excluded. Soon, however, it came to denote not the fact but the grounds for such exclusion; that is to say, it stigmatized a work as untrue with respect either

<sup>40</sup> *De pudic.* 20.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>42</sup> Utique receptor apud ecclesias epistola Barnabae illo apocrypho Pastore moechorum, *Ibid.*, 20. I cannot find any justification for Gregory's translation, "Would that the letter of Barnabas were rather received among the churches than that apocryphal *Shepherd* of adulterers" *Canon and Text of the N. T.*, p. 223.

<sup>43</sup> See Zahn, *Geschichte des Neutestamentl. Kanons*, I, p. 125ff. E. Schürer in *Herzog, Realencyclopädie*, Ed. 3, Vol. I, p. 622ff.

to its contents or to its origin<sup>44</sup> or both. But though we know that these several connotations existed in the early centuries, we cannot always be sure in which of them a writer uses the word. It is indeed sufficiently clear, from the opprobrious terms Tertullian heaps up, that he condemns the teaching of the *Shepherd* out and out, but we should like to know whether by "apocryphal" he means to imply that the work is also not what it claims to be with respect to origin; and of this we cannot be certain.

Let us now turn to an examination of the earlier reference. Some of the North Africans apparently regarded it as important to lay aside their cloaks during prayer and to seat themselves afterwards. In justification of the first of these they appealed to 2 Tim. iv. 13, and for the second to the fifth vision of the *Shepherd*. Tertullian treats both customs and both passages appealed to in the same way. Such customs he says are irrational, superstitious, and savor of idolatry, and such an interpretation of Scripture childish, and leads to the foolishest consequences if consistently applied. Now while it is true that this argument says nothing either of the canonicity of Paul's letter or the uncanonicity of the *Shepherd*, still as Tertullian did regard Paul's epistles as canonical, and as the North Africans to whom he was writing seemingly regarded the *Shepherd* as equally authoritative in matters of conduct, it is often affirmed that the African father would not have lost this opportunity to correct the erroneous estimation placed upon the latter, had he been at the time of this writing of the same opinion that he was when he wrote *De pudicitia*. Moreover, it is noted that he here calls the *Shepherd* "*Scriptura*". It is true that he does this also in the later reference, but in that case it is obvious that he does so sarcastically with reference to the attitude of those who would appeal to it, and that he may contrast it with the true

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<sup>44</sup> To Augustine "apocryphal" meant that the origin of a book was "hidden" or unknown, *De civit. Dei*, xv., 23, 4. Harnack, *Patr. Apostol. Op.*, III, p. xlix., n. 1, b., thinks Tertullian uses it with reference to authorship.

Scriptures.<sup>45</sup> But in the former case there is, it is said, no sign of sarcasm, nor anything to show that he differed from his correspondents in his estimate of the *Shepherd*, or that he regarded it as less binding than the writings of Paul.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>45</sup> "At ego eius pastoris scripturas haurio qui non potest frangi".

<sup>46</sup> Harnack (*Patr. Apost. Op.*, Fasc. iii. p. xlix) thinks that Tertullian at this time regarded the *Shepherd* as "Scripture" but as inferior to the prophets and the apostles ("sed minime audeo dicere Carthaginienses tum temporis Pastorem inter scripturas prophetarum et apostolorum recensuisse"). He refers to Tertullian's treatment of the Book of Enoch and suggests that the *Shepherd* may have had a place at the close of the New Testament after the Epistle to the Hebrews. But, in Tertullian's treatment of the Book of Enoch (*de cult. fem.* I. 3; II, 10, *de idol.* 15), there is every sign that he himself regarded this work as of equal authority with other Old Testament Scriptures; he calls it "*Scriptura*", cites it by way of proof, answers criticisms of its authorship and transmission, says it is vouched for by the Apostle Jude, and tries to explain why it was unjustly rejected by the Jews. Nor can the statement *et legimus omnem scripturam aedificationi habilem divinitus inspirari* (*de cult. fem.* I, 3, 2 Tim. iii. 16), be taken to explain Tertullian's attitude toward the *Shepherd*, for Tertullian is speaking here only of the Old Testament Scriptures, as was St. Paul before him—a thing that is often overlooked in discussing this passage (on the importance of this interpretation of Paul's words for the history of the New Testament Canon, see Harnack, *Das Neue Test. um das Jahr 200*, pp. 25, 35, 39f., and opposed to him Leipoldt, *op. cit.*, p. 40).

With regard to the relative value of the *Shepherd* and the Epistle to the Hebrews the matter is somewhat different. Harnack is here following Credner (*Geschichte d. neutest. Kanons*) and Rönisch (*Das neue Testament Tertullians*), in the view that Tertullian had in his New Testament as a kind of appendix, some works which were to some degree inspired and authoritative but on a lower plane than others. Rönisch gives as the names of these the Epistle of Peter *ad Ponticos* (1 Peter), the Epistle of Barnabas to the Hebrews (Hebrews), the Epistle of Jude, and the Epistle of the Presbyter (2 John). But, without going into details, it is hard to believe, after reading *Scorp.* 12 and 14, and *de orat.* 20, that Tertullian set the known writings of Peter in any respect below those of Paul; the Epistle of Jude is referred to only once (*de cult. fem.* I, 3), but then as the work of an Apostle and as authoritative; and 2 John is neither mentioned nor used by the North African Father (Rönisch, p. 572, see Zahn, *Gesch. d. N. T. Kanons*, Vol. I, p. 111, n. 1, pp. 304ff., pp. 320f.).

Tertullian's attitude toward the Epistle to the Hebrews requires closer examination. In his treatise *de pudic.*, after he had passed in review the teaching of the Evangelists, the Acts of the Apostles, Paul and the other Apostles, concluding with the Revelation and First



If this be the correct explanation of this passage we have to ask further on what grounds Tertullian granted such a high place to the *Shepherd*. In the first place it cannot be thought that he accepted it without having some opinion of its authorship; for he denounces strongly all works that do

Epistle of St. John, Tertullian draws the argument to a close (*de pud.* 20), and then adds, "I wish however to subjoin in addition, redundantly, the testimony also of a certain companion of the Apostles, which is well adapted for confirming, by nearest right, the teaching of the masters" (*volo tamen ex redundantia alicuius etiam comitis apostolorum testimonium superducere idoneum confirmandi de proximo jure disciplinam magistrorum* (Ed. Oehler). He then introduces the Epistle to the Hebrews as the work of Barnabas for whom Paul vouched, and adds, "and at all events the Epistle of Barnabas is more received among the churches than that apocryphal *Shepherd* of adulterers" (*et utique receptior apud ecclesias epistola Barnabae illo apocrypho Pastore moechorum*). He then quotes Heb. vi. 1, 4-8. There are two questions raised by this passage: the first concerns Tertullian's estimate of Hebrews, the second the comparative value of the *Shepherd* and Hebrews. With regard to the first of these it is evident that the Epistle to the Hebrews, according to Tertullian, was not in itself possessed of divine authority. This appears from the formal conclusion of his argument based on the Apostolic teaching (*disciplina apostolorum proprie*) before he turns to it, from the express statements that he uses it only to *confirm* the teaching of the Apostles and that it is superfluous (*ex redundantia*), from the fact that he does not ascribe but rather denies apostolicity to it, and that he never calls it "Scripture" (he uses *titulus* instead or refers to it by name). The view, which Zahn thinks possible, (*Gesch. d. Neutest. Kanons*, Vol. I, p. 291) that Tertullian himself placed a higher estimate on the work than is here apparent, and did not cite it among the writings of the New Testament only because it was not universally received, and therefore any argument drawn from it not universally valid, while commending itself for several reasons is incapable of proof. According to the evidence before us the Epistle to the Hebrews was outside of Tertullian's canon, and enjoyed only that amount of favor which was due to the writings of a man who was approved of St. Paul and God. But what does Tertullian mean by saying that the Epistle to the Hebrews was "more received among the churches" than was the *Shepherd*? Does "*receptior apud ecclesias*" mean that it was more highly esteemed, or that it was received as canonical by more churches? Rönisch understands it to mean both (*Op. cit.*, p. 565); Harnack to mean one or the other, he does not say which (*Patr. Apost. Op.* III, p. xlix, n. 1, c.), but in stating that the *Shepherd* seems to have had a place at the end of the New Testament *after* the Epistle to the Hebrews (*Ibid.*, p. xlviii, n. 1, e) he favors the former, and in another place (*Texte und*

not "bind themselves by full title and due profession of author".<sup>47</sup> And it is equally clear that he received only such works as were of apostolic origin, that it to say, composed either by Apostles or apostolic men.<sup>48</sup> We would therefore conclude that Tertullian regarded Hermas as a disciple of the Apostles. But if this be so the question immediately thrusts itself upon us, why does he not use the *Untersuchungen* V, i., p. 59), the latter. Zahn holds firmly to the latter interpretation (*Gesch. d. neust. Kanons*, I, pp. 121, n., 292f.) on the ground that "receptus" is not capable of degrees, and of the presence of the plural "ecclesias". So also Credner, *Gesch. d. neust. Kanons*, p. 117. But neither of these explanations is free from difficulty. By the first Tertullian is made to disagree with his other statement in this same treatise, that all the councils of the church had declared the *Shepherd* "apocryphal and false", and so he is sometimes accused of exaggerating in the latter remark (Harnack, *Texte u. Untersuchungen*, V, i., p. 59, Weiss, *Einleitung in d. N. T.*, 3rd Ed., p. 74). This is unwarranted, and, as we shall see later, these words may express literally a natural interpretation of a Roman statement concerning the *Shepherd*. Zahn's argument is unsatisfactory because it does violence to the Latin. Had Tertullian wished to say that the Epistle to the Hebrews was received by more churches than the *Shepherd* we would expect "receptus apud plures ecclesias". It seems to be true that "receptus" was used as *terminus technicus* to denote the inclusion of a work among the canonical books, and that in this sense it was incapable of degree. But the word was not used exclusively in this connection, and when not it could be compared (see instances in Zahn *loc. cit.*). It is in this latter sense that the word is used in the passage before us. The discussion is not about canonical works, but about two, both of which Tertullian definitely excludes from the Scriptures. With this in mind the argument in this chapter of *de pudicitia* is both clear and consistent with other parts of the treatise. I have now, says Tertullian in effect, concluded my argument from the New Testament Scriptures, but I wish to add the testimony of one other, which may not be used in the argument proper but is of value in confirming the teaching of the Apostles, for its author was their comrade. I refer to an Epistle of Barnabas, a man commended by God and the Apostle Paul. And though he is not an authority, you must at least acknowledge that his Epistle is recognized as of more value by the churches than that apocryphal *Shepherd* of adulterers which has been condemned by all the councils of the churches.

<sup>47</sup> *Marc.* IV, 2.

<sup>48</sup> To Tertullian apostolic men (*apostolici*) were those who had associated with and learned from the Apostles, *Marc.* IV, 2; *Praescr.* 32. Cf. also *Praescr.* 21ff.; 30; 44; and what he says against works of post-apostolic date, *Praescr.* 30.

*Shepherd* more frequently in his writings? To this no certain answer can be given, though it may be pointed out that Paul's Epistles to Titus and Philemon, the First Epistle of Peter and that of Jude, although undoubtedly belonging to Tertullian's canon, are referred to no more frequently or hardly so than is the *Shepherd*.

But this view, although held in slightly differing forms by many scholars, appears to me to be wrong from beginning to end. When the Christians of North Africa, in defence of their superstitious practices of laying aside their cloaks before prayer and of sitting down after it, appealed to the statements that Paul had left his cloak behind him at Troas (presumably having laid it aside at prayer) and that Hermas had sat down on his bed after prayer, the answer that sprang to Tertullian's lips, as it would to those of any other sensible Christian, was that such a use of Scripture was childish, silly, superstitious, and incapable of being indulged without entailing ridiculous results. More was unnecessary. To argue the question of the authority or canonicity of the *Shepherd* would not have been to the point. On the contrary it would have weakened the argument, as it might be taken to imply that had the *Shepherd* been authoritative, such a use of it would have been justified. Tertullian here as elsewhere sees the main issue clearly and sticks to it. And yet he has not left us without at least a hint of his estimate of Hermas and his book. He introduces them with the words "that Hermas whose scripture is generally called the *Shepherd*"<sup>48a</sup> This is not the way one introduces a well known and acknowledged canonical book. The demonstrative "that" pointing to Hermas with quite particular emphasis is hard to account for unless we find in it, as several scholars do,<sup>49</sup> the note of contempt. The words "that Hermas" find their parallel in "that *Shepherd* of adulterers", and the delicate sarcasm of the words "whose

<sup>48a</sup> Quid enim, si Hermas ille cuius scriptura fere Pastor inscribitur, etc. *De orat.* 16.

<sup>49</sup> So Credner, *Gesch. d. neutest. Kanons*, p. 117; Oehler, *Tertull. op.*, Vol. I, p. 367, not. c; Gregory, *Canon and Text of the N. T.*, p. 242.

(i. e., Hermas') scripture" is perceived at once when they are put beside those others, which we have heard Tertullian using elsewhere in discussing the *Shepherd*, "but I quaff the scriptures of that Shepherd who cannot be broken".<sup>50</sup> We are compelled therefore to the conclusion that, though some of his countrymen estimated the *Shepherd* very highly,—exactly how highly we cannot say for lack of evidence,—Tertullian at no period of his life of which we have any knowledge shared their views. He despised it.

In Alexandria Clement knew the *Shepherd* and was fond of it. He quotes it freely and shows beyond possibility of doubt that he believed it to contain a genuine revelation. He speaks of "the Shepherd, the Angel of Repentance" that spoke to Hermas,<sup>51</sup> of the "Power that spoke divinely to Hermas by revelation"<sup>52</sup> or "the Power that appeared to Hermas in the vision in the form of the Church",<sup>53</sup> more frequently he cites it simply as the "*Shepherd*"<sup>54</sup> (ποιμήν). He appeals to it as proof of Christian teaching associating it with the books of our Bible, he even interprets one passage allegorically.<sup>55</sup> And yet in spite of all this there are few who venture to affirm that Clement puts the *Shepherd* on a par with the Gospels and writings of the Apostles. It is noted that he never calls Hermas an Apostle as he does Barnabas and Clement of Rome, that he does not cite his book as "Scripture" as he does for example the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles.<sup>56</sup> It is pointed out that he re-

<sup>50</sup> See note 45.

<sup>51</sup> *Strom.* i., 17, 85.

<sup>52</sup> *Strom.* i., 29, 181.

<sup>53</sup> *Strom.* vi., 15, 131, cf. *Strom.* ii., 1, 3.

<sup>54</sup> The passages have been gathered by Harnack, *Gesch. d. altchristl. Lit.*, I. i., p. 53.

<sup>55</sup> Harnack (*Gesch. d. altchristl. Lit.*, I. i., p. 53). Kutter, (*Clemens Alexandrinus und das Neue Testament*, p. 86) would weaken the force of this, by showing that what Clement does is to interpret allegorically an act of Hermas. But in any case Clement is dealing with a passage out of the *Shepherd*.

<sup>56</sup> Kutter, *Clemens Alex. u. d. Neue Test.*, p. 139 f. On the use of γραφή in a broad sense and the extension of the term apostolic to include the later years of John's life and also Clement of Rome and Barnabas, *ibid.*, pp. 130, 136.

garded Greek Philosophy and the oracles of the Sybil as in a sense divine.<sup>57</sup> An attempt has even been made, but with indifferent success, to show that he values the revelations of the Angel of Repentance in the *Shepherd* more highly than he does the words of Hermas.<sup>58</sup> And the testimony of Eusebius is called in to show that in the *Hypotyposes* in which he commented upon all the books of the canonical Scriptures not omitting the disputed books, which are more nearly defined as Jude, the other Catholic Epistles, Barnabas and the Apocalypse of Peter, the *Shepherd* of Hermas is not included.<sup>59</sup> It has been argued too that, as the final authority for Clement was the Lord and His Apostles<sup>60</sup> and as the apostolic time ended for him in the days of Nero,<sup>61</sup> he could not have regarded a work, which he must have known to be of later origin, as on a par with the writings of the Apostles.<sup>62</sup> It does not come within the scope of our investigation to inquire more definitely into the merits of these views. Our purpose is accomplished when we have ascertained that Clement as a matter of fact did regard the *Shepherd* as at least containing a divine revelation: though it is not unimportant to note that of all the Christian writings appealed to by Clement as authorita-

<sup>57</sup> *Strom.* vi., c. 5. See Eickhoff, *Das Neue Testament des Clem. Alex.*, p. 7. Kutter, *op. cit.* 140f.

<sup>58</sup> Kutter, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

<sup>59</sup> Eusebius (*H. E.* vi., 14). Photius' statement (*Bibl. cod.* 109) that the *Hypotyposes* covered only Genesis, Exodus, the Psalms, the Pauline Epistles, the Catholic Epistles and Ecclesiastes, cannot stand in the face of Eusebius' explicit reference to the Apocalypse of Peter. Nor is the omission of the *Shepherd* accounted for by saying that Eusebius has probably omitted it through accident (Harnack, *Gesch. d. altchristl. Lit.* I. i., p. 53) or that Clement did not comment on it because of its length (Zahn, *Gesch. d. neutest. Kanons*, i. p. 330). Nor does Eusebius' failure to mention the *Shepherd* among his works used by Clement (*H. E.* vi., 13) destroy the argument.

<sup>60</sup> *Strom.*, i. 1, 11.

<sup>61</sup> *Strom.*, vii., 17, 106.

<sup>62</sup> Kutter, *op. cit.*, pp. 108, 128ff., 139f. cf. Kunze, *Glaubensregel etc.*, pp. 40, 138. But it is by no means sure that Clement was as well informed of the origin of the *Shepherd* as was the author of the Muratori Fragment, as Kutter assumes.



tive, this is the only one for which apostolical origin was not claimed in one way or another; and the difficulties which arise in connection with his use of the *Shepherd* would be to a large extent removed, and his procedure shown to be consistent with his own principles, if we might assume that for which there is nothing *pro* or *contra* in his writings, namely, that he thought this book to be the product of the golden age of the Apostles.

Origen, the successor of Clement in Alexandria, regards the *Shepherd* as "very useful and divinely inspired",<sup>63</sup> and frequently adduced proof from it as from any other Scripture. But he also informs us that the book was not universally received but even despised by some.<sup>64</sup> From him also we have a definite statement concerning the authorship and date of the *Shepherd*, namely that it was written by the Hermas to whom the Apostle Paul sends greetings in his Epistle to the Romans;<sup>65</sup> that is to say he refers it to apostolic times, the period which produced all the other canonical books.<sup>66</sup> Nor can we doubt that the opinion of Origen with respect to the authorship of the *Shepherd* was shared by a large proportion of the Alexandrian church.<sup>67</sup>

Among the Roman writers of this period we find no such high respect for the *Shepherd* as we have found in Alexandria. Hippolytus especially, than whom none was better acquainted with the affairs of the Roman Church, and who

<sup>63</sup> Valde mihi utilis videtur et ut puto divinitus inspirata. *In Rom.* (xvi., 14), *com.* x., 31.

<sup>64</sup> καταφρονούμενος, *De princip.* iv., 11; cf. *In Psalm. Selecta*, hom. i. in *Psalm.* 37; *In Ezech.* xxviii., 13, hom. xiii. These and other references in Harnack, *Gesch. d. altchristl. Lit.*, I. i., pp. 53ff.

<sup>65</sup> *In Rom.* xvi., 14, *com.* x., 31, "Puto tamen, quod Hermas iste sit scriptor libelli illius qui Pastor appellatur".

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Origen in Euseb. *H. E.* vi., 25, 12f.

<sup>67</sup> See Zahn. *Gesch. d. neutest. Kanons*, i., pp. 330ff. where he retracts his earlier statements. Harnack (*Patr. apost. op.* iii., p. lvii) would have us believe that Origen is expressing only his own opinion when he ascribes the *Shepherd* to the Hermas of *Rom.* xvi., 14. It may be true, as he asserts, that Origen does not claim to have any traditional basis for this opinion and never calls Hermas *virum apostolicum*, but it is hard to believe that a man of such scholarly methods as Origen was should make such a statement without basis for it.

had plenty of opportunities to use it, does not once mention by name, or quote from, the work.<sup>68</sup> And yet there is perhaps reason for believing that here too the book was regarded as inspired and authoritative and on a par with other canonical writings. I shall briefly review what evidence there is. (1) The position given to the Shepherd in the *Muratorian Canon*. We shall reserve our consideration of this for a few minutes. (2) Tertullian, in a passage already referred to, has in mind that the *Shepherd* is opposed to his montanistic views and defends himself against its teachings. "But I would yield to you", he says, "if the Scripture called the *Shepherd*, which alone loves adulterers, were worthy of a place in the divine instrument,—if it had not been adjudged among the apocryphal and false writings by every council of the churches even your own".<sup>69</sup> As Tertullian throughout this treatise has the bishop of Rome in mind, the *Pontifex Maximus* as he sarcastically calls him in the initial chapter, it has been inferred that the Roman had appealed to the *Shepherd* in defence of his laxer administration of discipline.<sup>70</sup> The inference is possible but by no means necessary. Tertullian had to defend himself not only from the actual arguments of the past but also from the possible ones of the future, against attacks not only from Rome but also from nearer home, where as we have seen the *Shepherd* was in high repute. The words "your churches" refer of course to the Catholic churches, not to those of any particular locality.<sup>70a</sup> (3) The third witness is the so-called *Liberian Catalogue* of the bishops of Rome, which has the following note under the name Pius: "During his episcopate his brother Hermes wrote the book in which

<sup>68</sup> Bonwetsch, *Zu den Komm. Hippolyts. Texte u. Untersuchungen* N. F. Vol. i., 2, p. 26, finds a couple of resemblances.

<sup>69</sup> *De pudic.* 10. "Sed cederem tibi si scriptura Pastoris qui sola moechos amat divino instrumento meruisset incidi, si non ab omni concilio ecclesiarum etiam vestrarum inter apocrypha et falsa iudicaretur".

<sup>70</sup> So Harnack, *Gesch. d. altchristl. Lit.*, I. i., 52, and others.

<sup>70a</sup> According to Harnack, Tertullian could not be referring to Roman or Italian councils (*Texte u. Untersuch.* V. i., p. 59).

is contained the command which the angel enjoined upon him when he came to him in the garb of a shepherd".<sup>71</sup> This catalogue in its completed form belongs to the middle of the fourth century and therefore lies outside the period of our investigation; but there is good reason for supposing that the earlier part of it, down to 231 A. D., was composed a century or more earlier and is from the pen of Hippolytus himself.<sup>72</sup> But even the earlier part did not leave the hand of Hippolytus in its present form. Some later editor or continuator added chronological synchronisms at least (the names of contemporary consuls, Emperors, &c.), and perhaps also this and one other note (concerning the death of the Apostle Peter). According to the table of contents appended to one of the recensions of Hippolytus' *Chronica* we should find in it *Nomina episcoporum Romae et quis quot annis praeftuit*.<sup>73</sup> The natural inference is that all except the names and the number of years was added later. Still while expressing doubt on the matter both Lightfoot and Harnack think it probable that the notice concerning Hermas was in the original work, the former because it "seems intended to discredit the pretensions of that work to a place in the canon and therefore would probably be written at a time when such pretensions were still more or less seriously entertained", the motive being "the same as with the author of the *Muratorian Canon* who has a precisely similar note",<sup>74</sup> the latter because "just at Hippolytus' time the *Shepherd* was excluded from the sacred collection in many churches and this notice apparently has reference to the controversy [involved]".<sup>75</sup> It is true that the *Liberian Cat.* agrees with the *Muratorian Fragment* in ascribing the *Shepherd* to a certain Hermas (or Hermes),

<sup>71</sup> "Sub hujus episcopatu frater ejus Hermes librum scripsit in quo mandatum continetur quod ei praecepit angelus cum venit ad illum in habitu pastoris".

<sup>72</sup> See discussion in Lightfoot, *Apostol. Fathers* I. i., pp. 253ff. and a summary of results in Harnack, *Gesch. d. altchristl. Lit.*, II. i., pp. 144ff.

<sup>73</sup> Lightfoot, *Loc. cit.*, p. 260.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 261f.

<sup>75</sup> Harnack, *Loc. cit.*, p. 150.

the brother of Pius, but it is equally important to note that it definitely asserts that it is a genuine revelation, which the Muratori Fragment does not; and it is highly improbable that Hippolytus, had he entertained this view of the work, would have made no mention of, or citation from, it in his other works. Moreover, if the purpose of the author of this notice was to contribute something toward the settlement of the controversy concerning the canonicity of the book, he chose a very inappropriate method. The statement that the book dates from the days of Pius does indeed implicitly deny apostolicity to the work, but the affirmation of its prophetic character definitely asserts its inspiration.<sup>76 and 77</sup>

<sup>76</sup> The singular *mandatum* also is suspicious. *Mandata* (pl.) might by a stretch be made to cover the whole book, but not its singular. The question rises what is meant thereby. The explanation of Zahn (*Hirt des Hermas*, p. 25f.) would solve the problem. In a letter of Pseudo-Pius dealing with the Quarto-decimanian controversy and therefore dating probably from early in the 4th cent., the writer appeals to a command given to Hermes by the angel that appeared to him in the garb of a shepherd, to the effect that the *Pascha* should be celebrated on the Lord's day ("eidem Hermae angelus domini in habitu pastoris apparuit et praecepit ei ut pascha die dominica ab omnibus celebraretur"). Zahn thinks this is the command referred to in the *Liberian Cat.* in which case the notice there contained must not only be from the fourth cent., but also have no reference to our work for it contains no such command. See also Harnack, *Gesch. d. altchristl. Lit.* I, i., p. 56, who finds Zahn's explanation "very improbable".

<sup>77</sup> For the sake of completeness we must say a word about the puzzling Pseudocyprianic tract known as *de aleatoribus*. This work might be ignored here were it not that Prof. Harnack (*Texte und Untersuchungen*, Vol. v.) some years ago endeavored to show that it is from the pen of the bishop Victor of Rome. This view has not found much favor with scholars and recently Prof. Harnack himself does not seem so desirous of maintaining it. (*Gesch. d. altchristl. Lit.*, i., 52, 719. Cf. Herzog, *Realencycl.* 3rd Ed. Vol. iv., p. 374; xx., p. 602); it has however been taken up by Leipoldt in his *Entstehung des newtestamentlichen Kanons*, and part of Harnack's argument made the basis of much of this work. In this tract the *Shepherd* is quoted once fairly literally, once loosely, and several passages seem to reflect the words and thoughts of Hermas. (The text with notes may be found in the treatise by Prof. Harnack mentioned above). In no case is the *Shepherd* or its author mentioned by name. In the case of the first quotation (cap. 2) the introductory words are *dicit enim scriptura divina* and the

We may pause here for a moment to review our examination to this point. There is no evidence that, during the first thirty or forty years of its existence, the *Shepherd* occupied any preëminent position in the Church. There are signs that it was known and used, but there is not the slightest reason for thinking that it was regarded as an apocalypse, as authoritative, or in any sense on a par with

quotation is coupled with a passage from Sirach and one from an unknown source [*"dicit enim scriptura divina* (quotation from *Sim.* ix., 13, 5), *et alia scriptura dicit* (Sirach xxxii., (xxxv.) 1), *et iterum* (an unknown passage)"]. In the second case (cap. 4) the author evidently thinks he is quoting St. Paul, [*"apostulus idem Paulus commemorat . . . . .dicens* (several passages from the Epp. to Timothy being combined), *iterum* (I Cor. v., 11), *et alio loco* (apparently from Mand. iv., 1, 9) *in doctrinis apostolorum est* (a quotation from an unknown source, possibly dependent on the *Didache*)"] Our hesitancy, in the face of this, to receive this author as a first-class witness to the canonical authority of the *Shepherd* is increased when we take into account his very loose manner of quoting, the fact that several of his quotations cannot be identified, and also that all the Old Testament passages he cites are to be found in Cyprian's *de Lapsis* or *Testimonia*.

We are not now concerned except indirectly with the general question of his forms of citation and the argument that is built upon them in the discussion of the history of the canon of the New Testament; but I cannot refrain from remarking that when Prof. Harnack lays down, as the basis of further argument, the *dictum* that the author (of *de aleatoribus*) "follows a quite definite and strongly consistent method of citation" ("*eine ganz bestimmte und streng festgehaltene Citationsweise befolgt*," *loc. cit.*, p. 56) he should not weaken his own argument by assuming that the author had two forms of citation, *dicit scriptura divina* and *dicit dominus*, that were apparently of equal value (*augenscheinlich gleichwerthig*). Nor should he say in another place (*Das neue Testament um 200*, p. 36) that according to *de aleatoribus* "the Old Testament and the Apocalypses of Hermas and John belong to the *scripturae divinae* but not so the Gospels and Epistles". Nor should Leipoldt follow him by saying (*loc. cit.*, p. 37) that "this writing (*de aleatoribus*) regards apparently only two books outside of the Old Testament as Holy Scripture in this strict sense of the term". As a matter of fact the Old Testament is never cited as *scriptura divina* in *de aleatoribus*, the passage from Sirach alone excepted, nor is the Apocalypse of John, which is introduced by the words *dominus occurrat et dicit* (cap. 8). To say, as Leipoldt does (*loc. cit.*) that this is apparently accidental is to confess that the whole argument is unfounded. It has escaped the notice of these writers that another and simpler, and consistent principle may be found for the author's method



the Scriptures of the Old Testament. On the contrary, there is good reason for the opinion that no one, orthodox or heretical, was concerned to make or maintain any such claims for it. After that period a higher estimate of it appears in some sections. In Gaul it is quoted by one great teacher as "Scripture", but in such a way as to leave us in doubt whether he really regarded it as Scripture in the strict sense of the word. In Africa the common people esteemed it highly, but their scholarly leader Tertullian despised it. In Alexandria it fared better. Both Clement and Origen regarded it as a real revelation, the former for reasons not clear to us, the latter ascribing it to the Apostolic age. From Rome, where it was produced and where it presumably was best known, comes exceedingly little evidence. Not a single author can be proved to have regarded it as divine or authoritative, but neither do we find any condemnation of it. This can not be the record of a work which was originally published as a divine revelation, accepted as such by the leaders of the church, and drawn upon by them in matters of faith and practice. It is rather the story of a book that began its career in a humbler fashion, that found its way to the hearts of the common people first, that was then occasion of citation, namely, that in all passages, whether from the Old or the New Testament, from the Gospels or Apocalypse, in which, *in the Scriptures*, the Lord is represented as speaking the introductory formula is *dominus dicit*. In the one occasion where the words quoted are not immediately ascribed to God in the Scriptures, the introductory phrase is enlarged by the addition of *per prophetam* (cap. 10, quoting Eli's words in I Sam. ii, 25.). When the quotation is from the Gospels the addition *in evangelio* is found three times (cap. 3, 10) and in the only other formal quotation from them, both *dominus* and *in evangelio* are lacking (cap. 2). The subject could be mentally supplied; and *in evangelio* was apparently not regarded as necessary. When the quotation is from the Epistles either the name of the apostle (Paul, cap. 3, 4, John, cap. 10), or the title *apostolus* without name (cap. 4, 10) is found with *dicit* (*dicens*). When the authority of the apostolic college is cited the formula is *in doctrinis Apostolorum* (cap. 4). In all other cases the general term *Scriptura* is used (cap. 2). The author has given us no passage from the Acts of the Apostles or from narrative portions of the Bible, and so we cannot say how he would have introduced them.

sionally dimly reflected in the words of some writer or other, and that then here and there, especially far from its native place, and where a wrong opinion of its origin was current, came to be regarded as divine. But we have still one piece of evidence to consider, perhaps the most important of all, and we shall turn to it now.

The so-called *Muratori Fragment*,<sup>78</sup> it is generally conceded, comes from about the end of the second century and reflects the opinion of the Roman or Italian church. It contains an incomplete list of the books received into or rejected from the New Testament Scriptures, with notes on the same. Toward the end of the list is found the following paragraph: "Of apocalypses also we receive only those of John and Peter which (latter) some among us will not have read in the church. But the *Shepherd* was written by Hermas, very recently, in our own times, when his brother Pius the bishop was sitting in the episcopal chair of the church of the city of Rome, and therefore it ought indeed to be read, but it cannot be publicly read to the people in church, either among the Prophets whose number is complete, or among the Apostles to the end of time".<sup>79</sup> Such

<sup>78</sup> The text may be found in an appendix to Westcott's *Canon of the New Testament*, also in Zahn, *Grundriss der Gesch. d. neutest. Kanons*, p. 75, Harnack, *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, Vol. v., p. 595, and elsewhere. An English translation is given in *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. v., p. 603. This is not the place to discuss the date and source of this unique document. I shall assume that it comes from Rome or at least represents the Roman tradition. Also when the plural number is used to denote the authors, I am only following a hint contained in the *Fragment* itself, ("*recipimus*"), without affirming anything of the authorship.

<sup>79</sup> Ll. 71-79. "Apocalypse etiam iohannis et petri tantum recipimus quam quidam et nostri legi in ecclesia nolunt pastorem uero | nuperrime temporibus nostris in urbe | roma hermas conscripsit sedente cathedra urbis romae ecclesiae pio eps fratre | eius et ideo legi eum quidē oportet se publicare uero in ecclesia populo neque inter | profetas completum numero neque inter | apostolos in finē temporum potest". In corrected Latin: "Apocalypses etiam Johannis et Petri tantum recipimus, quam quidam ex nostris legi in ecclesia nolunt. Pastorem uero nuperrime temporibus nostris in urbe Roma Hermas conscripsit sedente cathedra urbis Romae ecclesiae Pio episcopo fratre ejus; et

a statement as this would not be found in this place unless canonicity had been claimed for the *Shepherd*. It is natural too to infer that such claims had been made within that particular church from which the *Fragment* emanates. But this is not necessary. The writers had in mind not their own community only, but also the whole Catholic Church,<sup>80</sup> and therefore had to take cognizance of works for which claims were made by outsiders. From whatever quarter these claims may have come, however, the *Fragment* leaves us in no doubt about certain pretensions which were made for the *Shepherd*, and which were doubtless urged in favor of its canonicity. These were two in number. The first was that the *Shepherd* dates from apostolic times. This is evident from the way the *Fragment* heaps up clauses to disprove such an early origin.<sup>81</sup> It was written, it says, "very recently", "in our own times", "when Pius was bishop of Rome", by the brother of this same Pius and this is given as the ground (*et ideo*) for its exclusion from the Canon.

The second argument was that the *Shepherd* was an apocalypse. This is evident enough from its being classed with the Apocalypses of John and Peter. What is the attitude of the *Fragment* toward this? In the first place, it cannot be urged that the parallelism "we receive only . . . but" ("*tantum recipimus . . . vero*") shows the writers' own view *viz.* that the *Shepherd* too is an apocalypse. The only necessary inference is that the work was commonly or sometimes ranked as an apocalypse. Again, it may be asked, whether in asserting the late date of the book the *Fragment* does not mean to imply that it is not apocalyptic. No definite answer can be given to this, but

*ideo legi eum quidem oportet, se publicare vero in ecclesia populo, neque inter prophetas completo numero, neque inter apostolos in finem temporum potest*".

<sup>80</sup> *Frag.*, I, 66, *cf.* 69.

<sup>81</sup> So too Zahn (*Gesch. d. neutest. Kanons*, I, p. 340) who however does not regard the *Fragment* as well informed concerning the date of the *Shepherd*, but thinks its author was driven to exaggeration by the zeal of the advocates of an early date.

the indications are that it does. Elsewhere<sup>82</sup> the *Fragment* is pronouncedly anti-montanistic, and it is hard to believe that its authors could have thought of prophecy still existing in the Church as late as the time of Pius.<sup>83</sup> But there is still another indication that this is really the view of the *Fragment*. The last lines of our paragraph read, "it cannot be publicly read . . . either among the Prophets whose number is complete or among the Apostles till the end of time". "Prophets" and "Apostles" here, as elsewhere in the literature of this period, are doubtless equivalent to the Old and New Testaments. But there seems to be an especial appropriateness in the use of the terms here. Out of several designations of the Scriptures at their disposal, all current at the time, the authors of the *Fragment* have chosen two which had reference to the two arguments advanced in favor of the *Shepherd* by their opponents. That this is so, that the use of these words is not perfunctory, is shown too by the insertion of the phrase "whose number is complete" after "prophets". This phrase indeed amplifies and completes the argument against the reception of the *Shepherd*, begun in the assertion of its late date. The *Fragment* therefore says in effect, that the *Shepherd* cannot be classed with the Apostles for it is of later date, nor with the Prophets for their number is complete, that is, Hermas was not a prophet nor his work a revelation.<sup>84</sup>

Taking this then as the view of the authors, and remembering the historical situation, this little section of the *Muratorian Fragment*, so puzzling to commentators, becomes a well conceived and carefully guarded statement. The problem was this: Here was a work forty or fifty years old, which had been popular and useful in the church. On account of its apocalyptic form and the apostolic name of its author

<sup>82</sup> L. 84.

<sup>83</sup> Zahn, *op. cit.*, ii., p. 116.

<sup>84</sup> Similarly, Leipoldt, *op. cit.*, p. 48; Hesse, *Das muratorische Fragment* p. 270f.; Credner, *Gesch. d. neutest. Kanons*, p. 117, whose statements however are not in full harmony, cf. p. 165; Overbeck, *Zur Gesch. des Kanons*, pp. 100, 105, and others.

it was held by some to be divinely inspired and equal to the canonical Scriptures. The authors of the *Fragment* knew better. They knew by whom it was written and when, and that it was not a revelation. They had to remove the misunderstanding that was abroad concerning the work, but they had to do so warily or create an opinion of the *Shepherd* as incorrect as the one they would destroy. They dared not say for instance "we do not receive it", a phrase which is used of other rejected books.<sup>85</sup> Of course in one sense the *Shepherd* is rejected.<sup>86</sup> It is not recognized as part of the canonical Scriptures. But all the works of which "not received" is said, (apocryphal letters of Paul and the writings of Arsinous and others), are not only rejected from the Canon but positively stigmatized as evil: as the *Fragment* says, "gall should not be mixed with honey".<sup>87</sup> This phrase could not therefore be used of the *Shepherd* without giving rise to the impression that it was "gall", and so the authors avoid it. Again, put yourself for a moment mentally in the position of those who believed Hermas to be the friend of Paul to whom he sent greetings, and the *Shepherd* to be the record of divine revelations which had been vouchsafed to him. What would be your first thought, were you informed that the book was written a hundred years after you had supposed, and was not a revelation? You would say at once: then the book lies about its origin and its contents, it is apocryphal and false. These are exactly the words Tertullian, as we have seen, used to describe the declaration of some councils of the churches concerning the *Shepherd*, and it seems more than probable that just such a statement as the one before us was in his mind.<sup>88</sup> Whether, however, Tertullian is

<sup>85</sup> Ll. 63ff; 81ff.

<sup>86</sup> This is involved in "*tantum . . . vero*".

<sup>87</sup> L. 67.

<sup>88</sup> Similarly Credner, *Gesch. d. neutest. Kanons*, p. 117. An interesting parallel to Tertullian's statement is found in Zahn, *Gesch. d. neutest. Kanons*, ii. p. 113, "wer das Buch trotz des Namens Clemens (vis. ii. 4) und vieler anderer Anzeichen für ein Werk aus der Zeit um 145 hielt, musste es für eine pseudepigraphische Fiction halten". Cf. also p. 118 and Vol. i., p. 342.



guilty of this or not, such a false inference had to be guarded against, and it is for this purpose that the authors of the *Fragment* after the assertion of the *Shepherd's* late date hasten to add "therefore it ought to be read". Commentators have been puzzled by the "therefore" here. One, who otherwise has excellently understood the situation, is driven to the extremity of saying that the work was ordered to be read because it was written by the brother of a bishop.<sup>89</sup> But the matter is clear when seen in its proper setting. The writers have in view those who would be inclined to go from the extreme of admiration to that of denunciation. To these they say: "the *Shepherd* is not what you think it is, but you must not condemn *it* because *you* have made a mistake; it is a good book and therefore it ought to be read". But after all the main thing in the writers' minds is to ensure the exclusion of the *Shepherd* from the Scriptures, and so, after having qualified its rejection in this way, they conclude strongly (the "therefore" being still in force): "but it cannot be read publicly in the church to the people either among the Prophets whose number is complete or among the Apostles to the end of time"; that is to say, it is to be ranked with neither the Old nor the New Testament.

The correctness of this interpretation will be more apparent when we see how others are involved with difficulties. I will take for examples those of Professors Zahn and Harnack, who approach the matter from different standpoints. Professor Zahn,<sup>90</sup> who has little respect for the judgment of the author of the *Fragment*, explains the injunction to read the *Shepherd* as follows. The Fragmentist believed that the *Shepherd* had been published as an apocalypse but was himself of the opinion that it was not such, and was not friendly disposed toward it. But because it could not be charged with heresy, or intentional falsehood, or because it had been found valuable in the church, or perhaps by way of concession to the opposite party,—we

<sup>89</sup> Hesse, *op. cit.*, pp. 268ff.

<sup>90</sup> *Gesch. d. neutest. Kanons*, Vol. i., pp. 342ff, Vol. ii., pp. 111-118; in Herzog, *Realencycl.* 3rd Ed Vol. ix., pp. 778f.

cannot be sure of his motives,—he retained the work in a minor position, as a sort of deuterocanonical work, and ordered it to be read, only providing that it shall not be read in the public services of the church along with the Old and New Testament. But such an interpretation is possible only to one who holds as low an opinion of the author or authors of the *Fragment* as Prof. Zahn does. In several respects it is out of accord with the statements of the *Fragment*, and what we know from other sources about this time. Elsewhere the *Fragment* is straightforward, honest, and, we may add, definite in its statements concerning the rejection or acceptance of writings. When there is a difference of opinion in the church regarding a work, as in the case of the Apocalypse of Peter, the fact is recorded without comment or attempted compromise. It is hardly thinkable therefore that the author or authors would admit even to a secondary place a work which they believed laid claim to inspiration falsely. Moreover, there is no sign in the *Fragment* or in the other literature of this time of any deuterocanonical books,<sup>91</sup> and later when there were, only such works were involved as were of obscure origin. For the authors of the *Fragment* the origin of the *Shepherd* was not doubtful.

Professor Harnack<sup>92</sup> thinks that the author of the *Fragment*, in agreement with the church generally, regarded the *Shepherd* as a genuine prophecy; that the eloquent silence of the author concerning Christian prophetic writings in their relation to the authoritative church collection is very significant; that the time was past when prophecy just because it was prophecy could be accounted canonical; other conditions were now prerequisite to reception into the sacred collection; that it was necessary therefore for the Fragmentist to create a new category for Christian prophetic books, and that he did this by making it the duty of Christians to read them *privately*, that is, not in the public church

<sup>91</sup> Harnack emphasizes this, *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, iii., p. 399.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 369ff.

services. But how inconsistent this is with itself and with what Prof. Harnack says elsewhere in the same article! How can the *Fragment* be "eloquently silent concerning the relation of the prophetical writings to the authoritative church collection" and at the same time "create for them a special category"? And how does the creation of a special category differ from the erection of a deuterocanon, of which Prof. Harnack tells us there is no sign at this time in the *Fragment* or elsewhere? Or, looking at the larger question, is it possible that works which a few years before had occupied a position second to none among the Christian writings, should within one generation be relegated to at least comparative obscurity?<sup>93</sup> But quite apart from these considerations Harnack's interpretation is wrecked on the fact that the *Muratorian Fragment* has not one word to say about Christian prophetical writings as a class being read. All other so-called Apocalypses are definitely excluded by the *tantum* of line 72; only the *Shepherd* is separated from them and made the subject of special remark. There is not a shadow of justification for the statement that the contents of this remark were applicable to any other writing or class of writings.

When, therefore, we find these scholars, differing as they do in their attitude toward the history of the Canon and in their estimate and interpretation of the *Muratorian Fragment*, both alike involved in difficulties and inconsistencies through the assumption that the *Shepherd* was published, and for long regarded, as an apocalypse, we come back with the more confidence to the interpretation of this passage to which we were led by our investigation of the historical background. What the authors of *Muratorian Fragment* say here is in effect: "We know in detail the history of the origin of the *Shepherd* of Hermas and can assure the church that it never was intended to be taken as an apocalypse; those who have so regarded it have been mistaken; it is a

<sup>93</sup> Harnack himself (*Ibid.*, p. 405) acknowledges the "ausserordentlich raschen Verlauf des Prozesses. Cf. the criticism by Overbeck, *op. cit.*, p. 75f.

good book and ought to be read, but it is not part of the Scriptures". In other words, what the *Muratorî Fragment* does, is not to take away the authority which had universally been conceded to the *Shepherd* at one time, but to check a growing tendency to regard it as canonical.

We have now reviewed the important evidence of the second century in respect to the position occupied by the *Shepherd* in the Church. What is our conclusion? Just this: the only assumption about which the known facts may be arranged logically and consistently is that the *Shepherd* was published originally, and accepted by the author's contemporaries, as a purely human work in the form of an allegory. It soon became widely known and popular among the churches, and some thirty or forty years after its publication was regarded in some localities as inspired and Scripture. Its literary form doubtless deceived many who were not acquainted with its origin into thinking it a genuine revelation. The attempt was also made to foist it upon the apostolic age. But the Church of Rome, of which Hermas had been a member and in which his work had been produced, was comparatively or wholly free from these wrong opinions, and, as represented in the *Muratorî Fragment*, entered a strong protest against this false valuation of a useful but purely human work.

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## THE NEW OPTIMISM VERSUS THE OPTIMISM OF THE GOSPEL.

Higher Criticism does not and cannot have one hypothesis and method for the interpretation of the Old Testament, and another for the New. For whatever the difference between these two parts of the Bible, they are related as antecedent and consequent. The Old anticipates a fuller revelation of God to mankind than it contains; the New is the fulfilment of that anticipation. This must be recognized in some form whatever be our conception of the content and purpose of the Bible in its entirety. Hence, irrespective of our conception or hypothesis, the Old Testament cannot be thought of as a finality, for it has an outlook beyond itself, and if that outlook be not toward the New Testament, then we know not to what it points. But from this it follows that, relatively, the hypothesis and method of Higher Criticism is comparatively less difficult when applied to the Old Testament than when applied to the New. And chiefly for two reasons. (1) The Old Testament is, primarily, the history of a Nation—a people lineally descended from Abraham. It is this, whatever else may be the value of its religious and theological content. Further on we shall dwell upon the relation of the history to the content. Here it is enough to say that our view of the Old Testament as history determines essentially our interpretation of its religious and theological content.<sup>1</sup> The New Testament centres about a person Jesus, the Christ. Dating from the entrance of our Lord upon His public ministry, to the close of the Acts of the Apostles, it covers a period of approximately thirty-five years,—a small fraction of the many

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<sup>1</sup>We may apply here the language of Percy Gardner (*Exploratio Evangelica*, p. 3), "In throwing the Bible into historic perspective modern criticism changes the basis of the whole of Protestant Theology and compels it to seek a new foundation."



centuries from the call of Abraham covered by the Old Testament. But it is the person and work of Christ that fill those years. Hence, this comparatively brief period does not have the historical background for applying the hypothesis and method of Higher Criticism, such as the many centuries covered by the Old Testament provide. Throughout the latter the Nation is always before the Critic: in the former a person. (2) Being primarily history, the Old Testament is a completed history. Of course a few centuries intervene between the close of the Old Testament and the final overthrow of the Hebrew Nation as such. But none the less the Old Testament is the completed history of that nation so far as that nation was identified with the religion and theology of the Old Testament. The intervening centuries added nothing to either. The New Testament, though canonically a completed book, is none the less the record of a movement that had its beginning in the life and teaching of Jesus of Nazareth; a movement in its genesis inseparably allied with Him, whatever hypothesis and method we apply to the interpretation of the New Testament; a movement the most aggressive and comprehensive in spirit and purpose the world has ever known, and which continues the same to our own day. For these two reasons, the most complicated problem for Higher Criticism is Jesus of Nazareth. The New Testament therefore relatively, is the *crux* of the hypothesis and method of this criticism.

Hence, while in dealing with the Old Testament Higher Criticism has to do with nearly two millennia of the completed history of a Nation which as such many centuries since ceased to be, in dealing with the New Testament it has to do with the genesis of a movement which has been a potent factor in the promotion of all that has been highest and best in human progress for nearly two millennia. Moreover this movement, for some reason, has had an inhering initiation wholly its own. At the first it disclosed this power of self-initiation. It continued to do so in its earlier expansion. It was alone, unaided and violently resisted

on every side. Again and again during the following centuries, the self-initiation of the movement has reasserted itself, going back with new emphasis of faith and conservation of purpose to absolute dependence upon itself as having the inhering power of the Gospel of Christ as its genesis—its power—its assurance of victory. And in doing this it has never been defeated by those who combined in resisting it. It has been from the beginning an Optimistic Movement. All this is a fact of history, and is abundantly confirmed by the new vigor shown in our day by all evangelical bodies in the prosecution of foreign missions. Higher Criticism, therefore, in dealing with the New Testament, cannot afford to ignore the inherent initiation and aggressiveness of the Optimism of the Gospel of Christ manifested not only throughout almost two millennia of history, but to-day although confronted as it is by so many and great hindrances from without, and beset by so many pessimistic and paralyzing hindrances within.<sup>2</sup>

But reverting to the Bible in its entirety and permitting it to speak for itself, it is evident that the Old Testament is provisional—the New Testament is final. In the former, neither does Moses nor do the Prophets claim that their utterances are the final revelation of God to mankind. But the New Testament affirms itself to be the final revelation. In the Gospels Christ does so. In the Acts and Epistles the Apostles do so. To say that each successive epoch in Old Testament history looks beyond itself, is saying nothing more than Higher Critics say, the era of the Prophets of Israel

<sup>2</sup>As Forsyth says (*The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, p. 84): "The greatest issue for the moment is within the Christian pale: it is not between Christianity and the world. It is the issue between theological liberalism (which is practically Unitarianism), and a free but positive Theology, which is essentially evangelical." And here Lyman Abbott's judgment as to this issue, as he sees it from the liberal side, is confirmatory of Forsyth (*Theology of Evolution*, p. 61), "It must be frankly conceded that the question at issue between Modern Criticism and the Old Orthodoxy is not an insignificant one. . . . It is a profoundly serious one. The Old Orthodoxy is right in regarding the New Criticism as revolutionary."

and Judah being to them the culminating stage in the evolution of an ethical Monotheism that has come down to our day.<sup>3</sup> And it is precisely this ethical Monotheism that underlies the four Gospels and the entire New Testament. It was this ethical Monotheism, in its largest meaning, that Jesus of Nazareth grasped. This too the Critics concede, or rather I make integral to their interpretation of the religion and theology of the Bible in its entirety. But to quote Forsyth,<sup>4</sup> "the most impressive thing about Christ's vast consciousness is His sense of finality. It is upon this so much turns, not on His being *a* revelation of God, but *the* revelation, the *final* revelation." This finality is the foundation of and defines what we have termed the optimism of the Gospel of Christ, contradistinguishing it radically from all theories of philosophical optimism. Here, on its practical side, is the issue between the evangelical faith and the convergence of the tendencies of much in the amorphous New Theology. For the question of supreme significance now is, whether or not Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ, was and is the final revelation of God to mankind. If He was not, and if He had only clearer perceptions of ethical Monotheism than the Prophets of Israel and Judah: if His life, character, and teachings are only a stadium in the evolution of ethics, religion, and theology, we may expect further light upon these vital subjects. If we speak of the religion of Jesus as we do of the Buddhistic or the Mohammedan or any other religion, then as Forsyth so forcibly puts it,<sup>5</sup> "the evolution, the relativism that makes us to outgrow the New Testament Christ, will also carry us beyond the religion of Jesus and the cult of Fatherhood. Christianity will become but a stage, even on its ethical side. The Fatherhood of God will become merely a spiritual idea of great, but passing value." For the only finality the evolutionary process allows or a philosophy of religion in which that process is basal can recognize, is the result that

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Jastrow, *Studies of Religion*, pp. 5-6.

<sup>4</sup> *The Person and Place of Christ*, p. 92.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49.

terminates the entire cosmic evolutionary process. Between the inception of that process and its culmination, there is no place for finality in ethics, religion or theology.<sup>6</sup>

On this hypothesis optimism has no place in the present. For what may come to pass thousands or myriads of years hence under the existing order of things, is of no concern to us in the life we are living now. What we need, and need imperatively, is an optimism which, in its foundation, motives, outlook, and bearing upon every problem of our conscious being, provides for and meets the conditions of the reality of that being. It is precisely this sort of optimism man in all the ages has been feeling for, groping after. Uncounted millions have abandoned the quest, believing they had found the object of their search in the Gospel of Christ. Many millions have done and are doing the same thing to-day. This Gospel has been for all these the Gospel of hope.<sup>7</sup> The lives they have lived have had their motive, inspiration, mold in that hope. They have lived and are now living for others. If they had not lived, would the world have been—by so much—better than it is to-day? Who would dare so to affirm? The fact should be fully and fairly recognized. The optimism based upon the Gospel of Christ has made for itself a record for nearly two millennia, that may confidently challenge the closest scrutiny of all classes of critics and thinkers in our day.

Our insistence on this fact is accentuated by a current

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 193.

<sup>7</sup> The Greek, *ἐλπίς* means strictly—expectation—something for good reasons confidently anticipated. Paul uses it in a sense distinctly including both (cf. Rom. v. 2, 4, Gal. v. 5, Col. i. 27, 1 Tim. i. 1.). So does the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews (cf. Heb. iii. 6, vi. 18-19). Peter employs it even more emphatically as security, in the sense of absolute safety and its guarantee (cf. 1 Pe. i. 3, 21, iii. 15). This hope is always a hope having both foundation and confident assurance in the acceptance of the Gospel of Christ as the final self-revelation of God to mankind. Here believers have rested their faith. Were they deluded? Are they now? Amiel says (*Journal intime*, p. 264, Eng. Trans., 1885): "The Gospel proclaims . . . the news of irrevocable pardon, this is to say, of eternal life. The Cross is the guarantee of the Gospel. Therefore it has been its standard".

tendency to minimize what the optimism begotten by the Gospel of Christ has wrought, and to divert attention to ecclesiasticism, dogmatism, traditional creedal beliefs. These, it is urged, have been a hindrance to the correct understanding of the Bible, of Christ, and hence of Christianity. We concede that there is truth in this. But when we admit all the truth it contains, it becomes an additional argument for the optimism of the Gospel of Christ. For if the history of Christianity shows anything with the lucidness of demonstration, it is the inhering power of self-initiation the Gospel of Christ has had. Ecclesiasticism, dogmatism, tradition have not in the end bound or delimited that Gospel. It has reasserted and reaffirmed itself. In doing this it has gone back always to the Christ of the Gospels. It has reemphasized the self-revelation of God to mankind in the person and work of the incarnate, the crucified and risen Christ as the finality of this revelation. At no stage throughout its centuries of history has the Christianity of Christ needed any other foundation or motive for enthusiastic optimism than those of the Apostles of the risen Christ. We sympathize with some phases of what is and ought to be urged against ecclesiasticism, dogmatism, and tradition as these have asserted themselves in the history of Christianity. But our insistence is that when all is said that justly ought to be said, it, by so much, historically confirms the optimism of the Gospel of Christ. It makes nothing for the new and better optimism commended to us in the tendencies and conclusion of Higher Criticism and the New Theology. We by no means enter a caveat here against all the positions of Higher Criticism nor against all the modifications of doctrine urged by the conservative representatives of the New Theology. But when on the authority of Higher Criticism and clad in the vestments of the New Theology men proffer to us a new optimism, having neither foundation, nor inspiration, nor motive other than those deduced from an hypothetical evolutionary cosmic process, and supported by inferences from a philosophy of re-



ligion that as yet is embryonic rather than nascent, then in the light of nearly two millennia of what the optimism of the Gospel of Christ has wrought, our reply is, "Jesus we know, and Paul we know, but who are you?"

And they answer, the Bible, Christ, Christianity must be reinterpreted in the light and by the infallible data of Science, criticism in its accepted canons, and the attitude of the modern mind as defined by the compass and drift of modern thought. All essential in each is to be reverently retained; is indeed to be stamped by the authority of scholarship as of greatest value. But what and how much is held to be essential in the reinterpretation? We answer, just so much, and not a whit more, as can be worked into the evolution of ethics, religion and theology,<sup>8</sup> using these technical words with the meaning given them in the philosophy of religion. That is, ethics, religion and theology are cardinal in the universal evolutionary process. Or to put the same thing differently, the Biblical development of what these terms connote must be modified so as to harmonize that development with a comprehensive philosophy of religion the foundation of which is the hypothetical evolutionary process. That is, the ethical, religious and theological in the Bible are to be accorded neither preëminence nor priority because these are there. Their one and only claim to special consideration as data in the study of the philosophy of religion is that they have a well-defined setting in the history of a nation—the Hebrew, and in nothing on the ground that the Bible claims to be the record of the self-revelation of God to mankind,—giving to their development exceptional value.

And here in confirmation of what we have said and in

<sup>8</sup> "The evolutionist perceives the necessity of making the framework of theory strong and sound." Therefore, "the evolutionist must recognize the true value of the religious instinct and admit the vast importance of providing a mode embodying it in the future. How this is to be done is the great problem of coming generations. The generation that is passing away has learned its importance, however far they may be from the solution itself" (Leslie Stephens, *The Nineteenth Century*, p. 350, ed. 1901).

support of our conclusion, we introduce citations from Pfleiderer, certainly one of the ablest expositors of that philosophy of religion, one of the logical necessities of which is the elimination from the Bible of special inspiration, special revelation, and, hence, miracles, but at the same time giving prominence to the Bible as a source of data of the greatest value in the construction of a philosophy of religion all-inclusive of ethics, religion and theology. Of the Old Testament Pfleiderer says,<sup>9</sup> "The Prophets raised the tribal god of Israel to be the God of the world. . . . To the Hebrew Prophet Jehovah always remained the God of Israel in a peculiar sense, but his government of the world had nevertheless a universal end, which passed beyond the national limits and was unconditionally valuable in itself," having as "its moral end the divine government of the world." Further on he says,<sup>10</sup> "If a religious revelation is to be found anywhere, it is certainly to be found in the spirit of the Hebrew Prophets, who knew that the will of God is the will of the morally good. This knowledge, which is of infinite reach, arose among them many centuries before Plato, and they grasped this truth more firmly than that profound thinker." And elsewhere he elaborates this statement and says,<sup>11</sup> "Through this knowledge of the moral nature and government of God which had arisen in their heart and conscience the Hebrew Prophets became the creators of ethical monotheism, the true Biblical religion, which comes to its true fulfilment in Christianity." Of the four Gospels he says—what his exposition of the philosophy of religion assumes of the entire New Testament,<sup>12</sup> "The primitive community (of believers) was the guardian of the most precious treasure of Christendom—the meaning of the facts of the earthly life of Jesus, of His discourses, doings, and sufferings. If it had not so faithfully preserved this treasure the world would have received no Gospels, nor

<sup>9</sup> *Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. i., p. 120 (Gifford Lectures).

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 198.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 45.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 125.

any tradition of the several features of the life of Jesus. . . . And what would Christianity have been without the Gospels." A defender of the evangelical faith need say scarcely more than this of the worth of the four Gospels. But as if Pfleiderer felt this required explanation and modification, he adds, "Yet the traditions of the primitive community even were already far from being able to give a photographically faithful portrait of the reality." He means of the Jesus who actually was. We ask why so? Here is Pfleiderer's answer. "In its way it (the primitive community) was already creating, fashioning the historical according to the idea, and introducing ideas into history," thereby giving to the earthly life, discourses, doings, and sufferings of Jesus "more and more supernatural color and content." The language of these citations is remarkable. Some at least of those who follow in its general positions and arguments Pfleiderer's philosophy of religion, hesitate to go so far as he does in what he says of the Hebrew Prophets in their creative relation to ethical Monotheism.<sup>13</sup> And to any one not understanding clearly the position he champions as to the Bible, Christ, and Christianity, such language as we have cited might easily be misleading. But in these citations there are two assumptions upon which we shall dwell briefly.

(1) The Old Testament. "They became *creators* of ethical monotheism." But *how* its creators? Pfleiderer explains. It was through the "knowledge of the moral nature and government of God which had arisen in their heart and conscience." That is, it was self-evolved. But in what the Prophets did, being the pioneer by "many centuries" of Plato, if "a religious revelation is to be found

<sup>13</sup> For example, Tiele (*History of Religion*, Eng. Ed., p. 89): "Out of the conception of Yahveh's supremacy over the other gods of the country sprang the idea of his sole lordship over Israel. Beyond this idea the first Prophets of reformed Mosaism made no great advance . . . The great value of the preaching of the Prophets lies in its ethical character, and in the pure and elevated representation which it gave to their Yahveh. But even this conception of deity is still one-sided, and their universalism continues particularistic."

anywhere it is found in the spirit of those Prophets." Nevertheless Pfeiderer does not admit that there was either special revelation or special inspiration anywhere—either in the Old Testament or the New.<sup>14</sup> *Ex hypothesi* he could not do so. The evolutionary hypothesis upon which he builds his philosophy of religion imperatively interdicts such an admission. The Hebrew Prophets were men exceptional in their "insight into the moral nature and government of God." They were men of fervent piety; patriotic, devout worshippers of Yahveh to the utter exclusion of all other deities whether of Israel or of contiguous peoples. They were men too who held as authoritative the traditions of Israel. For these reasons they resisted idolatry and preceded all others in emphasizing the government of the world by the God of Israel. It was indeed, as Pfeiderer virtually admits, a marvellous achievement in ethics, religion and theology. But it is in its antecedents, in the environment of the Hebrew Prophets in their own time—and in its age-long permanency of result, only one link in the chain of evolution. In it there was neither special revelation nor special inspiration. Thus the era of the Hebrew Prophets and the conceded permanency of their exposition and application of ethical Monotheism becomes the crux of the application of the hypotheses and methods of Higher Criticism to the Old Testament. If it fail here it is self-invalidated in much besides.

(2) The New Testament. Pfeiderer says that in the Gospels "the primitive community (of believers) was the guardian of the most precious treasure of Christendom." Except for this "primitive community" which "so faithfully preserved this treasure, the world would have had no Gospels"; and then he asks, "What would Christianity have been without the Gospels?" But he goes on and affirms that this primitive community "was far from being able to give a photographically faithful portrait of the reality"—the Jesus who actually was. They introduced "ideas into

<sup>14</sup> Cf. especially *Philosophy of Religion*, vol. ii., sect. iii.

history" and so fashioned the historical as the ideal traditional conception of the Jesus who was, thus giving to the reality "more and more supernatural color and content." This assumption of Pfleiderer is fundamental to the interpretation of the Gospels and of the entire New Testament which we are being urged to accept.

It is affirmed that the primitive community superimposed a "supernatural color and content" upon the actual facts of the earthly life of Jesus. This affirmation manifestly eliminates from the Gospels everything supernatural and miraculous,—hence the miraculous conception and bodily resurrection of Jesus—and yet it assumes that this was the work of the primitive community. The sophism here is in the assumption that the Christ of the Gospels is not the Christ of history but an ideal Christ superimposed upon the facts of the life, teaching and work of the Christ who actually was; and this by "the primitive community". But this assumption itself is certainly unhistorical. For from the first "the primitive community" received the knowledge and interpretation of the Gospel of Christ from the Apostles. He had called to be with Him, and who declared that they were the eye-witnesses of His resurrection. In the community the Apostles spoke with an authority which was fully recognized.<sup>15</sup> Though not one of the original Apostles, Paul the expositor of the content of the Gospel of Christ and the Apostle to the Gentiles, was the defender of the Apostles' teaching against all departures from it.<sup>16</sup> If he had had the four Gospels before him, he could not have given us a portrait of Jesus the Christ, more like the one they present, than he has given. If then there be in the four Gospels "a supernatural coloring" of the life, works, teaching of the Christ, it evidently was not the primitive community that did this. It was the Apostles' teaching.

But again, this alleged "coloring" is a misleading metaphor. There is the coloring of the artist's pigments and

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Acts ii. 42, with 2 Pe. iii. 2.

<sup>16</sup> 1 Cor. iv. 9; Eph. iii. 5; 1 Thess. ii. 6.



brush,—perhaps to flatter his subject. Such a coloring, critics of the school of Pfleiderer insist, has given us the portraiture of Jesus the Christ in the Gospels. But there is another and different kind of coloring. We mean the blended shadings, the delicate tints and the deep, rich primary color which the sunshine paints on the flower. The sunshine does not make the coloring and then paint it on the opening flower. As well think of the sunshine painting a flower upon the face of a rock. The sunshine brings out the coloring that first in the bud was to be in the flower, thus revealing its beauty. What sunshine is to the flower, the Holy Spirit was to be and is to the person, the life, the teaching, the work, the sufferings and death—hence to the resurrection of Jesus and His enthronement at the right hand of God the Father. For the Holy Spirit was not, and could not be the interpreter of Christ and the content of the Gospel until Christ had completed the work He came to do and resumed, as Mediator, the glory He had with the Father before the world was. This interpretation began on the Day of Pentecost,<sup>17</sup> but it did not end then.<sup>18</sup> It was to be mediated through the subjective experience of those who believed,<sup>19</sup>—not that this experience of itself or any consensus of such experience was to be authoritative in doctrine; but because it was only to such experience that Christ in His person and work could be spiritually interpreted.<sup>20</sup> This may be a reason why even the earliest of the Gospels did not appear until the doctrinal content of the Gospel had been developed and had become the understood faith of the primitive community. What Garvie has said applies here. “Those who accept the historical Jesus as the Son of God and Saviour of the world, and assign the significance and value of Divine revelation to His earthly life, also recognize Him as the Living Christ, present, interested,

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Jno. xiv. 25-26, xvi. 7-14, with Lk. xxiv. 49; Acts i. 3.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. 1 Cor. ii. 4, 10.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. 2 Cor. iv. 6, with iii. 16-18.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. 1 Cor. ii. 14, with Rom. viii. 6.

and active here.”<sup>21</sup> This was the belief of “the primitive community.” But it was a belief founded upon and developed by the preaching and teaching of the Apostles, and not a belief evolved out of the consensus of the self-consciousness of that community. This belief may have been only an ideal wrought into valid historical tradition as to Jesus—the Christ. But if so, it was the Apostles who did this, not “the primitive community”.

We now have come to a point of view from which it is germane to our subject to say something of the insulation of the Hebrew Nation as a nation. Of course, all nations—ancient or modern, are insulated. That is, each nation has a government and laws of its own. Otherwise a nation could not be. A race may continue; but a nation ceases to be when its government is dismantled. And its laws, being without the support of authority, are of necessity abrogated. The Hebrew Nation was theocratic; its laws and legislation were understood by the people to be of theocratic origin and sanction. And here is the fact that contradistinguishes the purpose for which the Hebrew Nation was called into existence and so strangely preserved, notwithstanding the vicissitudes and overwhelming misfortunes and calamities they underwent for so many centuries, from that of other contemporary nations. Beside the Hebrew Nation, there has never been another whose existence, continuance, and destiny were so indissolubly bound up with fidelity to a distinct religious belief.<sup>22</sup> The insulation of the Hebrew

<sup>21</sup> *The Inner Life of Jesus*, pp. 63-64.

<sup>22</sup> The Hebrew Prophets “All start with the belief in a personal God whom they name Jehovah. He is God of Israel. He brought them up out of Egypt.” (Davidson, *The Old Testament Prophecy*, pp. 274-275, cf. p. 421.) “The Hebrew Prophets from Moses onwards, with their superior hold upon morality, which is the very nerve of personality, purified their popular religion, but without losing themselves in abstractions; and it is a mere travesty to speak of their God as an impersonal tendency. From beginning to end He is essentially personal.” (Illingworth, *Personality, Human and Divine*, pp. 55-56.) Max Müller postulates that the formation of a nation is conditioned by previous agreement as to religion. (See his *Science of Religion*, Sec. iii, pp. 144-155.) Is there one instance of this—ancient or modern—except the Hebrew

Nation was such that unlike other nations they were not to seek the extension of their geographical limits by diplomacy or war. The promises made to them were conditioned upon their fidelity to their stewardship. The threatenings and judgments pronounced against them were for unfaithfulness. Sometimes the philosophical student of history finds one of his most perplexing problems in discovering the reason for a nation's existence: for he can find no legacy bequeathed by it to the future.<sup>23</sup> Not so with the student of the history of the Hebrew Nation. He discovers, and plainly enough, the reason both in its history and—having long since passed away—in the legacy it has bequeathed to mankind. For be the hypothesis and method of any one what they may in interpreting the Old Testament, he must premise that it contains the history of an insulated nation, in which insulation this nation was historically allied to the development of an insulated religion. And further, he can scarcely escape premising that the development of this religion could not have been without the isolated nation. For it must be evident that in some definite sense and by some means Israel did become the channel for the accomplishing of the divine redemptive purpose in behalf of humanity. That purpose is the golden thread running through the history and literature of Israel, giving it a variety which is certainly not due to conscious purpose on the part of individual writers.<sup>24</sup> Those who deny that the Old Testament contains a special revelation from God to mankind, nevertheless recognize the oneness of purpose "running through the history and literature of Israel". Otherwise their hypothesis of the evolution of religion could not be applied to the interpretation of the content of the Old Testament.

Nation? The distinctive religious liberty of the Hebrews dates back to the call of Abraham. Cf. Clay, *Amurru, The Home of the Northern Semites*, pp. 85-86. Also Berry, *The Old Testament Among the Semitic Religions*, pp. 193-201.

<sup>23</sup> Greece and Rome are the conspicuous exceptions to this.

<sup>24</sup> Wilson, *How God has Spoken*, p. 161.

If then it be denied that the Old Testament contains a special revelation to mankind, but assumed at the same time that the insulated evolution of the Hebrew religion gave to the world the true conception of ethical monotheism, which had its subsequent relatively fuller exposition in the intuition of the fatherhood of God by Jesus of Nazareth, could this insulated evolution of ethics, religion, theology have been without an insulated nation the history of which was coeval and continuous with that evolution? As a fact it was not. Higher critics and writers on comparative religion and on the philosophy of religion, find much to commend in the religions of Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria,—and perhaps more in Buddhism, Confucianism and Mohammedanism. And it would be anomalous indeed if in these religions they found nothing to commend—nothing that might be compared with the ethics, the religion and the theology of the Old Testament, and as well with those in the New. For whatever the development and progress of any section of the human race, such development and progress surely could not have originated in the primal and essential differentiation of one particular section from the race in its totality of potentialities. No man, be he scientist, philosopher, historian, or higher critic, has any warrant in known facts for affirming such original and fundamental differentiation. Why then should such differentiation be virtually assumed in the case of the Hebrews? Rather, there are far stronger reasons for assuming such differentiation in the Egyptians, the Babylonians, the Assyrians, the people of India, or of China. Yet it is not to the evolution of ethics, religion, and theology in any one or all of these, to which we are pointed to-day, as having bequeathed to us a legacy of invaluable worth. Who commends to us Buddhism, Confucianism or the far later Mohammedanism as in its history, in its achievements, in its status to-day,—to say nothing of the distinctive tenets of either,—as offering the solution of our social and ethical problems, and hence as a foundation for a practical and efficient Optimism?

All these are commended, sometimes eulogized, and much is said of the lessons Christianity may learn from them. But those who do this never fail to give preëminence in ethics, religion, theology to the Bible in its entirety though denying that it contains a special revelation.

We have used the phrase "insulated evolution" to define the trend and outcome of the Hebrew religion in that by which, historically, it is differentiated from all other religions. It is this insulation that demands explanation in any study of comparative religion or in any philosophy of religion. For there is no fact in either profane or sacred history that stands out more boldly or in its results has made a like contribution to ethics, religion and theology. Except for what we have termed "insulated evolution" neither the fact nor the results would have been. We cannot enlarge upon this. But if the Hebrew Prophets about the year 800 B. C., without special revelation or inspiration themselves, and without the guidance and help of such antecedent leadership in the belief of Israel during the preceding centuries of its history, evolved their ethical monotheism out of their own consciousness in some such way as Raplan defines,<sup>25</sup> then why did not the seers, the prophets, the "advanced thinkers" of other and contemporary religions do the same thing? There is nothing captious or evasive in this question. But we are not aware that writers on the evolution of religion, on the philosophy of religion, or on comparative religion, now regard it as a question of special importance. W. Robertson Smith easily disposes of it.

<sup>25</sup> Raplan's *Psychology of Prophecy* has only very recently appeared. So far as we know it is the first formally scientific exposition of Prophecy. Of Revelation he gives this psychological definition: "Revelation, as I conceive it, therefore, is a sudden mysterious awareness of an inflow of thought, an inundation of spirit, an awakening of mind, seemingly from unaccountable sources, and, therefore, believed to be from non-natural channels through supernatural agency." (p. 110.) The sub-title, "A Study of the Prophet Mind as Manifested in the Hebrew Prophets," explains the purpose of the book. It really differentiates in nothing essential "the Prophetic Mind" of the Hebrew Prophets from that of the prophets of Paganism. In both, psychologically understood—prophecy is one and the same.



He says: "What is often described as the natural tendency of Semitic religion towards ethical monotheism, is in the main nothing more than a consequence of the alliance of religion and monarchy."<sup>26</sup> This alliance was germinal of "the way in which the prophets conceived of Jehovah's sovereignty."<sup>27</sup> But "in Judaism the spirit of loyalty was allied with genuine moral earnestness."<sup>28</sup> His conclusion is that "in other nations individual thinkers rose to lofty conceptions of a supreme deity, but in Israel, and in Israel alone, these conceptions were incorporated in the accepted worship of the national god. And so of all the gods of the nations Jehovah alone was fitted to become the God of the whole earth."<sup>29</sup> Smith gives about ten pages to a discussion of the subject of which we have stated only four of the salient points. But these are enough to show that he deals with the question as it makes the evolution of religion integral to its answer. Jevons has recently, though somewhat sympathetically, criticised the position of Smith. He says:<sup>30</sup> "The monotheism of the Jews is a unique and solitary phenomenon in the history of religion. Nowhere else in the world has the development of religion culminated in monotheism. The reasonable inference from this patent and fundamental fact is, that nowhere else can religion have developed along the same lines as among the Jews." Why this difference? Smith's explanation does not explain as Jevons shows conclusively. We have used the phrase "insulated evolution" tentatively only as a working definition. For in fact evolution allows nothing of the kind, because in the theory of the evolution of religion, the Hebrew religion and the religion of Christ are in the same category as the evolution of the soaring eagle from its reptilian ancestor.

Such in general is the interpretation of the Bible in its

<sup>26</sup> *The Religion of the Semites*, p. 74, Ed. 1889.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 81.

<sup>30</sup> *Introduction to the History of Religion*, p. 388. Comp. p. 390. IV. Edition.

entirety lying behind and defining the optimism that is to supersede the optimism of the Gospel of Christ. Hence, the only optimism that meets the demand of the present is an optimism defined and delimited by the ethical, religious, and theological evolution of the past which as yet has had its highest and purest expression in the religion of the Hebrews and in the exceptional intuition Jesus of Nazareth had of the Fatherhood of God—consequently of the sonship and brotherhood of mankind. This optimism is to be for us the inspiring motive for the present—the prophet of the future. But it is in nothing a finality. For, as we have seen, the only finality the evolution of religion allows is a finality inseparable from the ultimate finality of the whole cosmic evolution.—something in the very far-off future. That issue for humanity under the existing order of things is portrayed in roseate colors. But as yet the evolution of religion in the Old and New Testaments is given preëminence in this portrayal—especially the life, character, ethical teachings of Jesus—the Christ. Of the many confirmations of this we could easily adduce, we offer but one. Le Conte is neither a Higher Critic nor a theologian, but a scientist and a thorough-going evolutionist. He says, “The most powerfully attractive ideal ever presented to the human mind, and, therefore, the most potent agent in the evolution of human character, is the Christ. This ideal must come, whether in the imagination or in the flesh we say not, but must come—somehow in the course and not in the end. At the end the whole human race drawn upward by this ideal must reach the fulness of the stature of Christ.”<sup>31</sup> No one, so far as we know, has stated this position from the optimistic point of view more explicitly than Le Conte does here. But the changes are being rung easily upon it. We are told that this is *the* essence of *the* mission of Jesus the Christ, while, in almost the same breath we are warned against interpreting and understanding the Gospel of Christ as the finality of revelation. Nor are all by any means so confident

<sup>31</sup> *Evolution of Religion*, pp. 363-364.

as Le Conte seems to be that the Christ will continue to be "the most potent agent in the evolution of human character." He may prove to have been only a link in the chain of evolution as it moves toward its ultimate issue. Some see even now the evidences of this. Comte omitted the name of Christ from his roster of illustrious men who bequeathed legacies to mankind. Foster anticipates the coming of a time when Christ may be forgotten. Many even now doubt whether Christ has any message for our age. And Savage speaks for many when he says "It matters not therefore that Christianity (he means the Unitarian conception of it) is the last and most perfect system of religion; since it is a product of evolution it will be set aside by evolution."<sup>32</sup>

But as yet this is more a sporadic and isolated than a converging tendency. What it presages does not here concern us. What we have kept steadily in the prospective is the optimism founded upon an "ethical Gospel,"<sup>33</sup> which is the heritage of the evolution of religion in the history of the Hebrew Nation, and afterward fully evolved in the life, character and teachings of Jesus of Nazareth, and in His intuition of the Fatherhood of God and of the sonship and brotherhood of man. We may now dwell, as briefly as possible, upon the cardinal points in the general conclusion to which our line of thought and argument leads.

(a) The new optimism logically rejects all that is basal to the optimism of the Gospel of Christ, that is, the special inspiration of the Bible; the miraculous conception and

<sup>32</sup> *The Morals of Evolution*, p. 187. Quoted by Alviella, *Contemporary Evolution of Religious Thought*, p. 217.

<sup>33</sup> Sanday, quoting a writer in the *Hibbert Journal* who describes the New Theology as "a return to simplicity of statement and to the preaching of an ethical Gospel" which "discards every theologumenon which has not a practical value," says: "The mischief lies in the sweeping negative, which may well set the loyal Christian on his guard, as he knows how much that is precious to him may easily be included. . . . There, once more, we know what to expect; and I am afraid our expectations are realized to a greater extent than they need be." (*The Life of Christ in Recent Research*, pp. 151-154).

bodily resurrection, hence the Incarnation, Deity, and glorification of Christ with the Father, of Christ the finality as the self-revelation of God to mankind. We do not mean the criticism and restatement of the formulation of these beliefs of the evangelical faith—which is one thing. But their rejection *in toto* which is altogether another. The issue here is not whether these beliefs are true or false *per se*; but that the new optimism has no place for them. For they are eliminated by the hypothesis and methods of Higher Criticism.<sup>34</sup> This may not be at first, but the gravitation from the first is that way. Regarded as subordinate, therefore, relatively indifferent, they are not in any case to be held as essential to the Gospel of Christ. This position is indefensible, and its maintenance is impossible from a psychological point of view. For in nothing can the human mind long tolerate the attitude of doubt on any subject of inquiry, and especially upon any subject related to religious belief. It logically demands and presses toward a definite conclusion *pro* or *con*. Here neutrality and indeterminateness are in the nature of the case impossible as they can be in nothing else. It is the evolutionary philosophy of religion that predetermines the direction of the gravitation and dictates the conclusion. The foundations of the new optimism are so radically other than those of the optimism of the Gospel of Christ, that whatever is distinctive fundamentally in the latter, is by the imperiousness of the logical gravitation in the former rejected. The evidences of this are now before us. The cleavage is sharp. Compromise is impossible. Antagonism is inevitable.

(b) The new optimism emphasizes social progress—and does not, except indirectly, emphasize the salvation of man as a sinner from sin. Solidarity is far more prominent in its conception of mankind than the individual. Its unit is not the individual, though its free use of the nomenclature of Christianity and the language of the Gospels especially, seems to give the impression that it is most zealous for the

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Forsyth, *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, p. 103.

individual. But its practical aim is not the individual first, and then through the individual the betterment and ethical uplift of society and thereby the promotion of the progress of humanity. Its normal tendency has been the reverse of this. Nor could it be logically otherwise. The cosmic conception that molds its theory of the evolution of religion does not place the primary emphasis upon the salvation of the individual from sin. It is needless to show that the optimism of the Gospel of Christ emphasizes, above all beside, the salvation of the individual sinner from sin. It was in this that early evangelism won all its victories, and in three centuries wrought such marvellous ethical and social transformation among peoples so long and so thoroughly dominated by paganism. And here again compromise is impossible. Antagonism is inevitable. The evidence is abundant and irresistible that the power of the optimism of the Gospel of Christ has been in the radical change it wrought in the individual. By this it became the source of the transformation of society. The new optimism gives no sign of having a like power. Nor is evidence in sight that it ever will possess it. For, *ex hypothesi*, it cannot move faster than the evolutionary process that molds it. It can have no other or greater inhering initiation. If the optimism of the Gospel of Christ had had no other initiative, would Christianity have made for itself the place it holds in the history of human progress?

(c) The new optimism emphasizes the existing order of things as the horizon of its vision. Its evolutionary genesis and mold—we may add, its confident prophecy as to the future of humanity, necessitates this. All this optimism is to achieve for mankind is predetermined by the potentialities of the present order of things. A future state of existence may be assumed, but can never be more than an assumption in the new optimism; for there is nothing in it that makes the belief in a future state of existence fundamental. The more closely the new optimism by means of advance in scientific certainty, and in both the philosophy



of history and the philosophy of religion, allies itself intelligently with the entirety of the evolutionary process under the existing order of things, the more determinate of the content and the incentive to endeavor becomes the horizon bounding that order. For no matter how greatly that horizon may be enlarged, it is always the same order of things. It never includes anything beyond this order of things—either in time or space or eternity. And here again the new optimism is self-differentiated from the optimism of the Gospel of Christ in a way and for reasons that make compromise impossible and antagonism inevitable. For the foundations upon which the optimism of the Gospel rests are not delimited by the existing order of things. They are not predetermined by either time or space. They are timeless and eternal in the redemptive purpose of God. This is the genesis of the optimism of the Gospel of Christ. If it include the existing order of things, which certainly, according to Holy Scripture, it does, it includes that order because of the order of things that is to follow. Here is the inhering power of self-initiation in the Gospel of Christ—the reason why it has brought to pass results in human progress through the salvation of individuals, giving them the hope and the inspiration of the certainty of eternal life, which the new optimism cannot give.

Our limits forbid further analysis of the conclusion we have reached. It is enough to add that the issue we have defined has become so acute that a reaction is certain,—indeed has begun. Not to mention other reasons, the elimination of special revelation with all it includes, from the Old and New Testament, has necessitated a corresponding elimination of what the universal self-consciousness of man has recognized as inhering in the reality of his being. If radical criticism has left only an expurgated Bible, it has defined a corresponding conception of man. For the Bible is addressed as a revelation of God to man, to the totality of the being man, his life here and his eternal destiny. And, therefore, whatever is rejected in the foundation and content

of the optimism of the Gospel of Christ, must by so much delimit our conception of man in the totality of his being. In other words, it requires the assumption that in the reality of the being of man there is nothing responding to the self-revelation of eternal redemption in Christ Jesus. But we ask, are not the distinctive truths of that self-revelation just what man has felt after if haply he might find them? And further, we ask, could man have responded to that revelation and have had the experimental assurance of its adaptation to the needs of his being, or have been the subject of so radical a change in his character<sup>35</sup> by the power of the Gospel of Christ, if this were not so? The millions who have believed this Gospel and in whom it wrought such miracles in character and life, constitute an irrefutable answer to our four-fold question. We here leave our discussion of the new optimism *versus* the optimism of Christ, which we have intended to be tentative and suggestive, not exhaustive.

*Germantown, Pa.*

W. H. H. MARSH.

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<sup>35</sup> Percy Gardner, though dissenting so largely from the evangelical faith, gives considerable prominence to Christian experience. In anticipating criticism for this he says (*Exploratio Evangelica*, p. 25), "The phenomena of religion are by far most fully and clearly displayed in Christian experience. . . . In my opinion the great teachers of Christianity have far better understood the psychology of religion than have any other investigators who have proceeded on other lines."

# REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

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## APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. By JAMES ORR, M.A., DD., Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology in the United Free Church College, Glasgow. 8vo.; pp. xii, 224. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1910.

This book comes to us under a great name. Ever since the publication of "the Christian View of God and the World," some twenty years ago, Dr. James Orr has been regarded both as one of the most learned of Christian scholars and as one of the most up-to-date as well as least concessive of the defenders of the Christian faith.

The aim of the volume under review is in accord with this reputation of its author. 'He would defend revelation and inspiration in connection with the Bible by a more positive view of the structure of the Bible itself than is at present prevalent' In other words, he would prove by the assured results of the best biblical scholarship that the Bible is the supernaturally inspired record of a revelation which is supernatural both as to its source and as to its method.

His style, too, is what might have been expected, and so is every way worthy of his great theme. Indeed, we think that, as a writer, Dr. Orr is at his best in this volume. There are the same comprehensiveness and variety and minuteness of information, the same absolute command of his material, the same fairness and force in argument, to which we have all along been accustomed; but it seems to us that his temper is even more genial, his reasoning even more direct, and his sentences even simpler and more flowing than usual. In short, we do not see how he could have presented his views better than he has done.

In these views, moreover, we find much to admire and to commend. With his aim, of course, we are in heartiest sympathy. With his position that "a positive view of the structure of the Bible, the recognition of a true supernatural revelation in its history, and a belief, in accordance with the teaching of Christ and His apostles, in the inspiration of the record imply each other,"—with this we find ourselves in full accord. We would call attention, too,—to particularize among excellencies too numerous to be even named—we would call attention to his insistence on and his explication of the distinction between the natural and the supernatural, to his emphasis on the historical character of the Old Testament, to his discussion of the miracle

as related to revelation, to his treatment of prophecy, to his proof of the supernaturalness of Jesus. Along these lines specially it seems to us that he has written most illuminatingly and has indeed made the newer learning vindicate the Scriptures as the very "Word of God."

And yet, when all this has been said, the reviewer is forced to add that, in his judgment, at several points of present controversy, Dr. Orr takes positions which are both incorrect and prejudicial to that view of the Bible which he would establish.

1. He fails to relate special revelation to sin. He discovers the need of such revelation in "a true idea of God," in the "conception of religion as personal fellowship," and in "a right idea of the plan of the world." While, however, these are all real reasons why special revelation is demanded, not one of them is the reason which the Bible gives. Its teaching is that Christ, who is the revelation of God, was manifested on account of sin. The Gospel was given for and because of sinners. "God gave his only-begotten Son that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." (John iii. 16) Moreover, not to present sin as the immediate and great occasion for special revelation is to pass over the real because the self-evident reason for its necessity. Doubtless, had man never sinned, his religious nature would at length demand an immediate and special revelation of God, such an one, therefore, as nature never could have afforded. Sin, however, cannot but demand at once that God himself should speak to us: for what the sinner needs is grace; and grace is not an attribute of God's essential nature, but the most glorious trait of his moral character. God's purpose of grace, consequently, while it may be hinted at, can not be assured by any mediate or natural or general revelation. If we are to know that and how God has chosen to save sinners, he must himself tell us. Hence, for Dr. Orr not to connect special revelation with sin is to undertake to defend the former and yet omit the divine and the strongest argument for it.

2. He exaggerates ethnic revelation. To us it almost seems as if he confounded common grace with special revelation, the operation of the Spirit acting through the truth, whether of the Gospel or of reason or of conscience, and the operation of the Spirit making known truth not given in either reason or conscience. Of course, we are not unmindful that "God has never left himself without witness," and we have not forgotten Job and Melchizedek and Balaam. These, however, seem to us examples of what the Spirit accomplished by means of the light of reason and conscience and above all through the primitive revelation, the light of which, as Dr. Orr justly remarks, was never wholly lost: they imply, as after all our author himself is careful to point out, illumination of what has been revealed rather than special and supernatural revelation. But if this be so, why suggest even the possibility of such a revelation having been made to the heathen? In doing this does not one weaken the argument for the necessity of such a revelation for the heathen?

3. He misses, as it seems to us, the true relation of fact to word, of

life to doctrine, in revelation. While he admits that "in all cases the divine act is connected with the divine word, without which its meaning would not be intelligible," he holds that it is still the historical element, the fact, the life, in the Biblical revelation which gives it "its distinctive character." Is this the truth, however? Of course, our preaching and even our faith would be vain, if Christ had not risen according to the Scriptures; and so, as Dr. Orr properly and cogently insists, the historical element is fundamental in revelation: but is it not the didactic element which gives to the revelation of Scripture its distinctive character? Suppose that we had nowhere been taught that Christ "died for our sins and was raised again for our justification," how would the history of his resurrection and, indeed, the whole Gospel, differ, not in truth, but in character, from many heathen fables? Is it not the words of Christ that give its significance to the fact of Christ? Is it not more nearly true that doctrine should interpret life than that life should make doctrine? And this mistake, too, can not but embarrass our author's argument. It causes him to adopt a principle which is admitted in no other sphere and the reason for which he does not give. If a man explains his conduct, can the world be brought to regard anything as so important because so distinctive as his explanation of his conduct? Even when his conduct is not so much the foundation for teaching as itself didactic, still it will be around the man's own interpretation, whenever given, that interest will centre.

4. As might have been expected, he considers the facts of the Scriptures before the latter's teaching with regard to its inspiration. Instead of analyzing the testimony of Scripture to its own inspiration and then inquiring how far the facts agree with this testimony, he begins with the facts which illustrate the *nature* of inspiration as seen in the book itself and then tries to show how this agrees with the witness of Scripture to itself. To us, however, this seems to be a wrong procedure. In the case of other books the first question would be: What has the document to say of itself? This would be the first fact to be considered. This is so for two reasons. One is that if the claims of the book are contradicted by the facts of its nature, that discredits the book and renders further examination unnecessary, but in order to this conclusion the claims must at the outset be understood. The other reason is that the claims of a book determine the presumption with which its examination should be undertaken. If the Bible claims to be infallible and inerrant, then we must examine the facts in which this claim fulfils or contradicts itself with a presumption that we could not and should not have in the case of a book which made no such claims. It is as necessary that it should be so as it is impossible for us to approach any question of which we know anything without some presumption. Hence, again, Dr. Orr weakens his argument. Without explaining why, he adopts a procedure elsewhere regarded vicious.

5. As also might be anticipated, he denies the inerrancy of the Bible.



That is, while he heartily insists that most alleged discrepancies are such only in appearance and can be explained away, and that "the most searching inquiry still leaves us with a Scripture, supernaturally inspired to be an infallible guide in the great matters for which it was given—the knowledge of the will of God for our salvation in Christ Jesus, instruction in the way of holiness, and the hope of eternal life," he is unwilling to affirm the truth to fact of the *ipsissima verba* in all less important respects. This is consistent with his position just noted. If one will determine his view of inspiration solely by the facts in which the nature of the Bible appears, then he must hold with Dr. Orr; for undoubtedly there are statements in the Bible which have not been reconciled with what seem to be the facts. But is not this again a wrong method of procedure? If one would understand Darwin's doctrine of natural selection, he inquires, not what do the facts of nature that he would explain by his doctrine show that he should have said, but what did he himself actually say. And if we would ascertain the truth of his doctrine, we take into consideration, even in his case, more than the facts by which it must be tested. Because of his high character as a man of science, we would not reject even his doctrine on the ground that there were some facts which it did not as yet seem to fit. In a word, though a man and essentially fallible, it would be felt that his character ought to count for something. How much more, then, ought the character of him who is the Son of God and so essentially infallible to count for much? And, therefore, the question is not, whether in view of some apparent discrepancies in Scripture, we must not deny its inerrancy. It is whether, in view of the facts, that no one of these discrepancies has been proved to involve a contradiction; that the doctrine of inerrancy would be unlike every other Scriptural doctrine if it did not meet with difficulties in the facts that it would interpret; that the progress of scholarship tends, as Dr. Orr gladly admits, to remove these discrepancies; that the doctrine of inerrancy rests on the same basis as every other doctrine of the Bible in that it is its plain teaching; and specially that our Lord, who is himself "the truth", not only held the view of his day, which was that the testament then existing was infallible, but explicitly taught that "the Scripture cannot be broken" (John x. 35)—in view of all these considerations, the question would seem to be whether, in spite of some difficulties that we see not how to overcome, we ought not, because of the amount and character of the testimony, to insist on the absolute inerrancy of the original autographs of the Word of God. Any other procedure in other matters the common sense of men would condemn. Moreover, our author's course weakens his position yet further. The idea of a supernatural revelation is a difficult one for many to accept, but it becomes more difficult if we have to conceive of it as errant. To err we feel to be human, and we can see no reason why he who is himself "the Truth" may err in the fact that what is said relates to unessentials. It is the truth of his own nature and not the nature of what he is saying that necessitates and guarantees his inerrancy.

6. He minimizes Christ's knowledge as man and, indeed, would seem even to forget that in him there are two natures. This results necessarily from the position which we have just been criticizing. God, it is felt, cannot err. Therefore, it must be shown that in becoming man God so emptied himself of divinity as himself to become capable of and even liable to error. But is this according to the teaching of Scripture as to the person of our Lord? He was and is still and ever will be a true man, "bone of our bone" and "flesh of our flesh." But he is not an ordinary man. To begin with, his humanity is perfect. Now this, as Dr. Orr says, is consistent with limitation, nay, it implies it. The human, though perfect, can not be or do or know all things. Hence, our Lord affirmed that as man he did not know the time of the day of judgment. Limitation, however, is very different from error and does not imply it. A man may know nothing of Assyrian and yet be a scholar; but if a man professes to know Assyrian and still makes mistakes in it, he can not be a perfect scholar. Moreover, though the two natures in Christ remain forever unmixed and distinct, the divine must powerfully influence the human. While our Lord as a man is all that we are, save sin, we are not all that he is even as man. The union with the divine nature must exalt inconceivably the human nature and qualify it for its work. Is it to be supposed, then, that Christ would or could be left to hold or to teach error? Even though the errors as to the Old Testament were as unimportant and unessential as is claimed, this is still so. Error of any kind is incompatible with Deity. A divine person—and that Christ always was—can not err. The human nature, if the divine person has assumed one, must, because human, continue subject to limitation; but because of the divine personality into which it has entered, it can not, even as human, make mistakes. To hold that it could is to assert a contradiction. This is the greatest stumbling-block in our author's way. The confessional view of Christ's person is undoubtedly mysterious, but that which Dr. Orr falls back on is contradictory.

7. In line with the procedure just noticed, and growing out of the same misconception, he conceives of special revelation itself as imperfect. It must be so, it seems to him, because it is progressive. It is on this ground that he would explain the ethical difficulties of the Old Testament, such as the sanction of laxity in the marital relation, the wars of extermination, etc. These are imperfections, but then they do not count against the Old Testament because it was given in the childhood of the race and belonged to a preparatory dispensation. Such reasoning, however, would not be tolerated elsewhere. A wise parent may not require of his children all that is right; but, and specially because he is dealing with children, he will require and sanction only what is right. He will distinguish between completeness and perfection; and while he will recognize that his teaching, because of his pupils' lack of development, must be very incomplete, he will recognize at the same time that, also because of this, it must from the first be perfect. Now it is so with the Old Testament. It neither

requires nor sanctions, when fairly exegeted, anything inconsistent with the absolute holiness of God's nature. For example, the Seventh Commandment rests, not on the divine nature, but on God's free constitution of things; and while we, as belonging to and under that constitution, have no right of ourselves to modify or set it aside, God, as being its author, has the right to do so when and where and as he pleases, provided it be consistent with his nature or in the interests of righteousness, as in all these cases it can be shown to be. In a word—for we must conclude this already too long review—there is a radical difference between completeness and perfection; and while supernatural revelation may often be incomplete, and while its adaptation to its time and mission may, as in the bud, consist in its incompleteness, it must from the first and in all its stages be conceived as perfect. What is imperfect, what in its principle is out of harmony with the divine nature, can not be regarded as the very word of him who in himself is perfection. It is our author's occasional failure to recognize this which seems to us the chief weakness of his in most respects very admirable book. He would "contend earnestly for the faith which was once for all delivered unto the saints;" but he is sometimes blind to the fact that, much light as the modern view of the Bible may throw on it, still, its very conception of the Supernatural is the denial of that Scriptural and rational doctrine of supernatural revelation which Dr. Orr, in common with all the saints, would vindicate.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE SPIRITUAL NATURE OF MAN. By STANTON COIT, Ph.D. 8vo., pp. 112.

The West London Ethical Society: The Ethical Church, Queen's Road, Bayswater.

This is an ingenious attempt to dispense with God by putting man in his place. "The Group Spirit", "the Social Oversoul", the "General Will and the Common Heart of social humanity", whatever you please to call the human race conceived as a unity, is our Heavenly Father. Jesus Christ is "that idealistic trend which exists in and out of the churches, and which has freed the slaves, is emancipating woman and is bringing kings and lords, and all worshippers of Mammon, into the fellowship of a universal equality." "Religion" as ordinarily conceived, "is just a discipline devised by statesmen to help nations in the struggle for existence." And "the affirmation which the nations wait for is that finite intelligences, coöperating for the common ends of mundane existence, are themselves of infinite worth and of ultimate and absolute reality, in the same sense in which such assertions have been made concerning an Infinite Ego or Creator." The fundamental difficulty with this whole position is that it rests on an absurdity. It assumes that finite human intelligences can, by coöperating and so multiplying themselves, become the Infinite Ego or Creator. That is, in the last analysis, it identifies quantity and quality.

*Princeton*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES AND ETHICS. By FERDINAND S. SCHENCK, D.D., LL.D., Author of *The Bible Reader's Guide*, *The Ten Commandments and the Lord's Prayer: A Sociological Study*, *Modern Practical Theology*, *The Sociology of the Bible*. 8 vo.; pp. vii, 176. New York: Young Men's Christian Association Press. 1910.

This book is "offered as a text-book in colleges—and mainly for voluntary classes in those state and other universities and colleges where these subjects are not taught, and for such classes of young men and women wherever formed." As should be the case, though covering a great deal of ground, it is very concise and simple. The deeper problems it passes over, and its method is that of question and answer. To the reviewer this method seems somewhat mechanical, and as unlikely to develop the student so much as if he were expected to frame for himself his answers out of the material given to him; but we can well understand how, with so competent a teacher as the author to discuss and amplify the answers, the method of this book might be admirable.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE STUDY OF RELIGION IN THE ITALIAN UNIVERSITIES. By LOUIS HENRY JORDAN, Special Lecturer on Comparative Religion: Author of *Comparative Religion: Its Genesis and Growth*; *Comparative Religion: Its Method and Scope*, etc. In collaboration with Baldassare Labanca, Professor of the History of Christianity in the University of Rome, Author of *della Religione e della Filosofia Cristiano*, *Storia e Filosofia dello Religioni*, etc. 8vo.; pp. xxviii, 324. London: Henry Frowde. Oxford University Press, Amen Corner, E. C. Edinburgh, Glasgow, New York, Toronto and Melbourne. 1909.

"This volume presents a synopsis and review of the history of the study of religion in one of the chief strongholds of Christendom. Its contents are furnished in about equal proportions by its two collaborators, one half of the book being written by the author, while the remainder consists of a translation which Mr. Jordan has made of Prof. Labanca's monograph, *Difficolto antiche e nuevo degli studi religiosi in Italia*. In addition to the personal assistance which Prof. Labanca has supplied, the author has adopted some suggestions offered by Prof. Mariano of Florence, and has incorporated them in his manuscript. The exposition, taken as a whole, constitutes a complete survey of the subject with which it deals. The account given of the conflict that resulted ultimately in the abolition of the Theological Faculties in all the Italian Universities is probably the fullest and the most exact that has yet been published in England. A new spirit of inquiry is spreading over Italy, and must, before long, affect very powerfully the critical study of religion in the national Universities."

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.



## DIE VERSCHIEDENEN TYPEN RELIGIÖSER ERFAHRUNG UND DIE PSYCHOLOGIE.

Von D. WILH. SCHMIDT, ord. Professor an der Universität Breslau.  
Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann. 1908. 8vo., pp. iv, 318.

Dr. Wihl. Schmidt, to whose colleague at Breslau, Prof. G. Wobermin, the German translation of James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* is due, has taken this book as the starting point of an investigation of the relations of psychology to research in the sphere of religious phenomena. His work, as it lies before us, falls into three parts which may be headed in turn, briefly, "James," "Psychology," "Religion," the intention of the whole being to arrive at a well-grounded conception of what may be expected of psychology as an aid to the understanding of religion. That psychology, the sphere of whose observation embraces the whole spiritual world, cannot neglect so great and universal a spiritual phenomenon as religion, goes without saying. That the study of religion cannot afford to turn its back on any source of light upon its problems is equally clear. That the two lines of research should coöperate lies therefore in the nature of the case. The only question concerns the manner of their coöperation. James's book has the value of a first reconnaissance of a great, and hitherto as good as unknown, field of research, and as such has a distinct pedagogical significance. What it chiefly teaches us, however, is how not to do it. We cannot reach the specifically religious feeling by way of examination of merely assumed kindred moods, analogous feelings, fixed ideas, morbid states of mind. When we are saying this, we are setting aside, however, not psychology but James's method, for the study of religion. Nevertheless psychology cannot expect to say the last word with reference to religion; whether in its origin, or in its development and its stages, religion stands outside the reach of science, which always finds religion extant, however far it stretches its investigations,—a thing to be acknowledged rather than dominated by it. No one can pass judgment on such a phenomenon, except one who knows it from his own experience. And it follows from this that there can be no such thing as a universally valid explanation of religion. This is the result of the peculiarity of religion, which, as an actual experience, is and abides an individual thing. So far, however, as this inner experience manifests itself in common traits seen in different cults, and shows tendencies to similar lines of development through the historical evolution of religious cults, it may become the object of scientific study, and here psychology will find an ever enlarging sphere. These are in brief Dr. Schmidt's conclusions, after a very thorough and detailed discussion of the whole field, presented of course from his own particular standpoint, which is fundamentally that of the old mediating theology with an emphasis on individualism and the autonomy of the will peculiarly his own.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.



COMPARATIVE RELIGION. A Survey of Its Recent Literature. By LOUIS HENRY JORDAN, B.D., Author of "Comparative Religion: Its Genesis and Growth," "The Study of Religion in the Italian Universities," "Modernism in Italy," etc. Second Section, 1906-1909. 8vo., pp. 72. Edinburgh: Otto Schulze & Company, 20 South Frederick Street. 1910.

This pamphlet reviews twenty-five of the works on Comparative Religion issued during the years indicated on the title page. That these works have been wisely chosen and discriminatingly reviewed does not need to be added when once the reviewer has been named. The criticism of these books is followed by "a reasoned summary of the conclusions to which, as regards the present outlook of Comparative Religion, it is inevitable that every open-minded reader must be led." To this last statement the writer of these notices feels constrained to except. He is not ready to admit that he is not open-minded. But neither can he consent to the wisdom or the justice of classing and analyzing with the other religions, and as the other religions, that one which alone he believes to be supernatural. Unless it be assumed that this distinction can no longer be maintained, it must be recognized in order to any true comparison. That there may be such, one of the chief conditions is that essential differences in the things to be compared should first be noted and appreciated.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION. A Study in Anthropology and Social Psychology. By IRVING KING, Ph.D. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1910. Pp. xxii, 371. \$1.75.

In this study in the social psychology of primitive religion, which Dr. King of the University of Iowa assures us is written in no dogmatic spirit, we are furnished with an instructive attempt to interpret the history of religion in terms of the philosophy of pragmatism. Students who approach the problem with different presuppositions, especially those who consider a Divine revelation *a priori* possible and *a posteriori* discoverable in the history of religious development, will find occasion seriously to differ with Dr. King, but will, nevertheless, be glad to make hearty acknowledgment of his psychological insight, his lucid style, and his thorough command of the best ethnological sources.

Dr. King contends that the religious consciousness cannot be differentiated from general consciousness, either on the side of content or function. With somewhat less petulance than is frequent, Dr. King declines, in the name of the science of psychology, to reckon with a possible connection between the natural and the supernatural, declaring that should such connection exist, it is incapable of description by the categories of experience. The religious consciousness is, therefore, not a development from any innate religious instinct or perception, but is a type of valuational attitude, which has been *built up* through the overt activities which appear in social groups.

Acts always precede a consciousness of value in a given direction: the activities of primitive social groups, both those which appeared with reference to meeting various practical needs of the life process, and those which were spontaneous and playful, led to the appreciation of the universe as full of a Mysterious Power, such as the *manitou* of the Algonkin, or the *mana* of the Melanesian. In general, it may be said that magic is a relatively individualistic and secret way of reacting to this Potency, while religion is the social and public reaction, which finds expression in ceremonials of varying complexity and significance. The objects which have engaged the activities of a people in the elementary processes of food-supply, protection, and reproduction seem to them surcharged with this impersonal Power, and form a rallying point for religious values. As soon as man conceived of an active force present in the world, it was natural for him to regard persons as infected with this powerful contagion. So originated the culture-heroes and the man-gods of whom Mr. J. G. Frazer has given so full an account. These deities, who are in the beginning regarded as closely and actively related to some acute social interest develop in the direction of the extension or variation of the social life which called them forth. The essential elements of a supreme being are, moreover, present in the god of such a social group or tribe. "For practical purposes, he is a supreme being because the tribe itself is a limit to the comprehension of further values", though he may not be intellectually so conceived until a later stage is reached (p. 269). The ethical conceptions of the Hebrews are conceived to be the product of such a psychological monotheism. "The distinguishing characteristic of the religio-ethical ideas of the later Hebrew prophets is that they are the outcome of reflection upon contemporary mores and traditional religious concepts" (p. 280). From the standpoint of Dr. King's pragmatism, the *value* of the ethical monotheism of the Hebrews is not impugned by any attempt to work out its natural history. The peculiar function of religion is in relation to experience. "The only way to prove any claim of theology is to show its vital relation to the crises of life. No one was ever convinced of the truths of religion in any other way nor has any one who believed them from this side lost his faith by mere ratiocination. If such a one has lost his faith, it has been because its vital contact with his life has ceased, and the work of reason is, then, simply to show that what is left is dead" (p. 350).

The philosopher who is not a pragmatist will find himself in fundamental disagreement with Dr. King's presuppositions. The anthropologist will be indebted to him for emphasizing the prevalence among primitive peoples of a belief in a Mysterious Power, call it *manitou*, *mana* or what you will; he will also be grateful to him for calling his attention more closely to the part that is played by the social group as such in the development of cultural ideas, and for many illuminating hints for the solution of particular problems which have long engaged the patience and ingenuity of those who are concerned with

the history of religious and social origins. The Christian will rejoice that it is still possible for Dr. King to declare his faith, though the declaration rests on what will seem to many precarious and insufficient grounds.

*Princeton.*

HAROLD MCA. ROBINSON.

CHRISTIANITY IS CHRIST. By W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS, D. D., Anglican Church Handbooks, Longman's, Green and Co., 39 Paternoster Row, London, New York, Bombay and Calcutta. 1909.

The author of this admirable little book states in his prefatory note that its aim is "to present in a short, popular form—the substance of what has been written in recent years on the central subject of Christianity—the Person and Work of Christ". He endeavors to give a "summary of the Christian position as stated by its leading modern exponents"; and as its purpose is "to be of service", to the clergy and laity "in meeting the various attacks upon the Christian faith", it is in form and substance strongly argumentative and apologetic.

The great central thought of the whole book is suggested by its title. Christianity is Christ; and Christ as portrayed to us in the Gospels, in the church and in religious experience can only be explained and understood upon the basis that He is God manifest in the flesh. Instead of arguing for the truth of Christianity from the historicity or inspiration of the Scriptures, Dr. Thomas begins with the fact of Christ. That this is the foundation of Christianity has always been recognized. It therefore is absolutely necessary to consider who and what Christ was. This brings before us the great question of the Person of Christ.

The order of the development of the argument is as follows: Christ's character as portrayed in the Gospels is absolutely unique and sinless. But this sinless One claimed to be the Son of God. Christ is the great authority as a religious teacher, His teaching is unique. It is inexhaustable, permanent, authoritative and verifiable. His miracles are unique. Taken alone they are of no value but are to be expected in connection with such a one as Christ. The death of Christ was a sacrificial death and He went willingly to die for others. His Resurrection is proved beyond a doubt. (The author gives an admirable summary of the different supplementary arguments for the reality of Christ's resurrection). Such is the picture of Christ as given in the Gospels. The problem is to account for it. Christ's character is real and natural and it is monstrous and impossible to think that it could have been invented by the writers of the Gospels.

Besides all this, we find the Christian church founded on a belief in the Divine Christ, inspired by it, empowered by it and still controlled by it. About us we see Christ now changing human lives and leading his church to victory over all the world. The author

continually presents the question "What manner of man is this"? Who is Christ?

After a chapter on the Virgin birth, which is shown to be required by Christ's divine character, the book concludes with a short discussion of the "Meaning of Christ"—"God reconciling the world to Himself"—and the "Verification of Christ" through the work of the Spirit.

The book deserves a wide reading. It is a fine synthesis of the great arguments for the Person of Christ and for the Divinity of Christ considered from a new viewpoint with much freshness and vigor. The argument is so presented that the conclusion is overwhelming that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that those who believe may have life through His name.

*Cranford, N. J.*

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

GOD AND MAN: PHILOSOPHY OF THE HIGHER LIFE. By E. ELLSWORTH SHUMAKER. G. P. Putman's Sons. Price \$2.00 net. 1909.

As the title suggests, the author treats of the great questions of the relation of God to man and to the world. Starting from the obvious position that man stands in definite, determined physical, psychical, and spiritual relationship to the whole universe and to all things in this world whether present or past, he goes on to consider the "many sided man, himself" and suggests his varied abilities and his possibilities.

The author is at his best when glorifying man and much that he says is thought-producing and inspiring. His treatment of God is not nearly so satisfactory.

Dr. Shumaker treats man's environment or the "World-all" as the cradle or training school used by God to fit man for his great destiny. He vigorously maintains that all nature reveals God at work as the great parent "mothering" the human race. The author tries to draw a parallel between the revelation of God in nature, in Christ, and in His Spirit, and the mode of gaining knowledge in the other spheres where truth is revealed to man or discovered by him. He explains from the view-point of psychological philosophy the approach of God to man, man's need of a decision to seek the highest, and the wonderful richness of the higher life of communion with God.

It is impossible to pass over without comment the form and language of this book. The English is a monument to the unfortunate influence of the German atmosphere. Too frequent use is made of compound words and there are many new derivatives which seem to be imported directly from Teutonic sources. It is also unfortunate that the whole was not condensed into one half its present size as there is far too much repetition and a needless amount of amplification and illustration.

Dr. Shumaker's book is interesting from the point of view of the philosophy of the higher man but has the serious and all too common fault of failing to differentiate sharply between nature and

nature's Maker, of forgetting the great primary fundamental truth that the Christian's Heavenly Father is before all a Person and that His revelation of Himself is that of a person to persons.

Man has all the wonderful possibilities claimed for him in this philosophy with one terrible exception. He lacks both the permanent powerful desire and the strength to rise heavenward. If there were no sin and no consequences of sin, this philosophy might be sufficient. But with the world as it is, we still need the Gospel of the Power of Jesus Christ—the personal, present divine Saviour from sin.

*Cranford, N. J.*

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

PROBLEMS OF YOUR GENERATION. The author claims but to have been privileged to transmit the following chapters. Daisy Dewy. New York: The Arden Press, 122 East 25th St. 1910. Price, Post-paid one dollar.

As the title suggests, this book claims to be a communication from the spirits of those who have died. Its object is to explain the truth of the Infinite and Eternal to the finite minds of those who face life's present pressing problems. It is elementary in teaching, fanciful, foolish and condescending in style, and while full of semi-scientific speculation, contains no new revelation or new synthesis of truth. It is somewhat religious but is not Christian. The publishers have done what they could with the material at their disposal, and this little book might serve as a pretty parlor ornament along with many other works whose chief value is to be found in their attractive binding.

*Cranford, N. J.*

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

PAIN AND SUFFERING. Their place in the World. By the RT. REV. A. C. A. HALL, D.D., Bishop of Vermont. 8vo., pp. 16. Milwaukee: The Young Churchman Co.

This is only a tract, and it is a short one; but it discusses a great and difficult subject, it says all that needs to be said, and we have never heard it said better. Not its least excellence is that in suffering which can not be prevented or removed, it does not hesitate to see the cup which our Heavenly Father gives.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE FUNDAMENTALS. A Testimony to the Truth. Vols. I and II. 8vo., pp. 126 and 125. Testimony Publishing Company, 808 La Salle Ave., Chicago, Ill., U. S. A.

These books belong to a series which will be sent "to every pastor, evangelist, missionary, theological professor, theological student, Sunday school superintendent, Y. M. C. A. and Y. W. C. A. secretary in the English speaking world, so far as the addresses of all these can be obtained." The expense of this undertaking is borne by two Chris-



tian laymen, "because they believe that the time has come when a new statement of the fundamentals of Christianity should be made." The conservative standpoint and the high character of the fourteen papers in these two issues is indicated and guaranteed by the names of the authors. These show that the ablest of our conservative scholars have been secured for this enterprise. We do not see how it can fail to do much good, and we wish for it great success.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE APOLOGETIC OF MODERN MISSIONS. Eight Outline Studies. By J. LOVELL MURRAY, M.A. 8vo., pp. 80. Student Volunteer Movement, 125 East 27th Street, New York.

These studies do not present the argument for the supernaturalness of Christianity that may be based on the foreign missionary movement, but they aim "to examine the more common criticisms of foreign missions," such as: "Criticisms of the idea of foreign missions, Criticisms of the life and qualifications of the missionary, Criticisms of the methods and practices of missions, Criticisms of the results of missions." The chief value of this little volume is in the Bibliography at the close and the references under each topic to pertinent literature.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

A CALL OF ATTENTION TO THE BEHAISTS OR BABISTS OF AMERICA. By AUGUST J. STENSTRAND. 8vo., pp. 36.

This is a decidedly incoherent and sometimes ungrammatical appeal to all seekers after truth, and especially to American Babists to study impartially the early history of Babism.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE HISTORICAL MAN OF NAZARETH. By WILBUR F. BRYANT. 8vo., pp. 121.

Though by a layman, this is an interesting, instructive, and often acute defense of the historical character of the Gospel narratives.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

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## EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

KOSMOS, A Poem from the Proverbs of Solomon, Son of David, Who Ruled in Israel, Translated from the Van Ess Edition of The Septuagint Version, and Compared with American Revised Version of Proverbs of Solomon I-IX, Arranged as Follows: Object of Author, Prologue of Earth, Prologue of Saturn, Address of Sun, of Moon, of Mars, of Mercury, of Jupiter, of Venus, of Saturn, Followed by Epilogue of Saturn, Epilogue of Earth. By JAMES CHESTON MORRIS. For sale by George W. Jacobs and Co., 1216 Walnut St., Philadelphia. 75 cents net. Pp. 32.

Mr. Morris, who appears from the Dedicatory Letter, addressed to the late Bishop McVickar of Rhode Island, to have published already the Book of Ecclesiastes as the Ethics of Solomon, gives no explanation, justification or comment to enlighten the reader as to the peculiar setting he has here given Proverbs i-ix, save a few words in said Letter that are wholly inadequate if intended to satisfy the reader of the author's correctness in his astrological assumptions. Beyond a brief review of David's reign, a reference to Psalm xix and Job xxxviii.7, an allusion to the expressions paths, ways, etc., as intended to mean orbits and the like, an application of ix. 1 ("Wisdom hath hewn out her seven pillars") to the days of the week, and the mere quotation of vii. 21a (wanting in the Hebrew text), there is nothing to assist the expectant and even sympathetic reader in his effort to accompany Mr. Morris on his celestial journeys. The whole booklet leaves an odd impression. In spite of the assignment of the last poem to Earth as her Epilogue, one feels dazed and wonders how he got into this fairyland, why he was led thither and whether he can ever remember how to get there again. If there are any clear allusions in the whole nine chapters to any of the celestial bodies (besides Earth) they are iv.18, a verse which refers to the sun but which appears in the "Address of Mars," and vii. 20, a verse which refers to the moon but which appears in the "Address of Venus." Proverbs ix. 12 appears a happy expression of the reviewer's state of mind on finishing this remarkable publication: "If thou (the author) art wise, thou art wise for thyself"—no one else will ever share that wisdom; "And if thou (the critic) scoffest, thou alone shalt bear it"—we prefer not to scoff.

*Princeton.*

J. OSCAR BOYD

HEBREW INSTITUTIONS, SOCIAL AND CIVIL. By J. B. SHEARER, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Biblical Instruction, Davidson College, N. C. Presbyterian Committee of Publication, Richmond, Virginia, 1910. Pp. 170.

This book belongs to a section of our land and to a past generation. By it the older South, "being dead, yet speaketh." The reviewer is glad to be assured by those who have the right by birth and sympathies to speak for the South of to-day, that the opinions and sentiments on social and civil questions voiced in this book are not its opinions and sentiments. May this younger generation soon prove by its productions that conservatism in theology is not necessarily linked in the South with indefensible traditions, abandoned positions, and conditions that have passed away never to return.

*Princeton.*

J. OSCAR BOYD.

THE QUEST OF THE HISTORICAL JESUS. A Critical Study of its Progress from Reimarus to Wrede. By ALBERT SCHWEITZER, Privatdozent in New Testament Studies in the University of Strassburg. Translated by W. MONTGOMERY, B.A., B.D. With a preface by F. C.

BURKITT, M.A., D.D., Norrisian Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. London: Adam and Charles Black. 1910. 8vo. Pp. vii, 410.

Schweitzer's book, of which this English translation is now offered to the public, contains two distinct elements. The larger part of it is a historical critique of the Life-of-Jesus literature. To this is added a constructive attempt to interpret the life of Jesus on extreme-eschatological lines. The constructive part is, however, of much smaller compass than the historico-critical section and besides brings no new material, being virtually a testatement of the views developed in the author's earlier treatise, *Das Messianitäts-und Leidensgeheimnis. Eine Skizze des Lebens Jesu* (1901.).

The entire book is brilliantly written. Dr. Schweitzer wields a trenchant pen. His thorough familiarity with the extensive literature enables him to handle it with supreme ease. He evinces great skill in making the biographers of Jesus speak for themselves, not so much by direct quotation, but rather by a free reproduction of what is individually-characteristic and epoch-making in the work of each. Still the chief value of the work lies not after all in these popularly-attractive features, but in the philosophic grasp which the author reveals in tracing the inward trend of the Life-of-Jesus movement in its logical necessity from Reimarus up to the present day. As a true philosopher of history he interprets to us in a most illuminating and convincing manner the progress of this theological movement step by step. No doubt it is to no small extent the author's personal detachment from what he describes that enables him to do this. He is so subjectively-free of the theological motives and principles which inspired the "liberal" Life-of-Jesus production as to be for that very reason an ideal judge and historian of the same.

It will well repay us to note briefly some of the outstanding conclusions reached by Dr. Schweitzer concerning the motives, tendencies, methods and results of this interesting phase of theological activity in the nineteenth century which now seems to have reached, if not its ultimate limit, at least a significant mile-stone in its career. As to the motive from which the whole movement sprang we are told that it "did not take its rise from a purely historical interest; it turned to the Jesus of history, as an ally in the struggle against the tyranny of dogma." "Hate as well as love can write a life of Jesus and the greatest of them are written with hate." By "hate" in this connection is meant not hate of the Person of Jesus, but hate of the supernatural nimbus with which He appears surrounded in the faith of the Church. And this defect in the initial motive has proved a veritable *vitium originis* in the entire after-history of the movement. Because the so-called "historical Jesus" was at the outset enlisted as an ally in the great theological strife of the age, he had forever after to put on the armor and wear the colors of the party that had enlisted Him and to share in its successive evolutions and transformations. He had to become all things to all: to the vulgar rationalists a rationalist, to the

liberals a liberal, to the mediating theologians, a mediating type of mind and character. Like a Nemesis this inability to see in Jesus anything else but the reflex of its own opinions and prepossessions has pursued the investigation and treatment of the subject. With unsparing severity the author lays bare its baneful influence upon the "liberal" school in particular. The "liberals" were obsessed with the idea that they had a mission to perform in writing the life of Jesus. It was "to defend the originality of Jesus by ascribing to Him a modernizing transformation and spiritualization of the eschatological system of ideas." The "spiritual" was to them, of course, identical with the content of their own theology. From a different angle, but much to the same effect, a characterization of this school is given in the following sentence: "Historical criticism had become in the hands of most of those who practised it, a secret struggle to reconcile the Germanic religious spirit with the spirit of Jesus of Nazareth." The intimate connection of this whole "liberalizing" tendency with the Marcan hypothesis as a fixed principle in literary criticism is well brought out. Mark with its scarcity of discourse and its assumed gradual development in the career and consciousness of Jesus offers so much less serious resistance to the elimination of the eschatological, unaccountable, in a word the supernatural, than the other sources. The Marcan hypothesis from its very birth was delivered into bondage to an a-priori view of the development of Jesus. Hence not Reimarus, not Strauss in his original *Life of Jesus*, not Bruno Bauer, but Weisse, Wilke, Volkmar, Schenkel, Weizsäcker and H. J. Holtzmann are at one and the same time the god-fathers of the Marcan hypothesis and the typical champions of the "liberal" spiritualizing interpretation of the character and teaching of Jesus.

Not less interesting than all this is the characterization Dr. Schweitzer gives of the method applied in the *Life-of-Jesus* construction. With what self-congratulation and pride was the "liberal" school accustomed to present its own method as the ideally-objective one and as based on and verifiable by the sources, over against the subjective and a-prioristic constructions of the dogmatic tradition. As a matter of fact, if we may believe the author, the modern *Life of Jesus* is not entitled to classification with history, in the strict sense of the word, at all. Dr. Schweitzer, to be sure, states this fact not for the purpose of criticism, but as an inevitable result of the character of the sources. But leaving this opinion for what it is worth, even so the old orthodox contention that the "liberalized" Jesus was not a product of research properly so called, is strikingly verified. To quote once more the author's own words: "The character of the problem is such, that historical experiment must take the place of historical research. That being so it is easy to understand, that to take a survey of the study of the *Life of Jesus* is to be confronted, at first sight, with a scene of the most boundless confusion. A series of experiments are repeated with constantly varying modifications . . . Most of the writers, however, have no suspicion that they are merely repeating an experiment which



has often been made before. Some of them discover this in the course of their work to their own great astonishment—it is so, for instance, with Wrede, who recognizes, that he is working out, though doubtless with a clearer consciousness of his aim, an idea of Bruno Bauer's. If old Reimarus were to come back again, he might confidently give himself out to be the latest of the moderns, for his work rests upon a recognition of the exclusive importance of eschatology, such as only recurs again in Johannes Weiss." All of which amounts to a confession that the modern interpretation of the life of Jesus has been sailing under false colors, when instead of openly acknowledging itself a species of experimentation upon an unwieldy material, it insisted upon posing as the product of genuine research, and demanded, but too often successfully owing to the unwariness of the public, acceptance as such.

The modern treatment of the life of Jesus has according to Dr. Schweitzer proceeded along two distinct lines and accordingly arrived at two distinct conclusions. Along the literary line it has led to thorough-going scepticism, along the historical line to thorough-going eschatology. The former movement culminated in Wrede, the latter Schweitzer, who does not permit his modesty to obscure the truth, finds culminating in himself. Formulated with respect to the central question of the Gospel-history, the Messiahship of Jesus, the difference between the two positions comes to this, that the literary method of approach has issued into explaining the Messianic element in the tradition as a later growth, whereas the eschatological method gives it a central place in the life of Jesus itself, makes it indeed the determining factor of the development of this life. Because the Messianic element is present in the Gospels, not after a desultory fashion but pervasively, the assertion of its secondary, unhistorical nature must needs lead, as in Wrede, to thorough-going scepticism, so far as the possibility of restoring the picture of the historical Jesus is concerned. Schweitzer emphasizes his agreement, or rather coincidence, with Wrede as regards the severe criticism to which both subject the modern psychologizing treatment of the account of Mark, a treatment which reads so much between the lines in the interest of a hypothesis of development and so unjustly discriminates between Mark and the two other Synoptics, as though the former belonged to a higher genus and had been guided by something like the modern historical spirit in handling his material. He also agrees with Wrede in the latter's polemic against the historical-kernel-method, and insists upon it that a report as a whole must be taken either as historical or as unhistorical, that to take part and reject part, without reliance upon some objective criterion, is the height of arbitrariness. The whole "liberalizing" version of the life of Jesus, depending as it does on these two delusions, is utterly discredited. "The psychological explanation of motive and the psychological connection of events and actions which these writers have proposed to find in Mark, simply do not exist." "A vast quantity of treasures of scholarship and erudition, of art and artifice, which



the Marcan hypothesis has gathered into its storehouse in the two generations of its existence to aid it in constructing its life of Jesus, has become worthless." "Thorough-going scepticism and thorough-going eschatology between them are compelling theology to read the Marcan text again with simplicity of mind. The simplicity consists in dispensing with the connecting links which it has been accustomed to discover between the sections of the narrative, in looking at each one separately, and recognizing that it is difficult to pass from one to the other." In recognizing this disconnectedness the thorough-going scepticism and the thorough-going eschatology agree. The difference comes in when each tries to explain the method there is in this Gospel-madness, the strange system that runs through the disconnectedness. Wrede has for this the explanation, that into the warp of the life of a mere teacher and miracle worker, which constituted the original story, there has been introduced, already by the tradition preceding Mark and still further by Mark himself, a strong weft of ideas of a dogmatic character, according to which Jesus was a higher, superhuman being called to the Messianic office. And it is this later, not the former, element which gives movement and direction to the Marcan narrative. Only in so far has the memory of the original course of events not been entirely obliterated, as the Messianic, Christological scheme is introduced into the tradition not as an open profession on the part of Jesus, or as a recognized fact on the part of the disciples, but as a hidden thing, a mystery during the earthly life, not to be divulged until the resurrection. This still betrays, according to Wrede, the not entirely extinct consciousness that the Messianic character did not exist in His life-time, but was the after-product of belief in His resurrection from the dead. The atmosphere of mystery which pervades the Gospel is partly due to this, partly it is the natural concomitant of the conception of Christ as a supernatural being. Such in a few words is the hypothesis of Wrede. Schweitzer subjects this hypothesis to a very acute criticism. He shows how Wrede is at a disadvantage as compared with his precursor Bruno Bauer, who considered the interpolation of the Messianic element the personal, absolutely original act of the Evangelist, whereas according to Wrede it was largely and primarily the collective act of tradition. The alleged process is too subtle to ascribe to a collective subject. Besides this, in the account of the incident at Caesarea-Philippi, of the entry into Jerusalem, and of the confession before the High Priest, we have three instances which break through the scheme of Messianic secrecy, so that Wrede himself is compelled to find here the hand of a more naïve, less-consciously productive tradition than elsewhere. But Schweitzer remarks that even here of *naïveté* in depicting Jesus as the openly-professed and openly-recognized Messiah there is no trace, so that the presumption becomes strong that in these cases we strike the bed-rock of solid tradition. The story of the passion also runs directly contrary to Wrede's hypothesis, for those who set up the theory of secrecy could have had no possible interest in representing Jesus as having been openly put

to death as Messiah, *i. e.*, in consequence of Messianic claims. A more general ground on which the author criticizes Wrede's scheme is that primitive theology had no ostensible motive for dating back the Messiahship of Jesus to the time of his earthly ministry, at least, if one may judge from the relative indifference of Paul and the Acts with regard to the pre-resurrection period. It is impossible to explain how the Messianic beliefs of the first generation arose, if Jesus throughout His life was for all, even for the disciples, merely a teacher. If it is difficult to eliminate the Messiahship from the life of Jesus, it is far more difficult to explain its reëtrance subsequently into the theology of the early Church. The mere belief in the resurrection as such can not have produced the Messianic character; else those, who believed in the rising from the dead of John the Baptist must have regarded him as the Messiah. And, if the Messiahship actually dates from the resurrection, why is it that the Messianic teaching is not put into the mouth of the risen Jesus? Exception is justly taken to Wrede's method of treating alike all prohibitions of Jesus to make known his work and forcing them all into the same category of the Messianic secret, whereas it is plain that the motives varied in the several cases. Equally unwarranted is the identification of "the mystery of the kingdom" in the parable-teaching with the Messianic secret. Wrede fails to recognize that "second wider circle of mystery which has to do not with Jesus's Messiahship, but with his preaching of the kingdom."

Since then the thorough-going scepticism of Wrede does not solve the problem, the only experiment that remains to be tried is that of thorough-going eschatology. To be sure the eschatological key has been tried on the lock of the Gospel-mysteries before, only it was not the key of *thorough-going* eschatology. Schweitzer's objection to the eschatologists that came before him, like Johannes Weiss, is that they applied the principle in question to the teaching of Jesus only and not to His life. They make Him think and speak eschatologically, but fail to see that He must have acted in the same spirit. The true explanation of all the mystery enshrouding the Gospel-account lies in this that it is "dogmatic history", history moulded in its actual unfolding by theological beliefs. "The chaotic confusion of the narratives ought to have suggested the thought that the events had been thrown into this confusion by the volcanic force of an incalculable personality, not by some kind of carelessness or freak of the tradition." The concrete working out of this principle yields the following outline of Jesus's life. The ministry took up less than one year. This reduces the period of popular preaching and teaching to very narrow limits. After but a few weeks of such activity Jesus entered upon a policy of concealment. The explanation of this is not that His cause was lost and He had to flee. That is a mere figment of the psychologizing, pragmatizing interpreters of Mark. Jesus had been dominated from the first by a dogmatic idea, the idea of the immediate nearness of the kingdom, as made certain by the initial fact of the movement of repentance evoked by the Baptist. Jesus, however, was not so much borne upon the

current of eschatological expectancy; He Himself rather set the times in motion by acting, by creating eschatological facts and emergencies. He expected the kingdom not only in the near future, but definitely at harvest-time in that same year of his ministry. The parabolic references to the harvest have this for their realistic background. The mission of the twelve of Matt. x. was to make known the impending arrival of the kingdom. When Jesus sent them forth, He did not expect to see them back in the present aeon (v. 23). With the coming of the kingdom His own Parousia was to coincide. It was His purpose at that time to initiate the great eschatological crisis, to let loose the final woes, the confusion and the strife, from which should issue the new supernatural world. Now it was the non-fulfilment of this acute expectation that made the great turning-point in the life of Jesus. This and not "growing opposition" or "waning support" induced his change of attitude and procedure. From now on Jesus's one thought is to get away from the people. It is from them He flees, not from the hostile scribes as modern theology imagined. For the non-fulfilment showed, that the coming of the kingdom could not take place after the manner at first contemplated through repentance and a general tribulation befalling himself and his followers alike. Jesus now saw that God had appointed it otherwise. The suffering expected for all must have been set aside, abolished for the others and concentrated upon Jesus alone, and that in the form of a passion and death at Jerusalem. He must suffer for others that the kingdom might come. According to Schweitzer the idea of suffering had been associated for Jesus with the conception of the kingdom from the beginning, but only in a general way, insofar as the Messiah must needs share in the tribulation impending upon all. Now the suffering became His own individual destiny. Jesus further conceived of this suffering as atoning in dependence on Isa. liii. The many for whom He suffers are not, as Johannes Weiss would have it, the unrepentant Jewish nation, but in the most comprehensive sense the chosen of all generations since the beginning of the world. It was discharging a debt which weighed upon the world. Inseparable from the prediction of suffering is that of the resurrection. In recognizing this Schweitzer again agrees with Wrede over against the modern theology, which endeavors to explain the resolve to suffer psychologically and declares the prediction of the resurrection unhistorical. But, whilst Wrede says: because both belong together, both are dogmatic and *therefore* unhistorical, Schweitzer says: they are both dogmatic and *therefore* historical, because they find their explanation in eschatological conceptions. Jesus, then, went to Jerusalem for the express purpose of bringing about His own death and resurrection. He was the sole actor in this the second stage of His career. "The things which happen the questions which are laid before him, contribute nothing to the decisive issue, but merely form the anecdotic fringes of the real outward and inward event, the bringing down of death upon himself." And He actually succeeded in forcing the history

to obey this programme of dogmatic origin even to the extent of confining the catastrophe to Himself and not involving the disciples.

In more than one sense this construction makes *tabula rasa*. It leaves nothing of the "figure designed by rationalism, endowed with life by liberalism and clothed by modern theology in an historical garb." It is also negative so far as the author himself is concerned, in that it obviously carries with itself the denial of every normative, authoritative character to the consciousness and teaching of Christ. The Christ of this experimental reconstruction is nothing but a deluded visionary. This historical Jesus, Schweitzer admits, must be to our own age a stranger and an enigma. In the "liberal" picture He had seemed for a while to be advancing to meet our age. But it was only apparently so. "He does not stay, he passes by our time and returns to his own. Indeed the whole idea, as if by a restoration of the actual Jesus, through historical methods, spiritual forces can be set free, and a new and vigorous Christianity built up, is a great error. The historical knowledge of the personality and life of Jesus will not be a help, but perhaps rather an offense to religion." And yet, while admitting all this, Dr. Schweitzer is not willing to admit that by such a view the historical foundation of Christianity is destroyed. Jesus still means something to our world, because a mighty spiritual force streams forth from Him. But the author does not succeed in making plain how he conceives of this. It is something connected with the great sayings of Jesus. How such force can belong to these, seeing they are all eschatologically conditioned, it is hard to see. Beyond vague statements and phrases we get nothing that could help to solve this riddle. It is "Jesus as spiritually arisen within men", "the spirit that goes forth from Him and in the spirits of men strives for new influence and rule". How little all this means appears from the author's own confession of inability to disengage that which is abiding and eternal in the being of Jesus from the historical forms in which it worked itself out, and to introduce it into our world as a living influence. The only thing somewhat more definite we learn is that the words of Jesus, precisely because they are based on an eschatological world-view, that is to say were unrelated to all historical and social circumstances, are appropriate to any world, since they raise man in every world above his world and time. But raise him to what? Certainly not to the transcendental sphere, the heavenly aeon which Jesus had in mind, for the reality of that is not recognized. And if there be substituted for this the vague modern ideas of "eternal life" or "inward freedom", or some such thing, what power could possibly proceed from the words of Jesus, realistically meant as they undoubtedly are, to induce such a misty indefinable state? It all comes back to a sort of vague spiritualizing of the eschatological hope, something which Prof. Burkitt also suggests, in the preface, as called for by the times, now that the eschatological hope has proved to be no mere embroidery of Christianity, but the heart of its enthusiasm.

It does not seem to have occurred either to the author or to the



writer of the preface, that there may still exist even in the twentieth century a faith robust enough to take the Jesus even of the thorough-going eschatology at His word. We do not mean by this, of course, that any Evangelical Christian could accept Dr. Schweitzer's reconstruction of the life of Jesus in detail. There is too much in it that is phantastic, e. g., such assumptions as that in the early part of His career Jesus passed for Elijah even to the mind of the Baptist; that Peter against the intention of Jesus revealed the Messianic secret; that Peter's knowledge of this secret was due to the experience of the transfiguration which therefore did not follow but preceded the incident at Caesarea-Philippi; that what Judas betrayed to the authorities was not the place where they could apprehend Jesus, but the Messianic secret. On the other hand it might be suggested that this "thorough-going eschatology" is not quite thorough enough, in that e. g., it does not carry back the deliberate purpose to suffer and die an atoning death to the beginning of Jesus' ministry. There is certainly as much evidence for the early presence of this in Jesus' mind as there is for the early presence of the Messianic consciousness in general. But all this should not cause us to overlook the good work which the eschatological school has done and is still doing in restoring to the historical Christ the sublime lineaments which he has always borne in the historic faith of the Church. The Jesus of the eschatologists and the Christ of the Church-dogma are strikingly alike in several respects. For one thing such men as Weiss and Schweitzer have rescued the historical Christ from the desupernaturalizing process to which the liberal theology subjected His person and consciousness. For after all apocalypics and eschatology are preëminently the sphere of the supernatural. A Christ in whose mind and life these two elements were dominant must be a Christ steeped in the supernatural. The apocalyptic and the eschatological further stand for a very pronounced and definite conception of salvation. A Christ who derived the ideals and impulses of His life from these, must have laid claim not to the rank of a mere prophet or teacher or ethical reformer, but to that of a veritable Savior. And the same eschatological atmosphere excludes every undue emphasis upon human merit or effort as contributory to salvation and consequently brings out the principle of divine grace. One of the most striking features of Dr. Schweitzer's sketch of the mind of Jesus is the convincing manner in which the predestinarian character of many sayings is shown. To be sure Johannes Weiss had already made a beginning with this. But it had been never before so distinctly enunciated that eschatology and predestinarianism go together. It will not henceforth be so easy to maintain that the predestinarianism of Paul is foreign to and absent from the teaching of our Lord. The eschatological school must also be given credit for the rehabilitation of the principle of atonement as an integral part of the professed work of Christ, as indeed lying at the heart of His very purpose, to execute which through death He deliberately went up to Jerusalem. Here again Schweitzer



follows in the footsteps of Johannes Weiss, but goes one step further, in that he makes the atonement refer not to the unrepentant Jews but to the sinful world as such. Still further the eschatological Jesus resembles the Christ of the Church, in that He is and acts as a thorough believer in fixed dogmatic conceptions, indeed makes dogma the parent of history. And finally there is to be registered the great gain that the eschatological school has driven out of the life of Jesus the "liberal" figment of a subjective development in his consciousness both with regard to His work and His person. Taking it all in all there is abundant warrant for saying that the writers of this school have strikingly vindicated the right of supernaturalists, Augustinians, Calvinists to claim Jesus as their own. Everybody will have to admit that the historic church has more faithfully preserved the image of the Christ, if thus He lived and thought and preached, than any school or phase of theology that has criticized her faith.

The translation, so far as we have been able to compare it with the original, has been admirably done. In the title of Dulk's book on p. 324 "The false *Step* in the Life of Jesus" does not correctly render the original "*Der Irrgang des Lebens Jesu*". John occurs for Peter on p. 127. Bruno Bauer's birth-year is given as 1809, and yet it is said on p. 138, that, when in 1839 he removed from Berlin to Bonn, he was "just at the beginning of the twenties". The original has not "beginning" but "end" of the twenties, but the slip is pardonable since the age of thirty is too advanced to be called "that critical age" in the life of a young man when he is apt to "surprise his teachers".

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

## HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

LETTERS OF JOHN MASON NEALE, D.D. Selected and Edited by his DAUGHTER. With Portrait. London, New York, Bombay and Calcutta: Longmans, Green & Co. 1910. 8vo. pp. xvii. 379.

There is no more picturesque figure in the history of the "Catholic Revival" than that of John Mason Neale. We were not ungrateful for the *Memoir* of him published three or four years ago by Mrs. Charles Towle, although in many respects it left much to be desired. It is a pleasure now to be permitted to get somewhat closer to his interesting personality by means of this selection from his letters. His daughter, in the choice of the letters to print, seems to have had precisely this in view. The letters here presented tell us something of Dr. Neale's work: his work to such an eager worker was a large part of himself; and it is a distinct advantage to be enabled to view his work from the inside and to estimate more justly from the insight thus received the motives which impelled him and the spirit which animated him. What we chiefly value in these letters, however, is the glimpses they afford us of the personality behind the work, the

revelation they give us of the man that he was. It is a very attractive personality they present to us; crotchety no doubt, somewhat pugnacious, running in a narrow groove, but earnest, high-minded, indefatigable and animated by a true devotion to the causes he gave himself to. Never physically strong, he yet accomplished an amazing amount of labor. And he has left behind him not only a fragrant memory, but a triple monument in three great achievements. The nursing Sisterhood which he founded has prospered and become a beneficent power in the land. The reform in Hymnology which he introduced has affected the entire body of English hymnody and left a permanent impression on the worship of English-speaking churches. And his method of the indoctrination of the young by means of "truth embodied in a tale" remains until today the insufficiently followed example of a successful endeavor to mould the minds and hearts of the rising generation: have any stories in Church History as yet supplanted his?

Like several others of the leaders in the "Catholic Revival" Neale sprung from Evangelical soil and was bred in Evangelical traditions. His early letters from Cambridge introduce us to the Evangelical circles there. Charles Simeon died at the close of his first year, and Neale's letters of the time reflect the feelings of the Evangelicals on the great event. "Poor Mr. Simeon", he writes on Oct. 20th, 1836, "I am afraid, is dying. Mr. Carus watches over him, as if he were really, as he is fond of calling himself, his son." A fortnight afterwards he transcribes from Carus' own lips a moving account of the veteran's death-bed talk, recalling what may be read more at large in Carus' own *Memoir*; and then on Nov. 13 he records his death. "I, as you may easily conceive", he writes, "have thought of little else all day . . . So the day he has been preparing for fifty-six years has come at last. Oh, what a meeting he and Henry Martyn must have had! All the pleasure of thinking of that would be taken away by that horrible thought that friends will not know each other in another world. I cannot think how anyone can believe it. Poor Mr. Simeon; I cannot tell you how much I am grieved for his loss. I should think there was a great deal of sorrow tonight in Cambridge. I was going to say, 'What a glorious night for him!' but there is no night there."

Simeon had desired that his funeral should be very simple, and it was not designedly public, but the state of feeling in the University and town, partly in revulsion from former ill treatment, was such that the funeral became "unavoidably one altogether of public character." It fell on Saturday, Nov. 19—market-day—and the town was full: few greater displays of public sorrow and reverence have ever been seen in Cambridge. Dr. Moule in his memoir of *Charles Simeon* (in the *English Leaders of Religion Series*) gives two accounts of the scene at the funeral by "interested spectators." Neale gives another dated the day after (Nov. 20) but speaking as if it were written on the day itself:—"Today Trinity Church was a most striking sight: the deepest mourning everywhere, not silk but crape, and the crowded state of

every part, the altar and the ante part being overflowing. Though I was a quarter of an hour before time, I did not get a foot in the real Church, and had to stand all the time, as three or four hundred more had. Numbers had to go away. A beautiful sermon by Dr. Dealtry from "Them that honour Me I will honour."

Yet other than Evangelical influences were working on the ardent young man. The Oxford Tracts were agitating the world when Neale entered Cambridge, and not least the world of Cambridge. It was they and the successive parts of the "Pickwick Papers" which stirred the imagination of the eager undergraduates. A ferment was produced which a participant in it tells us no one can understand who did not witness it. Neale was caught in the effervescence of the hour and was so carried away that his friends thought of him as simply standing ready to "take up with the *ipse dixits* of a Newman or a Pusey." The letters do not enable us to trace the process of his change from Evangelicalism to Tractarianism. They pass over at once from the Evangelical letters of 1836 to the Tractarian ones of 1839. The change, however, no matter how accomplished, was thoroughly wrought. It was scarcely fair, nevertheless, to represent him as becoming a mere blind follower of Newman and Pusey. This he never became. Sharing, from his own Cambridge standpoint, the new views proclaimed at Oxford, he never became a personal follower of the Oxford leaders. To Newman's personality he was indeed rather antipathetic, and he looked somewhat askance at Newman's whole point of view. He did not even admire him as a writer of English prose. Among the few literary judgments expressed in these letters is this one: "I am disgusted with the article in the last *Christian Remembrancer* on Newman's Sermons. In our own communion I look on Andrewes and Taylor as superior to him as one man can be to another; and out of it, how could they have forgotten S. Francis de Sales, to mention no other?" And Newman's book on *Development* he had little patience with. He cannot imagine how any one could imagine Newman to hold a view compatible, for a moment, with Bishop Bull, and himself considered that Newman refrained from openly attacking Bull, only to avoid scandal. "The test way", he thinks, "very unfair." "Of course, N. would naturally choose such tests only as suited his purpose." "What I also object to is N's constant reference to his own past works. He means, of course, to say: 'You, the reader, believe now what I believed then: develop as I do, and you will in time think as I do now.' And doubtless, so far as his extracts go, we do hold now what he did. But there is another element in his then opinions which we never had—his exceeding hatred to Rome. And that may, almost unconsciously to himself, have made him what he is, on the principle of desire to reverse a wrong. So that I am more than ever inclined to go with Hope's theory, and believe that the first generation of reformers may perhaps be absorbed by Rome: but that the second will remain in our Church and renovate it. I don't care what Irons or anyone else thinks. I am quite sure that if we don't desert ourselves, God will not desert us. If you

all go, I shall stay. If Andrewes is not saved (who had far less reason than we have to remain) there are so few that will be that really it can little matter whether one goes on or not."

With so much detachment from the Oxford leaders, however, Neale's standpoint was essentially theirs. There may have been less primal "hatred of Rome" to be overcome in his case, and there was a more distinct drawing to the Orientals in him than in them. But the effect was the same; and one cannot help observing that the drawing to the Orientals was largely literary and sentimental. It led Neale, however, very far. In the doctrine of the Procession of the Holy Spirit he went with the Orientals absolutely. "In my own mind", he writes in 1850, "I am convinced with Palmer that the Latin doctrine, if consistently carried out, would become heresy, and that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son at all except in the way of Temporal Mission, and then not according to His Divinity, but only according to His operations." At bottom the meaning of this can only be that he could not conceive the Trinity save under the form of Subordination; and the equalization of the Son with the Father in all things seemed to him to be Sabellian. The roots of the Oriental view of Procession are indeed set in a subordinationism which is a caricature of the Nicene doctrine. So Orientalizing were his tendencies that his friends were alarmed lest he should become in his fundamental thought sectarianly Oriental. Early in 1844 he writes to his friend Benjamin Webb, to whom most of the letters in this volume are addressed:—"I know you are afraid I shall take an Oriental view, *i. e.*, I suppose so Oriental that it will cease to be Catholick. At the same time without becoming a shade more Anglican, I do see more and more clearly that the High Papal Theory is quite untenable. . . . I cannot think, as Montalembert does, visible union, or as the B[ritish] C[ritic] sometimes seemed to wish to do, the desire for visible union with the Chair of St. Peter, the keystone, as it were, of the Church, at least not in the sense in which the Western Church has sometimes done. We *Orientals* take a more general view. The rock on which the Church is built is S. Peter, but it is a triple Rock, Antioch, where he sat, Alexandria which he superintended, Rome where he suffered." Certainly this passage is compact of legend: but it makes very plain the position which Neale consciously sought to take up. He wished to be truly "Catholic", with conscious withdrawal from all that was peculiar—and therefore sectarian—whether in Oriental, Romanist or Anglican. His tendency was, however, very distinctly to identify Catholicism with Orientalisms. An amusing outgrowth of the reverence, amounting to idolatry, with which he stood before the very idea of "Catholicism", as well as of his zest in controversy, was the habit he acquired of employing the adjectives "Catholic" and "Protestant" as mere synonyms of "fine" and "horrid". Thus a beautiful oak wood is described by him as "Catholic", while of a Cathedral service he writes: "The chants were admirably well sung and *the* thing: but the Antiphons were just as Protestant and operatic," and of the undigni-



fied behavior of some Portuguese nuns, he says: "Truly I never beheld anything more horribly protestant."

To his own mind Neale was above all things a Reformer. The Church of England had fallen into a deplorable condition and it was the duty of all true men to do their part in lifting her out of the slough. And certainly the usages which he found here and there obtaining in isolated churches were enough to shock an earnest spirit. "I must tell you of a thing", he writes on one occasion, "practiced in Tong Church. The Squire has built a pew in the Chancel; when the Commandments are begun, a servant regularly enters at the Chancel door with the luncheon tray." This *apropos* of a crusade he was leading against pews, for which, a little later, he set to work systematically to collect appropriate anecdotes. "I have thought of a good idea", he writes to his friend Webb, "as I think you will allow. It is a collection of anecdotes against pews, such as the editor of the *British Critic* gave us, for instance. You and I will do it, and put our names to it, as proofs that the stories are authentic; we will set about it immediately. Scrape up all the stories you have been credibly told, or know yourself, and send them to me and I will digest them in order." There were more serious abuses. A clergyman "taking the duty" in a little parish, and being called upon to baptize an infant, on taking the child in his arms found there was no water in the font. "He thought it, of course, an accidental omission, and asked for some. The Clerk was in astonishment; however he sent for a glass of water, thinking the clergyman wanted it to drink. And on conclusion it came out that they never used it there!"

Among the usages which had grown up in the Church which Neale considered corruptions and felt called upon to reform was, oddly enough considering what he has come to stand for in the Churches, hymn-singing. No doubt his early dislike of hymns may have been in part due, as his daughter suggests (p. 45), to a revulsion from Dr. Watts' hymns, "which he and his sisters, in common with most of the children in Evangelical families, used to learn by heart." It was certainly more largely due, however, to reaction from all that was Evangelical; for hymn-singing was distinctively Evangelical, and when Neale reacted again from his dislike of hymns Benjamin Webb is accordingly found twitting him with not having fully cast off his Evangel-prevalent among the leaders in the "Catholic Revival" in opposition not merely to Evangelical hymns but to vernacular hymns, and indeed to hymns in public worship altogether. No hymns are included in the ical slough. It was partly due, also no doubt, to a general sentiment Prayer Book, and already in Palmer's *Origines Liturgicae* published in 1832, an attempt is made to show that hymn-singing is not "Catholic"; and Neale could speak in 1840 (p. 22) of his own dislike of hymns as something well known and altogether natural. Three years later, however we find him already fully converted to at least the practical value of even English hymns, and endeavoring to convince his friend Webb of it, too. "Why should Hymns" he now argues, "be less Cath-



olick than prayers? and therefore, why English Hymns less Catholick than English Prayers? We may wish to restore Latin in both, if you like. But till we can, surely English Hymns, if good, are better than none. . . . Depend upon it, we shall be acting more on the general principles of the Church, in making the best of a bad thing—allowing the universal abrogation of Latin to be so—than in saying, If we can't have that we will have none." (p. 58.) Webb proved difficult to convince; and a half-dozen years later called out from Neale a full argument in favor of the practical necessity and feasibility of creating an English hymnody by translation from the Breviary, by writing him frankly "I expect I shall loath your Methodistical snuffling hymnizing article. It is the oddest thing to me that you never slipped off that Evangelical slough: and it is due, I take it, to your fatal facility of versifying." (p. 124.) To Neale's leadership in this reaction from the earlier position of the "Catholic Revival" as to the use of hymns in public worship, and to his "fatal facility of versifying", the English Churches owe much,—how much has lately been told the readers of this *Review*, briefly but satisfyingly, by Dr. Louis F. Benson (July 1910: VIII. 3, p. 388 sq.). Neale's researches in mediaeval and ancient hymnology, were epoch-making also for our knowledge of a large and much neglected branch of devotional literature. He brought to light a great number of forgotten sequences and discovered the secret of their structure. His knowledge of Liturgiology on all sides but the aesthetical (where he allowed the superiority of his friend Webb) was unsurpassed, and especially so far as it was connected with the hymnological element. His sense for values in hymnology was remarkable and in his renderings of mediaeval hymns he had an unerring instinct for their adaptation both in content and language to modern needs. His feeling for sonorous sound is somewhat curiously illustrated by his mentioning these two lines—

"Michaelem in virtute  
Conterentem Zabulon"

as "two of the finest lines, I think, in mediaeval hymns". This praise of course can attach only to the cadence of the verses: they have no substance. To our thinking, indeed, it would require a very keen sense of the witchery of words to extract music from this collocation of vocables: but Neale's own hymns are witnesses to the exquisite ear he had for melody. Their extreme popularity is testified by their almost universal use. The editor of this volume (p. 175) tells us that one-eighth of the hymns in one of the editions of *Hymns Ancient and Modern* (61 out of 473) and one-tenth of those in the *English Hymnal* (72 out of 656) come from his pen. Going further afield we note that in the admirable *Hymnal* edited by Dr. Benson now in use in the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, twenty-one hymns are accredited to Neale, and that in Dr. E. H. Johnson's *Sursum Corda* the most recent Hymn-Book prepared for the American Baptists, nineteen are his.

Apart from matters brought into controversy by the "Catholic Revi-

val" there are few allusions in these letters to doctrinal subjects. Even to these matters themselves the allusions are brief; there are no extended discussions. There are, however, one or two interesting allusions to views on the Real Presence in the Eucharist. "I have had a curious correspondence with Popoff about Transubstantiation", he writes on one occasion (p. 122). "I confess it seems to me nonsense to say, We believe in *μετουσίωσις*, but we say nothing of the *modus*; and we use the word in a sense of our own, quite distinct from the Latin meaning. And the Slavonic *Presvshchestvenie* is almost stronger, and means—were there such a word—transapparentiation." A few days afterward (so it seems; but the dates of the letters seem awry) he writes again: "What we both wish to express is this: the Bread and Wine are in the Liturgy changed into the Body and Blood of our Lord, as much as one thing can be changed into another; how it is done we don't decide; it may be by Transubstantiation, or by Impanation, or by a Hypostatical union. Now what are we to call this change? I name it Transmutation because it seems to me the vaguest word as to *modus*, the strictest as to *res*. I agree with you, however, that *transmutare* is not strictly *μεταποιεῖν*. Therefore, I will give another word, 'transfactured'. But if *μετουσίωσις* be not transubstantiation, how is *ὁμοούσιος* Consubstantial? In fact, you can draw no distinction between substance and essence. If you believe the essence of the consecrated Bread and Wine is the essence of our Lord's Body and Blood, you believe in the gross idea of Transubstantiation (which I am not denying)." Some years later he writes again (p. 197): "I think St. Cyril's words are much more explicit than mine. He says clearly, 'Which is *not* bread,' and that I take to be the only thing of importance. In the difference between *not bread* and *not simply bread*, lies, I think, the whole question." Thus hard it was to keep from confessing Transubstantiation and yet confess a change of substance which does not carry with it a change of attributes. One feels reasonably sure that if it were not for the desire on the part of the Greeks, and the necessity on the part of the Anglicans, to separate themselves from "Romish error" here, no difficulty would be made with the word "Transubstantiation". If *μετουσίωσις* is just Greek for Transubstantiation (and who can deny that but a Greek?), is not the assertion that what was a moment before just bread and still has all the attributes of bread is not bread at all any longer, just plain English for Transubstantiation (and who but an Anglican would ever think of denying it?). Apropos of the Eucharist, there is a curious story told (p. 258-9) which has an application. We read: "Here is a story which I heard yesterday. Lord Strathallan, the great-grandfather of the present, was mortally wounded at Culloden. His chaplain, the Abbè Maitland (for the old Scotch clergy, from their great connection with France, took that title), was with him on the field of battle, and the dying man wished to receive Holy Communion. But no bread or wine could be procured. So he was communicated with the only procurable things—oatcake and whiskey. Of course, as a real Communion, it was utterly invalid in both

kinds; but making all due allowance for invincible ignorance, it was a beautiful act of Spiritual Communion." It is a matter of interest to inquire what Neale could mean by pronouncing an act which from his standpoint must have been sacrilegious "a beautiful act of Spiritual Communion." From the Reformed point of view it is needless to say that the Communion thus administered, in the circumstances recited, while irregular, was entirely valid: but we cannot see any thing particularly "beautiful" in it.

Of the troubles which disturbed Neale's life at Sackville College, we naturally hear a good deal in these letters; and what we hear is very welcome. We gain from it a sense of the uncomplaining patience with which he endured what to him was veritable persecution. Of the rights and wrongs of the general case the letters do not enable us to judge, but they do enable us to perceive the very high temper in which Neale passed through the serious annoyances which came out of it all. The later years of his life were largely devoted to the institution and firm establishment of the nursing Sisterhood of St. Margaret's, and it was in the service of this Sisterhood that he wore himself out in the end, and met his death. His daughter obviously considers this Sisterhood his most "abiding and visible monument". It is doubtless not free from the faults which mar the most of the Sisterhoods established by the leaders of the "Catholic Revival", though it is clear that Neale's good sense and good feeling saved him from the extremities to which some of them went: and it is plain on the face of it that this Sisterhood has been a beneficial institution. When we speak of the religious usages introduced by the Tractarians and made a part of the "Rule" of these Sisterhoods, we touch on the least attractive side of Neale's activities. He was very tenacious of his priestly functions and sought to make full proof of his ministry. Take the practice of Confession for example. He placed the highest estimate upon its exercise and was persistent and insistent in pressing it upon all over whom he exercised authority or acquired influence. We say nothing now of its legality in the Church of England, a matter on which Neale from the beginning felt quite clear. The practice seems to us on grounds of mere ethics or even common decency indefensible,—a matter on which Neale appears to have felt no qualms. We defy anyone of unsophisticated mind, nevertheless, to read even the touchingly simple and transparently sincere letter here given, written to a lady wishing to prepare for her First Confession, without a sense of the horror of the thing. Think of urging, with all the compelling authority of an obviously pitying priest, delicate-minded and shrinking girls to pour into an attentive masculine ear a full account of all the movements capable of being construed or misconstrued as sin which they may from the dawn of memory have felt in their hearts. "To me you had better begin from the beginning—'The first sin that I remember was that I—' and so on. When you have gone through your life till the present time, then will be the time that I should go over it with you, taking the Commandments in order . . . " It certainly is a humiliating exercise which is here

demanded of people, and we cannot wonder that Neale adds: "I know, from my own experience the dreadful pain of a First Confession". What we wonder at is that he should feel authorized to promise "comfort" from it. As we read, we have a distressing feeling that the analogies to the scene here presented to our imagination are to be found in such others as the Hindoo priest's urging mothers to cast their babies into the Ganges with the plea that the pain will no doubt be great, but the comfort will be sure.

Neale had just entered upon his forty-ninth year when he died. He had begun life under the pall of pulmonary disease. His great desire was for parish work. But he was able to carry on that work, in the neglected living which was given him, for only six weeks, when the verdict fell upon him and he went forth in bitterness of disappointment to find whatever life could be snatched by him from the destroyer. He snatched from the destroyer a life of rich variety, of profound learning, of abounding activity, of world-wide influence. And he died, in the midst of his usefulness and in the fulness of recognition, still in the harness. We have his books; his works live after him. We would fain know as much of such a man as we can. He is an example to us all.

The editing of the volume is good so far as it goes,—and it goes far enough to provide a fairly good Index. We wish it had gone far enough to provide full annotations. Fifty, seventy-five, years are a long stretch of time for these full days of ours, and this is the period which has passed by since these letters were written. There are many allusions in them to people, transactions, even places, which will need explanation to the majority of the readers of the book.

*Princeton.*

B. B. WARFIELD.

VICTOR MONOD. *LE PROBLÈME DE DIEU et la Théologie Chrétienne depuis la Réforme. I. Étude historique.* Foyer Solidariste: Saint-Blaise, près Neuchâtel (Suisse); Roubaix, 123, Boulevard de Bel-fort, 1910. 8vo pp. 169.

M. Victor Monod is profoundly disturbed by the condition of current opinion upon the nature and activities of God. The idea of God he thinks has perhaps never before been made the object of more intense and wide-spread study. But the issue of the prolonged debates of recent centuries has been little more than an immense confusion. Nearly every thinking man has formed a different conception of the Divine Being for himself. "In the teaching of the Churches heterogeneous philosophies and contradictory religious aspirations are juxtaposed or superficially amalgamated." The question is raised whether "the Christian doctrine of God is essentially amorphous and irrational or is only compromised to-day by lack of critical spirit and of historical knowledge in some of its adherents." M. Monod's convictions lie in the line of the latter alternative, and he naturally wishes to do his part to clarify the atmosphere. The task he has undertaken is essentially a dogmatic one. But it has its natural if not necessary historical approach. "To draw out in order,"



he explains, "the solutions of the problem of God which have been proposed by the great theologians, to set them in the historical framework which explains them, to indicate how they have been engendered by successive corrections or reactions, to discriminate, in a word, the vital necessity to which the succession of divers theological systems has responded; these have appeared to me the indispensable preliminaries of a methodical study of the question." Accordingly he gives us now this "historical study," while the dogmatic construction to which it is to lead us up waits a more convenient season. He does not feel bound, however, to pass in review in this "historical study" the whole history of the idea of God, in detailed exposition. He is not writing a history of the idea of God but a historical introduction to his own forthcoming attempt to put together a competent exposition of the idea of God. He therefore confines his survey to the historical antecedents of his own construction.

In point of fact, M. Monod confines his survey of the history of the idea of God to two epochs, the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries; and in these two epochs to two great outstanding movements of thought, the Reformation, or better, the Reformed theology, and the Kantian criticism. The conceptions of God characteristic of these two great movements of thought he sets over against one another in sharp antithesis, discriminating them under the contrasting designations of "God as sovereign" and "God as a moral person." The antithesis obviously is a false one; the two designations are not mutually exclusive. It is also historically unjust: the Reformed theology throws an emphasis upon the moral personality of God which cannot be exceeded, and the moral personality of God is not the most outstanding feature of the conception of God developed by the Kantian movement. M. Monod himself cites Calvin as declaring that God is good by a necessity as stringent as that by which He is God, and that it would be easier to sever the light of the sun from its heat than to separate God's power from His righteousness; while the very stress which the Reformed theology places on the will of God is a stress on His personality, since he who says will says person. And M. Monod himself points out how the moral character of God evaporates in, for example, the thought of M. Ch. Secrétan in the face of the demand of "absolute freedom" for Him. The real distinction between the Reformed and the Kantian movements in their relation to the idea of God lies quite apart from the question of His moral personality, although, of course, it concerns very distinctly the question of His sovereignty. The difficulty with Kantian speculation has been indeed to find any place for God at all in its scheme of things. Beginning with calling in God only as a postulate of the moral imperative, it ends by limiting His action in the interest of human freedom. The whole tendency of the Kantian thought is spoken out when M. Secrétan remarks: "There seems no place in the world for both man and God;" and M. Monod's dilemma is from the Kantian standpoint a very real one: Render with Calvin all glory to God and man is reduced to nonentity; vindicate with Kant all man's liberty and all man's dignity and



you have (with Schleiermacher) no use for God save, perhaps, for the Judgment Day. The issue that is drawn between the Reformed thought of the sixteenth and the Kantian thought of the nineteenth century is not between a sovereign and an ethical God; it is between God and man. And the movement from the one to the other is a veritable revolution by which God is dethroned and man elevated to His place as the center of the universe. M. Monod puts it not unjustly in a passage which we gladly quote entire (p. 108): "Just as for Copernicus the earth so far from being a pivot about which the stars revolve, describes an ellipse around a fixed sun, so for Kant the objects which constitute the external world so far from determining knowledge are subject to laws impressed by the mind. This figure can be adapted to indicate the way in which the Kantian theology sets itself in opposition to the theology of the sixteenth century. God is no longer the central star of the religious domain; He is only a satellite, a postulate of the mind. The point of departure is the thinking subject, his rights and his needs; the nature and the attributes of God can be determined only as functions of the exigences of the human being. And the whole effort of Kant bears on a point which theologians of the sixteenth century had not thought to investigate: In what is God necessary to man? Is the existence of God legitimated by the needs of reason?" In a word the sixteenth century conceived man as the creation of God, existing for God and serving His ends; men now are prone to think of God as, if not exactly the creation of man, yet as existing for man and serving man's ends. The center of the universe has shifted; and God has become as has been, perhaps wittily, perhaps bitterly, said, very much a domestic animal which man keeps, as he does his horse or his cow, to meet certain specific needs of his being.

About half of M. Monod's volume is given to an exposition of each of these two types of thought concerning God. The latter half, dealing broadly speaking with the Kantian notions, under the rubric of "God as a moral person", appears to us the more penetrating and satisfactory piece of exposition, chiefly because it seems to us the more sympathetically worked out. The master-thought of this movement is shown to be the conception of the greatness of man: "the idea that man so far as he is man and because he is man has right to the free efflorescence of his personality and can recognize as legitimate no authority which is not judicially constituted." This master-thought is traced in its enunciation to Kant, to whom God exists only as a moral postulate and only so far as His existence may be made consistent with what Kant deemed the necessities of the moral responsibility of man. So determining has the conception of "freedom" thus conceived become in modern thought that M. Monod incidentally drops the remark, as if it were a matter of course, that since Kant "liberty and morality have become so indissolubly bound together that Luther's and Calvin's doctrine of the subject-will has become merely an incomprehensible curiosity to the contemporary consciousness." After Kant, no doubt, there comes Schleiermacher, in whose system there is no place for any other liberty than

"that of Spinozistic spontaneity, autonomous vitality", the capacity of "reaction upon finite beings which exert a certain determination on man, and of determining them in turn"; and who led in the interest of the religious feeling a reaction towards a kind of spurious Calvinism which would preserve a divine sovereignty without emphasis upon the Divine personality. "God, for Schleiermacher," we read (p. 130), "is therefore a mysterious master of whom we know only one thing,—that He commands and that we ought to obey. He is an active Being and not a dead Law, but He is not less an abstract Being, with no name and no countenance, known only by the hand which He presses against us. The Sovereign God of Calvin, the Monarch of good-pleasure and individual feeling is gone; but on the celestial throne there still remains in austere idealization the Scepter, the Baton of command." But Schleiermacher does not mark the end of the series. After Schleiermacher comes Secrétan,—Secrétan to whom "freedom" is at once the first and the last word of philosophy, a "freedom" for man which admits of no limitations and a corresponding "freedom" for God which enables him to keep out of the way of this "free" man,—by virtue of which He is infinite only if He wishes it, and can be finite as well if He wishes it, knows what He wishes to know and is ignorant of what He wishes to be ignorant of. "If God is God", says Secrétan, "it is only because He wills it." Thus Secrétan finds his way out of the great difficulty of his school of thought by pressing to its extreme its primal postulate. It has been common to say that if "freedom" be defined as this school defines freedom, then we have to choose between a "free" humanity and a "free" Deity; both cannot be "free" in this sense, which knows no difference between freedom and ability. Secrétan replies that the difficulty disappears if only you make God free enough, if only you ascribe to Him "absolute liberty", a liberty which is capable of everything; for, then, He would be free not to be God, or even to abnegate His freedom itself. "Secrétan, we see," remarks M. Monod (p. 148), "commences by attributing to the absolute Being a fathomless freedom and sovereignty, but he adds that the day on which pure freedom resolves itself into an act, the day on which creation takes place, the reign of Law, of Relation, of Determinism commences." For M. Monod's present purpose, Secrétan has spoken the last word which has yet been spoken in the way of solving "the problem of God,"—that is to say, in the effort so to conceive God that man may be left "free", in the exaggerated sense of freedom assumed by this school. But this last word has not, he thinks, solved the problem; and the way is open for another attempt to reach a true conception of God,—a conception which shall do better justice to both sides of the problem, the side rooted in man's sense of dependence as well as that rooted in his sense of freedom. For the terms in which this solution may be worked out, however, we shall have to wait for the dogmatic discussion which, M. Monod promises us, shall follow this historical sketch. We may, indeed, already perceive that what M. Monod proposes to do is to set over against "God as sovereign" and "God as moral person" alike the conception of "God as

Father." This is, of course, to introduce another false antithesis, and to substitute tropical for scientific treatment. But despite these drawbacks with respect to method it is quite possible that M. Monod may give us in his dogmatic treatment a very happy solution of the problem of the conception of God. We are content to wait to see.

Meanwhile we note that M. Monod already recognizes that there is another side to the problem besides that of human "freedom" and "responsibility" so insisted on by the Kantian thinkers. This other side of the problem is that which forms the burden of the Reformed theology; and M. Monod has begun his book with a survey of it as given expression in that theology. We have already intimated, however, that we do not think this survey as illuminating, because not as sympathetic, as that given of the Kantian theories. It would seem that with all his desire to do justice to that sense of dependence on God which is the psychological reflection of the Divine Sovereignty, M. Monod is to some extent preoccupied with the current overestimate of man in his present condition in the world, which has its ultimate roots in a defective sense of sin. He himself very fairly describes this current point of view when, speaking of the surprise with which the modern man hears Calvin describe the doctrine of predestination as "sweet and savoury", he offers this account of it: "The reason is that the condition of man does not appear to us as tragically horrible as it does to the Calvinists; we are surprised at the rejection of the lost, the Reformed of the sixteenth century were astonished rather at the salvation of the elect." This is but to say that a Pelagianizing estimate of man in his powers, achievements and present condition can not accord with an Augustinian soteriology; the current estimate of man is distinctly Pelagianizing and therein lies the whole account of its ineradicable opposition to the Reformed theology. Borne along to some extent, doubtless, by this current of modern thought, M. Monod finds himself out of tune with the Reformed soteriology, and most of all with its emphasis on predestination; and finding himself out of tune with it, he is not quite able to comprehend it, much less to do full justice to it. He recognizes, indeed, the religious value and the practical motive of the Calvinistic doctrine of the Divine sovereignty; he even exaggerates this aspect of it, by representing it as a product of religious experience in such a sense as to give it only a subjective grounding, in this connection misconceiving the doctrine of the *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti*. "We see", he remarks, (p. 15), "that while scholasticism limited its art of persuasion to two processes, reasoning and the citation of an inspired text, the Reformation made appeal to a third authority, the inward witness of the Holy Spirit". The "witness of the Holy Spirit" was not to the Reformers, however, in any sense a "third authority" operating apart from (perhaps in opposition to) reason and the Scriptures—as anyone may satisfy himself by merely reading the Anti-Anabaptist chapters in Calvin's exposition of it at the opening of the *Institutes*; but a power of God clarifying reason in its use of the Scriptures and acting only confluent with them. M. Monod's partial sympathy with

the Reformed doctrine as an expression of religious experience is therefore itself a symptom of his real lack of complete sympathy with it; and when he goes into its particulars his lack of complete sympathy is manifested in not infrequent failures to enter fully into its spirit which betray him into certain errors of judgment regarding it. There occur even occasional lapses in apprehension of declarations of the advocates of the view he is controverting, which lead him into no doubt unconscious but nevertheless regrettable misrepresentations of their contentions. Thus for example the *De dono perseverantiae* xx. is cited (p. 59) as an avowal on the part of Augustine that "it was the Pelagian controversies which caused him to defend the doctrine of election in its integrity." What Augustine really says is precisely the contrary, namely, that before the controversy broke out he had taught the whole doctrine of election with clearness and emphasis, and had been compelled by the controversy only to do more laboriously and abundantly what he was doing in any event. Immediately after quoting Zanchi's clear statement of his *ordo decretorum* (which is, on this occasion at least, expressly Infralapsarian: "creation, fall, election, redemption"), and while in act of inveighing against Zanchi's scholasticism, M. Monod shows so little care for the niceties of the subject as to attribute to Zanchi Amyraut's *ordo decretorum*. "Once, once only," he cries "God has thought of man and assigned him his destiny. Thenceforward everything is evolved with the rigor of a mathematical theorem: creation, fall, redemption, election, reprobation, crimes and virtues, prayers and blasphemy, all has been willed, foreseen, foreordained by God." Are then the differences which separate Supralapsarian, Infralapsarian, and Postredemptionist too small to hold a place in the mind of one who consigns them all alike to the oblivion of an incomprehensible past?

It is naturally, however, when M. Monod undertakes professedly to report the objections to predestination that his failure of sympathy with the doctrine works most havoc in his reasoning. Here we have arrayed all the old uncomprehending arguments: predestination deprives the work of Christ of all significance, it menaces the authority of the moral law, it dissipates the guilt of man, and the like. What underlies everything, however, is failure to realize that predestination is never supposed to determine ends apart from means. It would for example be as intelligible to argue that when a king has determined to take a city he may at once intermit all concern about armies and engines of war—the determination will take the city; or that when a physician has determined to cure a patient, he may safely neglect to administer the remedies—the determination will cure the patient; as that when God has determined to save His people, all significance in the work of Christ, the only means by which the determined salvation is to be accomplished, is taken away. How reasoners like M. Monod are pursued by this incomprehensible uncomprehendingness is oddly illustrated in a footnote in which he wishes to ascribe to Luther himself, that sound and fervent predestinarian because sound and fervent believer in God and His grace, the objection to predestination that "it renders



singularly vain and futile the work of Jesus Christ." We quote this footnote in full. "This was the objection of Luther. Towards 1542 he wrote: 'I hear that the nobles and great people emit such criminal talk about predestination as to say, If I am predestinated I shall be saved whether I do well or ill, and if I am not I shall be damned. I shall gladly combat this impious language if my uncertain health will permit me. If this talk were sound, the incarnation of the Son of God, His passion, His resurrection and all that He has done for the salvation of the world would be abolished. What end would be served by the prophets and all the Holy Scriptures? What by the Sacraments? Let us cast off and trample under foot this talk'—*Commentary on Gen. xxi. Opera, Witebergae* 1580. Vol. vi. 353—How far we are here from the affirmations of the *De Servo Arbitrio*!" Needless to say the words quoted from Luther have no such implication as M. Monod puts on them. In them Luther promises that if only the infirmities of his health permit, he will confute those who abuse the doctrine of predestination, saying, "If I am predestined, I shall be saved no matter whether I do well or ill; if I am not I shall be damned." To give a brief hint of the line his confutation will take, Luther adds that if such talk were sound "the incarnation of the Son of God, His person, His resurrection and all that He has done for the salvation of the world would be abolished",—the prophets and the whole of the Sacred Scriptures, the sacraments would be useless; wherefore, says he, we should reject and trample under foot such prating. What Luther says in this none too vigorous language is, as we all at once perceive, simply that if predestination is preverted into a predestination of ends apart from all means—so that those predestinated to life will live no matter what they do—then the significance of all means is taken away and this is tantamount to abolishing Christ and all His work, the Scriptures and all the Means of Grace, since these are the means by which the predestined end is attained. But he says this only in objection to a manifest perversion of the doctrine of predestination, and in vigorous defense of the doctrine of predestination. And when M. Monod cries out upon it: "'How far we are here from the affirmations of the *De Servo Arbitrio*", he merely betrays how far he himself is from understanding not Luther merely whom he quotes (perhaps at second-hand; possibly through the deflecting medium of Luthardt) and the *De Servo Arbitrio* which he refers to, but the whole Reformed doctrine of predestination which he is in act of expounding and criticizing. Luther speaks here in complete and even enthusiastic accord with the affirmations of the *De Servo Arbitrio*, and can be misunderstood only by writers who, not being in agreement with Luther, are determined to make Luther be in agreement with them.

We have no intention, however, of indulging in a series of petty criticisms of the details of M. Monod's exposition of the Reformed doctrine. We have merely wished to illustrate by a few instances taken at random from his pages a vein of failure in comprehension which runs through them and vitiates their conclusions. There is much in his exposition and



criticism meanwhile that is worthy of remark—particularly, if we may specify, his connection of the political and religious thinking of the times. We can only express the conviction that if M. Monod had approached the study of the Reformed theology with the sympathy with which he has approached the study of the Post-Kantian movement, he would have found an acceptable doctrine of God less a problem to his thought, because he would have found it already worked out for him in that great body of Augustinian thinking which has been the possession of the world for nearly a millennium and a half. The *scandalon* of this body of thinking has ever been, and is, that it thinks of God as God, and will not have His glory diminished by the exaltation of man. M. Monod himself says (p. 84): "The error of Calvinism was, above all, that it did not recognize the specific and unique value of the human person." The charge is quite untrue. Calvinism fully recognizes the high value of human personality. But Calvinism certainly does not allow that the human person has power to set itself by the side of the Divine. And the retort is just that the error of Anti-Calvinism has always been, and continues to be, that it does not recognize the specific character and unique value of the Divine person. M. Monod sometimes speaks as if he would charge Calvinism with wiping out the gulf which separates man from the beasts that perish. It does not do that. Calvin teaches rather that man is raised infinitely above the brutes by that *sensus deitatis* which is ineradicably imprinted on his nature, and by reason of which he aspires to immortality (e. g., *Institutes* I, iii. 1, 3; v. 4). But Calvinism resists and will continue to resist every effort to wipe out the greater gulf which separates the creature from his Creator. We have said advertently "greater gulf." For we stand with Calvin, or rather with Augustine,—for Calvin is quoting Augustine here (*Opp.* viii. 256)—when he declares that "he is assuredly mad who does not ascribe to God a far greater preëminence above himself than he allows to the human race above the beasts." And we stand with Calvin when (still after Augustine) he adds that what is most becoming in the sheep of God's flock is quiet submission to His will; and when he adjoins, now on his own behalf, that this would assuredly be more fitting than, after the example of Pighius, to substitute man for God and demand that each man should earn his own destiny on the ground of his own virtues. The "problem of God" is to be solved for the twentieth century as for all that have preceded it, not by deifying man and abasing God in his presence, but by recognizing God to be indeed God and man to be the creation of His hands, whose chief end it is to glorify God and to enjoy Him forever. And this is as M. Monod truly perceives, just Calvinism.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. By PHILIP SCHAFF. Vol. V. Part I. The Middle Ages from Gregory VII., 1049, to Boniface VIII., 1294. 1907. Pp. xiv., 910. Price \$3.25. And Vol. V. Part II. The Middle Ages from Boniface VIII. 1294, to the

Protestant Reformation, 1517. By DAVID S. SCHAFF, D.D., Professor of Church History in the Western Theological Seminary, Pittsburg. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1910. Pp. xi., 795.

The late Dr. Schaff in writing his Church History thought it wise to finish those volumes that deal with the Reformation before taking up the Middle Ages. Unfortunately death overtook him before he could fill the hiatus thus made in his series, and the duty of completing the work devolved upon his son. By the two volumes before us the history is now continuous from the beginning of the Christian era down to the end of the Reformation.

The many readers of Schaff's History will be glad to know that in these volumes the same plan has been followed as in the earlier ones. There is the same index to the literature, the same division into comparatively short sections, the same kind of appended notes and excursus, with reviews of discussions of more debated points, or important documents. Nor will any difference in literary style be apparent to most readers. Only in one respect has the son departed from the plan of the father. He has devoted two volumes to the period 1049-1517, instead of one as was intended. For this, however, we may be thankful to him, for it has allowed a fuller treatment of such important matters as "the crusades, the rejuvenation of monasticism by the mendicant orders, the development of the canon law, the rise of the universities, the determined struggles of the papacy with the Empire, the development of the Inquisition, the settlement of the sacramental system, and some of the most notable characters the Christian Church has produced" as the author himself tells us. And certainly as we read the volumes, we feel that there is hardly a subject treated that could have been omitted, or that would not suffer by being treated less fully. The not infrequent detailed accounts of events such as the coronation of a Pope in the Middle Ages, the very circumstances of Becket's death, the altar-piece at Triani, Jerome's address in the Cathedral of Constance before his martyrdom, or the luxury of Leo X's court,—I have chosen them at random—might indeed be omitted by the specialist, but only enhance the value of the work for the ordinary student and reader.

It is unnecessary to review the volumes in detail, and it would be inappropriate to call in question its judgment on special matters. The volumes are not intended to be a critical history of the times, but to serve as hand-books and guides. As such they fulfill their purpose admirably. The author shows himself a sane and scholarly Protestant who is capable of appreciating the great work done by the papacy during the formative period of European civilization; he has sympathy for the mystics, the schoolmen, the Friars and others, and gives them credit for the work they did. To this we must add that his sense of proportion is good. A little more than a quarter of the space is given to the papacy and what centres thereon. To the monastic orders and scholasticism each are allotted over one hundred pages, the

Renaissance receives nearly the same, and those very important yet much neglected subjects of popular piety, superstition, witchcraft, &c., are given about an equal number. Altogether the author and his readers are to be congratulated on the appearance of these two well filled readable volumes. It is to be hoped that the author will now see his way clear to continuing the series beyond the Reformation, and bringing it down to modern times; for such a work is needed.

*Princeton.*

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

THE CONFESSIONAL HISTORY OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCH. By JAMES W. RICHARD, D.D., LL.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Gettysburg, Pa. Published for the Author by the Lutheran Publication Society, Philadelphia, Pa. [1909]. 8vo, pp. viii, 637. Price, \$3.00.

The late Dr. Richard employed himself with untiring energy through many years in an eager study of the doctrinal history of the great age of Lutheran theology. The present goodly volume, which was passing through the press at the time of his death, may be regarded as, in some sense, the garnered fruit of all these years of labor. It is a solid contribution to our knowledge of the origin, contents and history of the symbolical works which are current among Lutherans, written with adequate knowledge, with great clearness and force, certainly not without bias—Dr. Richard was a doughty controversialist—but with transparent honesty of purpose, though not always (for this happens sometimes with doughty controversialists) with perfect comprehension of points of view other than his own, or with sympathetic appreciation of their adherents. He begins from the beginning, with an illuminating account of the rise of the Reformation movement and follows the progress of events to the composition of the Augsburg Confession. The whole history of this document, internal and external, is then traced, and as well that of the other old Lutheran Confessions. Then a new start is taken, and the movements which led up to the formulation of the Form of Concord are minutely studied, culminating in an account of the collection, called the Book of Concord. A chapter, each, is then given to the history of the Lutheran Symbolical books in the eras of Pietism, of Philosophy and of Rationalism, and to their history in the Nineteenth Century; and the volume closes with a chapter on the Lutheran Confessions in America. The scheme, it will be perceived, is very comprehensive, and the treatment everywhere is quite detailed. The book furnishes a welcome guide through the intricacies of an unusually complicated section of the history of Christian doctrinal construction.

*Princeton.*

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

REGINALD PECOCK'S BOOK OF FAITH. A Fifteenth Century Theological Tractate. Edited from the MS. in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge, with an Introductory Essay, by J. L. MORISON, M.A., Professor of History in Queen's University, Kingston, Canada;

Late Lecturer on English Literature in the University of Glasgow.  
Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, Publishers to the University. 1909. Crown 8vo.; pp. 315.

Reginald Pecock, Bishop of Chichester, courtier, churchman, "rationalist," recanter, "forerunner of the modern world," has been enjoying something like a resuscitation in recent years. Mr. W. W. Capes in his *English Church in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*, Miss Greenwood in the second volume of the *Cambridge History of English Literature*, Dr. Gairdner in his *Lollardy and the Reformation in England*, seem to have conspired together to recover his name from the obscurity and his works from the ashes to which the angry churchmen of his day consigned them. Mr. Morison follows hard on their heels with this admirable edition of his last, in some respects his most important, book, which has been preserved to us in a single, imperfect manuscript. Mr. Morison does not scruple to speak of his hero as "the only great English theologian of the fifteenth century" (p. 22), whose "intellectual individuality" was "second only to that of Wycliffe in the history of the English Renaissance" (p. 68) and who possessed a "historic sense" "unequalled in England for more than a century" and a "capacity for the scientific standpoint" "startlingly modern" (p. 76). His *Book of Faith*, he pronounces, along with his *Represser* (*A Represser of ever-much blaming of the Clergy*, edited for the Rolls Series by Churchill Babington, 1860), "the most important contribution to English theological thought between Wycliffe and the Tudor writers" (p. 10). Such encomiums may seem overstrained—until we regard the waste and desolation of English theology of the middle of the fifteenth century against which the works of this self-conscious individualist are thrown up to observation. In any event it is an interesting episode in the history of British thought which Pecock marks, and we are glad to have this excellent edition of the maturest of his works.

It is on Faith; and it is written with the express design of showing that faith is reasonable. The conception of faith presented is the established notion of faith in its large sense. It is conviction founded on evidence; and the evidence on which it is founded, when it is religious faith, is, in the last analysis, the evidence of God. Here is how Pecock defines faith in another book (*The Folewer to the Donet*, p. 28): "It is a knowyng wherbi we assenten to eny thing as to trouthe, for as mych as we have sure evydencis gretter than to the contrarie that it is toold and affermid to us to be trewe, bi him of whom we have sure evydencis, or notable likli evydencis, gretter than to the contrarie, that therinne he not lied." And here is how he speaks of it here (p. 122): "But, sone, y wole that thou bere wele in mynde whet of feith is seid in the places bi thee now alleggid, thet feith, of which we speken now, into which we ben bounde, and which is oon of the foundementis of Christen religioun, is thilke kinde or spice of knowyng, which a man gendrieth and getieth into his undirstonding, principali bi the telling or denouncing of another persooone, which may not lie, or

which is God." There is nothing revolutionary in this, and there is nothing new in his deference to reason, even in matters of faith,—reason which he calls "the largist book of autorite that ever God made"; or in his confidence in the syllogism, which, Mr. Morison tells us, "he ever spoke of with a reverence he was not prepared to concede to God Himself." "A sillogism wel reuled," he asserts, "after the craft taught in logik, and havying ii premyssis openli trewe and to be grauntid is so stronge and so myghti in al kindis of maters, that though al the aungels of hevene wolden seie that his conclusioun were not trewe, yitt we shoulde leeve the aungels seiying and we shoulde truste more to the proof of thilk sillogisme than to the contrarie seiying of all the aungels in hevene." It is strongly said; but does it say anything more than each of us knows in his heart—that we cannot believe any testimony which contradicts what we perceive to be true?

The chief purpose which Pecock had in view in writing was to confute the Lollards, and we incidentally get a view of the wide extension of Lollardry and the devotion to the Scriptures shown by the Lollards. Pecock does not like their confidence in private judgment, and it is just the common Romish argumentation which we get from him. Decidedly, however, this confident old reasoner is worth listening to, and we are grateful to Mr. Morison for putting his *Book of Faith* in our hands.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL GOSPEL. By ADOLPH HARNACK, Professor of Church History in the University of Berlin, and WILHELM HERRMANN, Dr. Theol., Professor of Theology in the University of Marburg. Translated by G. M. Craik and edited by Maurice A. Canney, M.A. Crown 8vo., pp. viii, 225. [vol. xviii of the "Crown Theological Library"]. London: Williams and Norgate; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1907.

THE PROGRAMME OF MODERNISM. A Reply to the Encyclical of Pius X., *Pascendi Dominici Gregis*, with the text of the Encyclical in an English version. Translated from the Italian by Rev. Father GEORGE TYRRELL. With an introduction by A. LESLIE LILLEY, Vicar of St. Mary's, Paddington Green, London. Crown 8vo, pp. xvii, 245. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1908.

ANGLICAN LIBERALISM. By TWELVE CURCHMEN. Crown 8vo, pp. 321, [vol. xxiv of the "Crown Theological Library"]. London: Williams and Norgate; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1908.

MONASTICISM: Its Ideals and History; and THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE. Two lectures by ADOLF HARNACK, Rector of and Professor of Church History in the University, and Member of the Royal Prussian Academy, Berlin. Translated into English by E. E. Kellett, M.A., and F. H. Marseille, Ph.D., M.A. Crown 8vo, pp. 171., [vol. xxviii, of the "Crown Theological Library"]. London: Williams and Norgate; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. [n. d.].



A number of the volumes of the "Crown Theological Library" have already been reviewed in this journal, some of them at considerable length. We bring together here a few of its later issues which do not seem to call for more than passing notice, although each of them has its distinct value. The promoters of the "Crown Theological Library" have, of course, their own ends in view in the selection of the books to which they give a place in their interesting series. When they tell us that it "has been instituted to present a religious literature dealing with modern difficulties", and that the several volumes "have been selected with a view of meeting religious questionings of the present age", they are speaking, of course, from their own standpoint, which is that of an advanced "liberalism". From a different standpoint one might say the object in view was to commend the liberal construction of Christianity to a wide public by presenting it in a number of its most attractive minor publications. Certainly, so far as the foreign works published in this "library" are concerned, the selection has been made with wisdom for the attainment of this end. And, however little we may be able to accord with the conclusions presented, we shall always be charmed and instructed in reading such presentations of them. Of the writings now before us Harnack's essays on *Monasticism* and *The Confessions of Augustine* are the most attractive and the most important, each having been in fact almost epoch-making in its time (about thirty years ago). They are not here for the first time, however, given to an English public but are reprinted from an earlier issue by the same London publishers (1901). The volume entitled *Essays on the Social Gospel*, is scarcely less interesting. It is made up of two essays by Harnack on *The Evangelical Social Mission in the Light of the History of the Church* (1894), and *The Moral and Social Significance of Modern Education* (1902), respectively, and a well known and very radical essay of Herrmann's on *The Moral Teachings of Jesus* (1903, 1904). It must be admitted that a grave mistake has been made in compacting these essays, of such diverse character and subject and not altogether consistent contents, together into the appearance of a continuous discussion; and this mistake is emphasized by prefixing Herrmann's preface to his very individual essay to the volume as if it belonged to the whole. An uninformed reader will almost necessarily be misled into a wrong estimation of the volume and its contents by this odd procedure. The student of the history of the Modernist movement will be grateful for the translation of the Encyclical of Pius X and the Italian answer to it given him by Father Tyrrell, but neither document has other than an historical value. And perhaps we can hardly say even so much of the twelve essays brought together in the volume called *Anglican Liberalism*, although it will repay reading by those eager to know something about the currents of feeling which are flowing up and down in English "liberal" circles to-day.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

WIDERLEGUNG DER VON PASTOR ALLWARDT HERAUSGEGEBENEN SCHRIFT:  
*"Die jetzige Lehre der Synode von Missouri von der ewigen  
 Wahl Gottes"*. Auf Wunsch der Lebanoner gemischten Special-  
 konferenz dem Druck übergeben von J. F. F. GERIKE. Zweite Auf-  
 lage. St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia Publishing House. 1910. 8vo,  
 pp. 64.

"The Synodical Conference", commonly known as "The Missouri Synod", belongs to that class of Lutheran bodies which accepts the whole Book of Concord for its symbolical writings and therefore looks upon the Form of Concord as part of its binding confession. The eleventh article of the Form of Concord, *Of God's Foreknowledge and Election*, teaches that God's eternal election stands in a causative relation to "our salvation and whatever pertains to it". And therefore the Missourians have strenuously contended that the predestination of God is "a cause of faith", and faith as foreseen (*intuitu fidei* or *fide praevisa*) accordingly cannot be a cause of predestination. Lutherans in general, on the other hand, adopting this latter position, stand in an ineradicable controversy with the Missourians on "Predestination"; and among them the Synods of Iowa and Ohio, who accept, like the Missourians, the whole Book of Concord, but accord with the common Lutheran view that foreseen faith is the ground of election, naturally are most sharply involved in this controversy.

We cannot ourselves doubt that the Missourians are right in their interpretation of Chapter XI of the Form of Concord. And we can have even less doubt that the Form of Concord in placing the electing grace of God at the root of all salvation is asserting the very essence of the eternal Gospel. Our sympathies are entirely, therefore, with the Missourians in this controversy, and we look upon them as in it contending for the central fact of our faith, that God it is, to wit, to whom we owe all our salvation. We have read Pastor Gerike's pamphlet, therefore, with very great pleasure; the points in which, as Calvinists, we differ with him easily fall into the background in comparison with the great common confession of the *solī Deo gloria*. We assent with all our heart when we read (p. 41): "We believe on the ground of the Word of God that we are called according to the purpose (Rom. viii. 28): we believe further according to the Word of God that God has ordained us to conversion and therefore also to faith (Acts xiii, 41 'As many believed as were ordained to eternal life'). We believe, according to our Confession, that election is a cause of our salvation, and moreover, works, aids and promotes whatever pertains to it."

The occasion of the pamphlet is indicated sufficiently by its title. It is one of the "documents" of the perennial debate between the Ohioans and Missourians. The first edition was printed for private distribution, this for public circulation. We rejoice that the spirit of C. F. W. Walther still lives in the Missouri Synod, and that its voice is still resonant in defense of the free grace of God as the source of salvation.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

CHRISTENTUM UND WISSENSCHAFT IN SCHLEIERMACHERS GLAUBENS-LEHRE. Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis der schleiermacherschen Theologie. Von HEINRICH SCHOLZ, Lizentiat der Theologie. Berlin: Arthur Glaue Verlag. 1909. 8vo.; pp. ix, 208. Price: 3.25 Marks; bound, 4.25.

A careful and fruitful study of the fundamental problems of Schleiermacher's theology, written with all the glow of personal admiration. In Lic. Scholz's opinion Schleiermacher has not even yet come to his own. He likens him to Kant who himself said to Stägemann, "I am come a hundred years too soon with my books: a hundred years hence I shall for the first time be understood and my books will be studied and come to their rights." Not all the treasures have yet been disclosed which lie hidden in Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*, says Lic. Scholz, and proceeds to prove it by drawing out of that mine treasures, both new and old.

The disposition of the book is as follows: First, the foundation is laid in a chapter on "Faith and World-Knowledge," in which the character of Schleiermacher as a thinker, theological and philosophical, is discussed. Then, in a second chapter, the "Scientific Character of the *Glaubenslehre*" is explained under the three heads of "the Systematic Plan," "the Critical Style," "the Evolutionistic Method." Finally, in a third chapter, "the Apologetical Attitude of the *Glaubenslehre*" is expounded under the three heads of "the curtailment of orthodox dogmatics," "Pantheistic appearance and spiritual Christianity" and "the duty of faith and the absoluteness of Christianity."

We quote a sentence or two merely to show Lic. Scholz's manner of dealing with his hero:—

"To call him a Spinozist merely because it was Spinoza who struck out the great word, *libera necessitas*, has no justification, least of all if what is meant is to designate thus an element of his thought as alien to Christianity. Schleiermacher already said himself that if his doctrine of Predestination was Spinozist, Augustine must certainly be called a Spinozist *ante Spinozam*. Something further must be added. In spite of the energy of his efforts for union, Schleiermacher was a 'theologian of the Reformed School.' Here is the explanation, not only of his determinism but of nearly everything which has been laid to him as Pantheism—as A. Schweitzer admirably remarks: 'The chief criticisms which have been brought against Schleiermacher are precisely those which have always been urged against the Reformed type of doctrine—Pantheism, Determinism in connection with the absolute feeling of dependence, recession of the idea of freedom and the like'" (p. 151).

"The transfigured sublimity of the Fourth Gospel is the pulse-throb of the *Glaubenslehre*. Theoretically Schleiermacher repelled aristocratism with all his power. But as his high intellectuality far surpassed the normal understanding, so also the style of his piety rose into the extraordinary. Schleiermacher lived on the high revelations of the Logos, and attached his sense of redemption to the transcendental por-

trait of Christ of the Fourth Gospel. The eagle gazing on the sun is at the same time the symbol of his piety. He remains the great virtuoso of religion. The Christianity of the *Glaubenslehre* is, with all its limitations, the high Gospel of Spirituality, not the religion of the poor in spirit. This aristocratic trait must be reckoned with if we are to make friends with Schleiermacher" (p. 204).

The author in his preface raises the question whether his style is altogether consonant with the nature of his work. "I have often spoken with warmth," says he, "but I hope that the temperature of the exposition has never affected its clearness. Is it ever possible to speak of Schleiermacher without interest in his person?" (p. iv).

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

EPISTOLÆ OBSCURORUM VIROURUM: The Latin text with an English Rendering, Notes, and an Historical Introduction. By FRANCIS GRIFFIN STOKES. London: Chatto and Windus, MCMIX. Royal 8vo.; p. xxiii, 560.

Mr. Stokes hints in the opening words of his preface that the *Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum* are—at least in England—more often talked about than read. He has certainly done his part to take away this reproach from his native land: he who does not read the *Epistolæ* under the incitement of this beautiful—and readable—volume must be beyond alluring. The tall pages, wide margins, clear and well-leaded type provide a fit vehicle for the attractive matter which is presented in them. The volume consists of four elements, each of which calls for some brief remark: the text of the *Epistolæ*; the annotations which accompany the text; the historical introduction which precedes it; and the English rendering which follows it.

The text is that of the first edition of each of the successively issued portions of the *Epistolæ*. The editor remarks that attempts at emendation of this text are forbidden by the consideration that "a text that contains intentional blunders, and in which the grammar is a law to itself, seems to call for exceptional treatment."—This appears to us undoubtedly the right point of view.

The annotations seem to be adequate. They are taken in many instances over from Böcking, but have been adjusted to the needs of readers somewhat less well-equipped than those whom Böcking addressed. In this adjustment references have been added to "more recent and accessible sources" of information, whether of persons or things; and sometimes, it must be added, to somewhat secondary sources. That Mr. Stokes sends his readers to McClintock & Strong's Cyclopaedia to learn of the forms of crosses (p. 278) and to Hare's *Walks in Rome* to be taught something of the Campo dei Fiori at Rome, can be accounted for only by his wish to send them somewhere where they will go. An appeal to Rosa Dartle in *David Copperfield* (p. 20) to illustrate the simple remark: "But do not think me troublesome for disturbing your mightiness with these questions, for I do it for the sake of information," seems just a little far-

fetched. And surely there is something wrong with a reference like this: "Wetzer und Welte, *Dict. Encycl. de la Théologie Cath.* tom. V., Paris, 1859" (p. 10), and something wronger with one like this: "Wetzer and Welt, *Dict. Cath.*, s. v. 'Curia Romana'" (p. 135). Would not one language be enough? And would not that best be German? And would not the reference be better to the second German edition of 1882 sq.?

The Historical Introduction is brightly written and covers the ground in an interesting fashion, but scarcely adds to our knowledge of the subject and seems indeed, more than the notes, to be adjusted to the needs of those who have no special knowledge "of the period involved." It is based on good authorities, however, and will leave such readers very fairly informed of the matters they need to know in order to enjoy the *Letters*.

It is in the English rendering that the volume finds its real justification. Here an impossible task has been triumphantly accomplished. We do not get, of course, precisely the *Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum* over again in the English rendering: but we get a very fair equivalent for them. The English is much more jaunty, sophisticated, literary than the Latin; the plain, slouchy dog-Latin is entirely gone: there **has** been a transposition into an entirely new note, in which artifice takes the place of pure nature. But in the tones of the new note the old values have been marvellously preserved. We read the English without any sense of its being a translation, and find in it a piece of genuine literature, reflecting, if not precisely transmitting, to us the manners and minds of its reputed authors, and full of humor and satiric force. Mr. Stokes speaks of his translation as intended to be "close rather than literal." We should not so describe it. It seems to us quite free but also faithful, conveying the sense and atmosphere, rather than the exact expression of the original. Its least successful portions are naturally the rhyming portions. No effort is made to reproduce the characteristic rhythm. Indeed the rhyming heading of one of the letters (II.16) is incontinently turned into plain prose. The greatest success is registered in the rendering of the coarse passages. Their coarseness is not eliminated to be sure; but it is curtailed and made tolerable by a system of compression, combined with a judicious substitution of allusive or somewhat out-of-the-way expressions for the plain downrightness of the Latin.

Perhaps the best way to convey an idea of the quality of the rendering is to present a specimen of it. Take this very characteristic one, in which the solemn trifling of the "theologians" over artificial sins is neatly taken off:—

"I now write to ask your reverence what opinion you hold concerning one who, on a Friday, that is the sixth day of the week—or on any other fast day—should eat an egg with a chicken in it?

"For you must know that we were lately sitting in an inn in the *Campo dei Fiori*, having our supper, and were eating eggs, when on opening one I saw that there was a young chicken within.

"This I showed to a comrade, whereupon quoth he to me, 'Eat



it up speedily, before the taverner sees it, for if he mark it, you will have to pay a Carline or a Julius for a fowl. For it is a rule of the house that once the landlord has put anything on the table you must pay for it—he won't take it back. And if he sees that there is a young fowl in that egg, he will say: "Pay me for that fowl!" Little or big, 'tis all one.'

"In a trice I gulped down the egg, chicken and all.

"And then I remembered that it was Friday!

"Whereupon I said to my crony, 'You have made me commit a mortal sin in eating flesh on the sixth day of the week!'

"But he averred that it was not a mortal sin—not even a venial one, seeing that such a chickling is accounted merely as an egg, until it is born.

"He told me, too, that it is just the same in the case of cheese, in which there are sometimes grubs, as there are in cherries, peas, and new beans; yet all these may be eaten on Friday, and even on Apostolic Vigils. But taverners are such rascals that they call them flesh, to get the money.

"Then I departed and thought the matter over.

"And by the Lord, Master *Ortwin*, I am in a mighty quandary, and know not what to do. . . .

"Most earnestly do I entreat you to resolve the question that I have propounded. For if you hold that the sin is mortal, then, I would fain get shrift here, ere I return to *Germany*" (pp. 446-447).

The meaning of the last clause is that so heinous a sin would fall into the class of "reserved cases" which only the pope could shrive,—as is fully set out in another letter (p. 295).

The quaint and somewhat artificial diction which Mr. Stokes has adopted for his rendering may be fairly observed in this selection. "A comrade," as also "my crony," lower down stand for *socio meo*; "whereupon" for the simple *tunc*; "quoeth he" and "he averred" for the mere *dixit*; "taverner" varied at once to "landlord" for *hospes*; "mark it" for *videt*. The telling colloquialisms: "He won't take it back"; "Little or big, 'tis all one" are wholly the translator's; and so is the picturesque phrase, "In a trice I gulped down the egg," the plain Latin reading merely, *et ego statim bibi ovum*—*bibi* being used, as the editor remarks, because the egg was raw, a fact not made evident by the English "gulped". There is evident preciousness here; and that is precisely what is lacking in the Latin. But, as Mr. Stokes truly remarks, the Latin could not be rendered literally: "a word for word translation would frequently have the effect of converting phrases of mediæval naïveté into quite modern vulgarisms". Mr. Stokes has chosen rather to transmute the mediæval naïveté into a varied modern English, as flexible as it is picturesque. We think he did well so to determine, and we know he has done well in his undertaking.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

## SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

CHRISTOLOGIES ANCIENT AND MODERN. By WILLIAM SANDAY, D.D., LL.D., Litt.D., Lady Margaret Professor and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford; Hon. Fellow of Exeter College; Fellow of the

British Academy; Chaplain in Ordinary to the King. Oxford University Press, American Branch, [1910]. 8vo, pp. viii, 246.

Publicity is one of the striking characteristics of our times. Our Village Improvement Societies, demanding the removal of all fences, are but a symbol of a universal temper. Perhaps Dr. Sanday is the first scholar, however, who has deliberately elected to do his studying in the public view. He has, as it were, knocked down the walls of his study, and, taking his seat in the open, invited all that pass by to observe him writing his great book on the Life of Christ. It is pleasant to be taken thus into a great scholar's confidence; and we have all profited by the series of charmingly written volumes in which Dr. Sanday has laid before us the processes of his preliminary studies for his great task. The volume now before us, he tells us, is probably the last of these, and it does not yield in interest to either of its predecessors. We confess, however, to a certain decrease in the interest with which we look forward to the work to which they lead up, as we have read one after the other of these preliminary studies. They pass in review a great mass of modern research, and whatever they touch upon they illuminate. It would be difficult to find a more sympathetic survey of the recent literature of Gospel criticism or a more useful guide to the intricacies of modern constructions of the person of Christ. But it is possible for width of sympathy itself to become a snare; there are other qualities than breadth of importance to a teacher of fundamental religious truth; and it is not strange that the term "latitudinarianism" has even acquired an evil connotation. As we have re-read, one after the other, Dr. Sanday's preliminary studies, while our admiration of the extent of his learning and the clearness of his comprehension of the currents of recent thought has steadily grown, misgivings have grown with it of the firmness of his grasp on the fundamental problems which must underlie and give its body to a Life of Christ which would do justice to the deposit of faith. It was distinctly not reassuring to observe the nature of the hospitality which he accorded in the earliest of these volumes to certain very wire-drawn hypotheses as to the personality of the author of the Fourth Gospel. It was not more reassuring to observe the nature of the commendation which he gave in the second of them to Albert Schweitzer's brilliant, in some respects surely epoch-making, but sadly negative history of what Schweitzer's translators call, not unfairly from their point of view, "the quest of the historical Jesus". Nor does reassurance come with the present volume, with the feebleness of its hold upon the Biblical and Historical Christologies, its readiness to fly for refuge to doubtful modern speculations as supplying the key to the mystery of our Lord's person, its determination to have a Jesus who in all His earthly manifestations was, phenomenally, "strictly human". If the outline given on pp. 179 sq. of what Dr. Sanday calls "the working of our Lord's consciousness", in which is briefly traced His career from the cradle to the grave, is to furnish, as seems likely, the schematization of the coming Life of Christ, the

mould which is to determine the lines of its structure, then, we may as well say frankly at once, we shall have no interest in the new Life of Christ whatever. For then it will be nothing but one more of those "reduced" Lives of Christ, of which the world has already too many, the writers of which, deserting the testimony of the sources, have as Renan puts it "imputed themselves to their victim", and, creating a Jesus after their own image, permitted Him to function only within the limits of their own consciousness. It will be a matter of sincere regret if, after the warnings of even a Wrede and a Schweitzer, Dr. Sanday should only again "psychologize" the Life of Christ.

The title of the present volume—*Christologies, Ancient and Modern*—might lead one to expect to find it a historical sketch of Christological thought in the Church, or perhaps a critical discussion of the chief Christological theories which have been current in the Church. It is not quite either of these. Its leading motive is rather the suggestion of a new Christological theory, the Christological theory which is to underlie the forthcoming Life of Christ. Even so, however, the general drift of ancient Christological thought up to Chalcedon, and the chief forms of German Christological construction of the last century are lightly sketched, to form a background against which the new suggestion may be thrown out. These sketches are drawn, of course, by the hand of a master, although only leading principles are brought out, with no attempt to enter into details. In these circumstances probably we ought not to scrutinize with too much care the occasional details which are rapidly alluded to. Otherwise we might question the description of Tertullian's Trinity, without qualification, as "what is called an 'economic Trinity'" (p. 26), and we should certainly demur to the rendering of his *οἰκονομίας sacramentum* by "the mystery of the divine appointment" (p. 25). Dr. Sanday himself at a later point uses the term "economy" in Tertullian's sense, when (p. 45) he speaks of projecting "our ideas of Personality into the internal economy of the Godhead,"—which, by the way, is precisely what Tertullian was in the act of doing, when he wrote the passage which Dr. Sanday quotes. The language which is used in speaking of the Chalcedonian formula (pp. 54-57) again does not seem to us to retain perfect exactness. The Chalcedonian fathers would seem to have done all they could to save themselves from the charge of conceiving the Two Natures as "separable and separate", when they solemnly declared that they were united *ἀδιασπέρως*; Leo's "agit utraque natura quod proprium est *cum alterius communicatione*" would seem to preclude the supposition that these two natures were conceived as "operating distinctly"; and the emphatic "without confusion, without conversion" of the decree, would certainly appear to render it impossible to describe it as allowing "by a system of mutual give-and-take" "for the transference of the attributes from one nature to the other",—which is a characteristic feature not of the Chalcedonian but of the Old-Lutheran Christology. Nor do we think it happy (p. 104) to take over Paul's words in 2 Cor. v. 19 in the form,

"God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself", without remark, as a fair expression of the Ritschlian view of Christ's person. We suppose it to be unquestionable that these words, as they stand in Paul's epistle, have a Soteriological rather than Christological content, and should be read, "God was, in Christ, reconciling the world with Himself", or to put its full point upon it, "It was God who was reconciling the world with Himself in Christ"; and it is hardly desirable to perpetuate a perversion of an Apostolical phrase by making it in its perverted use the vehicle of a special Christological hypothesis. Small incidental matters of this kind, however, are scarcely more worth adverting to than the incapacity the American publishers show (pp. 27, 40, 51, 121) to print a Greek phrase correctly, a matter which must be especially mortifying to Dr. Sanday and his British publishers alike, to whom such things are unwonted.

The center of interest in the volume lies not in its historical but in its constructive aspect, in "the tentative modern Christology" which it outlines. This is dominated by a gently expressed but perfectly firm refusal of the doctrine of the Two Natures on the one side, and a fixed determination, on the other, to have a Jesus who, phenomenally at least, shall be "strictly human". It will go without saying, of course, that if there be not Two Natures in the person of Christ, then there can be but one; and He must be conceived, therefore, either as a purely divine Nature as Person, or as a purely human Nature as Person. In the former case we shall be landed inevitably, of course, in some form of Docetism; in the latter as inevitably in some form of Humanitarianism. Dr. Sanday, as is his gracious wont, speaks kindly of the Docetists, and seeks and finds the element of truth which they saw and endeavored to conserve. But he does not cast in his lot with them. Neither (very properly) will he consort with the Kenotists who think to have in a one-natured Jesus both God and man, on the theory that a shriveled God is a man, and that Jesus, who was nothing but a man, may be thought to have been God before He shrunk into human limits,—thus losing really both Natures in the attempt to make one two. There is nothing left for Dr. Sanday, therefore, but a pure Humanitarianism. His historical sense, however, and his Christian heart will not permit him to think of Christ "merely as man". He feels compelled to recognize Deity in Him as well as humanity. But not Deity alongside of the humanity. Why not, rather, he suggests, Deity underlying and sustaining the humanity—as Deity underlies and sustains all humanity? Then we may think of Christ as "strictly human"; but, as man differs from man in the richness and fulness with which the Divine that underlies his being surges up in him and enters into his consciousness, and Jesus stands in this incomparably above all other men, we may think of Him as incomparably the Divine man. Thus Dr. Sanday would cut the knot of the Christological problem. Obviously, what he gives us is at best, only a new Nestorianism, a Nestorianism stated in terms of modern speculation; Jesus Christ is a man in whom God dwells in a fulness in which He does



not dwell in other men. At worst, what he gives us is a devout Humanitarianism, a Humanitarianism stated in terms of mystical contemplation: the doctrine of the Incarnation gives place to a theory of Divine Immanence, and Jesus Christ is just the God-filled man.

The basis of Dr. Sanday's suggested Christology, we perceive, is a mystical doctrine of human nature. Support for this mystical doctrine of human nature he seeks, we must now note, in recent speculations as to the subliminal self. Nobody doubts, or has ever doubted, that mental processes take place below the threshold of consciousness. And nobody doubts that God operates on the human soul, as we say, "beneath consciousness". The peculiarity of Mr. Myers' doctrine of the "subliminal consciousness"—as it is misleadingly called, for how can we speak of unconscious consciousness?—to which Dr. Sanday attaches himself, is that this "subliminal consciousness" is supposed to be not merely the larger but the nobler part of the self. "The wonderful thing is", writes Dr. Sanday (p. 145), "that while the unconscious and subconscious processes are (generally speaking) similar in kind to the conscious, they surpass them in degree. They are subtler, intenser, further-reaching, more penetrating. It is something more than a metaphor when we describe the sub- and un-conscious states as more 'profound'. It is in these states, and through them, that miracles are wrought . . ." Our sub-conscious states and operations are not sub-normal, or even normal, but super-normal. Nay, they are even divine; for beneath our subliminal selves lies the ocean of the Infinite, and, as we are open at the bottom, the tides of the Infinite wash in. If we pass down deep enough into our subliminal being, then, we shall find God; or, if the tides of the Infinite wash in high enough, they will emerge in our consciousness. Dr. Sanday pictures our human consciousness "as a kind of 'narrow neck' through which everything which comes up from the deeps of human nature has to pass" (p. 176). This "narrow-necked vessel", he tells us, has an opening at the bottom. "Through it there are incomings and outgoings, which stretch away out infinitely, and in fact proceed from, *and are*, God Himself" (p. 178, italics ours). "That", he adds most naturally, "is the ultimate and most important point . . . Whatever there may be of divine in man, it is in these deep, dim regions that it has its abiding-place and home." Accordingly he refuses to follow Sir Oliver Lodge when that scholar speaks of this "larger and dominant entity" and greater self which is "still behind the veil", as "not anything divine but greater than humanity". "I should not like to put upon it this limitation", says Dr. Sanday (p. 193). Dr. Sanday apparently supposes that the conception of human nature thus enunciated will homologate with the Biblical doctrines of Divine influence, of the indwelling Spirit, of the framing of Christ in us. It will not. Its affiliations are rather with pantheising Mysticism, if we ought not to say outright, with Pantheism—that is if, as we suppose, the distinction of Pantheism from Mysticism lies in its postulating as an ontological fact what Mysticism proposes as an attainment of effort.



On the basis of this mystical view of humanity, Dr. Sanday suggests that we may frame our conception of the Person of Christ. With Him, too, as with us, whatever there is of divine must be looked for in the subliminal regions. As "the proper seat or *locus* of all divine indwelling, or divine action upon the human soul, is the subliminal consciousness", so "the same, or the corresponding, subliminal consciousness is the proper seat or *locus* of the Deity of the Incarnate Christ" (p. 159). It is safe to transfer the analogy of our human selves to Him so far at least as to understand that whatever there was of divine in Him it was in "these deep, dim regions" that it had "its abiding-place and home" (p. 178) and in coming up into consciousness "must needs pass through a strictly human medium" (p. 165). "We have seen", writes Dr. Sanday (p. 165), "what difficulties are involved in the attempt to draw as it were a vertical line between the human nature and the divine nature of Christ, and to say that certain actions of His fall on this side of this line and certain other actions on the other. But these difficulties disappear if, instead of drawing a vertical line, we draw rather a horizontal line between the upper human medium, which is the proper and natural field of all active expression, and those lower depths which are no less the proper and natural home of whatever is divine. This line is inevitably drawn in the region of the subconscious. That which was divine in Christ was not nakedly exposed to the public gaze; neither was it so entirely withdrawn from outward view as to be wholly sunk and submerged in the darkness of the unconscious; but there was a sort of Jacob's ladder by which the divine sources stored up below found a outlet, as it were, to the upper air and the common theatre in which the life of mankind is enacted." The precise meaning of this is perhaps not altogether clear. What it seems to say is that the difference between our Lord and us lies fundamentally here,—that the Infinite washes into His subliminal self more constantly and more freely than into ours; and so, though His life "so far as it was visible was a strictly human life", yet "this human life was, in its deepest roots, directly continuous with the life of God Himself" (p. 168). "If St. Paul could quote and endorse the words of a pagan poet claiming for the children of men that they are also God's offspring", Dr. Sanday goes on to expound; "and if they are this notwithstanding that they are confined in a body as creatures of perishable clay; if in spite of these limitations it may still be said of them that in God they 'live and move and have their being', might not the same be said in a yet more searching and essential sense of Him who was Son in a more transcendent and ineffable mode of being than they?" Dr. Sanday assures us that there is ample room left here for the Homoousion, "whatever the Homoousion means." We suppose he means that we may understand, if we will, that the whole of that "self-determination of the Godhead" which we call "the Son" may have invaded the subliminal recesses of the being of Jesus, as the Infinite washes in varying measures into all of us. But even

so, does the man Christ Jesus differ from us, into the subliminal being of all of whom the Infinite washes in varying measures, otherwise than in degree? And how does this conception of Jesus separate itself essentially from that, say, of Ernest Renan who writes as follows (*Vie de Jésus*, p. 78)? "The men who have most highly understood God, have felt the Divine in themselves. In the first rank of this great family of true sons of God, Jesus must be placed. Jesus had no visions; God does not speak to Him from without; God is in Him; He feels Himself with God, and He draws out of His own heart what He says of His Father. He lives in the bosom of God and enjoys constant intercourse with Him; He does not see Him but He hears Him . . . He believes Himself in immediate relation with God, He believes Himself God's Son. The highest consciousness of God which has ever existed among men, was that of Jesus". Surely this is as eloquently said as that: does it not also present as lofty a conception of Jesus' relation to the Divine Being?

We are not endeavoring to convey the impression that Dr. Sanday's attitude towards our Lord's Person is the same as Renan's. He tells us expressly that it is not. It would be monstrous to doubt Dr. Sanday's complete loyalty of heart to the true Deity of Christ, which he constantly asserts in the face of all gainsayers. But it is quite another question whether the mode of conceiving the Person of our Lord which he tentatively puts forward for our consideration conserves the true Deity of Christ. We cannot think it does. Dr. Sanday very properly discriminates contemporary Christian thought into two main types which he calls "full Christianity" and "reduced Christianity", each of which has a Christology of its own. The Christology which he has worked out here in outline only, distinctly belongs to the type which he calls "reduced Christianity". How could it help doing so when it is insisted that the humanity of our Lord must be taken in such real earnest that His life "so far as it was visible" must be conceived as "a strictly human life" and His consciousness (Dr. Sanday says His "human consciousness" but in the circumstances the adjective seems decidedly otiose) as "entirely human", and yet the application to Him of the Chalcedonian conception of the Two Natures is firmly declined? No adherent of the doctrine of the Two Natures will fall a whit behind Dr. Sanday in the seriousness with which he takes the humanity of our Lord: the true and perfect humanity of the Lord is as real and as precious a part of the doctrine of the Two Natures as is His true and perfect Deity. To the adherent of the doctrine of Two Natures as truly as to Dr. Sanday "the human consciousness of the Lord" is "entirely human". But to him "the human consciousness of the Lord" is not the entirety of His consciousness, and he will not say that "whatever there was of divine in Him, on its way to outward expression whether in speech or act" (why not say "in thought" too?) "passed through and could not but pass through the restricting and restraining medium of human consciousness." For the adherent of the doctrine of the Two Natures is de-

terminated to take the Deity of the Lord in real earnest also; and this is not taking the Deity of the Lord in real earnest but is subjecting it to the yoke of the humanity. When Dr. Sanday says therefore, "If whatever we have of divine must needs pass through a strictly human medium, the same law would hold good for Him", the adherent of the doctrine of the Two Natures draws back. This could be only if our Lord were not only human as we are, but divine also only as we are. We may indeed say this of His human nature, in which the Spirit dwells as He dwells in us, only without measure while He dwells in each of us according to his measure. But we must not leave Christ's Divine nature (which we have not) wholly out of account! He is not merely the most perfectly God-indwelt man who ever was,—though He is that. He is God as well. And He is God first and man only second. Why should He who is God and the Living God, infinitely full of the incomparable activities which we call divine, on assuming a human nature into personal union with Himself forthwith become incapable of life-expression save through "the restricting and restraining medium of human consciousness"? If we begin with the categories of purely human activities and proceed by confining the activities of our Lord to these, whatever else we include or exclude in our conception of Christ, we exclude the idea of God *manifest* in the flesh. The adherent of the Two Natures has this advantage over all such constructions of the Person of Christ as this which Dr. Sanday proposes,—that in doing justice to the humanity of Christ, (and none can surpass him in the earnestness with which he takes the humanity of Christ), he does justice also to His Deity.

The doctrine of the Two Natures, it must be confessed, is not very much in favor in the circles of modern scientific theology. Dr. Sanday, though himself turning away from it, finds himself impelled by his mere sense of justice to say a good word for it as not, after all, so black as it is painted. There are many causes which concur to produce this wide-spread indifference or rejection of it. Among them there should not be permitted to fall out of sight this very potent one,—the change in men's attitude to the Bible. For the doctrine of the Two Natures is a synthesis of the entire body of Biblical data on the person of Christ, and a synthesis which has been worked out in the crucible of life, not in that of mere intellectual inquiry. Work so done is done for all time. The principle of the Chalcedonian formulation is full justice to the entire body of the Biblical data: but men are no longer seeking to do full justice to the entire body of the Biblical data. The Bible has fallen to pieces in their hands, and they are impatient of an effort to synthesize all its points of view, as an artificial attempt to induce a fictitious unity in a variegated array of unrelated notions. What each successive investigator is endeavoring to accomplish is to penetrate behind the superincumbent mass of Biblical ideas to discover, if he may, not the common truth which binds them all together and finds trustworthy if partial expression in each, but the lost truth which has been covered

up and hidden under them all and can be recovered only by tearing them away and laying bare the forgotten reality beneath. The Bible having been lost the Christ of the Bible has naturally been lost also; and each thinker is left very much to his own imagination to picture how it were fitting that God should become man. Meanwhile it is certain that we know absolutely nothing of the facts of Christ's life or its manifestations except what the New Testament writers tell us, and on many grounds their account of it and of its *rationale* is far more apt to be true to the reality than any we can invent for ourselves to-day. If we are searching for the real Jesus we shall find Him nowhere else than in the New Testament writings, and we can have few better proofs that we have found Him than is furnished by this fact,—that all the representations of the New Testament writings are capable of so simple and so complete a synthesis as is provided in the doctrine of the Two Natures. In it all the Biblical data are brought together in a harmonious unity in which each finds recognition and from which each receives its complete exposition. The key which unlocks so complicated a lock can scarcely fail to be the true key: and when the key is once in our hands we may turn the argument around and from the details of the key authenticate the wards of the lock into which it fits. That all the data of the New Testament synthetize in the doctrine of the Two Natures authenticates these data as component elements of the Great Reality, because it were inconceivable that so large a body of varying and sometimes apparently opposite data could synthetize in so simple a unifying conception were they not each a fragment of a real whole.

*Princeton.*

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

THE LIVING ATONEMENT. By JOHN B. CHAMPION, M.A., B.D. The Griffith and Rowland Press: Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, St. Louis. 1910. Pp. 346.

More ground is covered in this volume than is indicated by the title. The nature of theology, the doctrine of the Trinity, the Deity of Christ, and Sin, are all discussed preparatory to the chapters on the Atonement.

The author uses the term 'Atonement' in a wide sense to include all that Christ does in saving men from sin. Hence the Atonement is defined broadly as "the righting of wrong." When, however, we ask exactly how this is done, no clear and definite answer is given. Christ is said to have been "identified with sin" so that when He died, "sin died, both actually and potentially." Thus the wrong of sin is said to have been "righted" by its "destruction," since sin's greatest wrong, the author declares to be "the fact of its existence." Furthermore, Christ is supposed to have been identified with sin, not by having its guilt laid upon Him, nor by sharing with men a sinful nature, "nor by sympathy and repentance;" but "chiefly by giving His sinless assent" to the sin of those who put Him to death. In other words, He allowed Himself to be killed. This so called "identifica-

tion with sin" is said to have "spread" in some wholly unexplained and inexplicable way to all human sin. But in what way this made atonement for sin is not explained, though the author does attempt to unfold the "experience" of God, of Christ, and of man, in the Atonement in which apparently they all share an active part.

In point of fact no definite view of the nature of the Atonement is given; or at least we have been able to discover no such idea. The author's view does not appear to be subsumable under any one theory that has ever been put forth. The entire discussion is lacking in clearness and definiteness, and the following sentences are not merely occasional or simply by way of illustration, but are fair samples of the kind of theological definition and discussion which marks the whole volume. Thus, for example, sin is said to be "the organic spirit of systematic piracy which preys upon the dominion of God," and "the total aggregate of evil spiritual energy, bound together by its own inherent affinity." The Atonement is said to be "the instatement of the life of God by sacrifice in the death of the Redeemer."

When it is born in mind that such sentences as the above are not sporadic utterances or given simply as expansions or illustrations of the author's definitions, but constitute the theological definitions themselves, perhaps we may be excused for not having been able to form a clear idea of his theory of the Atonement.

*Princeton.*

C. W. HODGE.

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL QUESTIONS. By W. CUNNINGHAM, D.D., F.B.A., Archdeacon of Ely; Fellow of Trinity College and Hon. Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge; Corresponding Member of the Massachusetts Historical Society and formerly Lecturer in Harvard University. 8vo; pp. xv, 232. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1910.

It is no new question which this attractive volume discusses, but it treats its subject with so much penetration and with so much sanity as to be quite novel and almost unique. It is "an attempt to set forth, from a Christian standpoint, the relative importance of all the forces which make for human welfare, or militate against it." First, our author takes up "world wide influences," such as "physical conditions," "racial differences," and "civil authority." Next, he deals with "national economic life," discussing under this head "the functions of government," "the reward of services" and "half-truths." Thirdly, he treats of "personal duty," under this considering "Christian character," "secularized Christianity" and "the Christianity of Christ." A valuable bibliography and a full index complete the book. In reading it one is at a loss which to admire the more, the author's mastery of his social and economic material or his profound understanding of Christian ethics and of its application to social questions. In this respect, as intimated, he stands alone and his discussion is in a class by itself. We may be pardoned, therefore, if we call attention to a few of its peculiar excellencies.



1. Its conception of civil authority as grounded only in and existing only to "enforce right and justice." Hence, arbitration, if it is to be effective in avoiding the horrors of war, must proceed, not by diplomacy, but by giving such full information as will issue in what is "right and fair."

2. Its impartial treatment of the trust problem. "It is not clear," he says, "that in minor matters the public interests are better attended to by public than by private monopolists. So long as the conduct of an enterprise is in private hands, the weight of authority is brought to bear in the interest of the public and to obtain redress; when the conduct of an enterprise is in the hands of municipal or other public bodies, authority is more likely to be used to conceal abuses and to evade criticism, even when the aggrieved party goes so far as to have a question asked in the House of Commons."

3. Its opposition to state intervention. "The whole trend of thought, in recent times, has been so much in favor of relying on state regulation that it seems that the worship of the State may exercise a baleful influence in the modern world; it rests on a sentiment similar to that which found expression in the worship of the Emperor. There is a danger lest personal initiative should be repressed, and that the importance of personal intelligence and character, both for maintaining and for improving the conditions of human welfare, may be obscured."

4. Its vigorous insistence on the Godward trend of Christ's teaching. "His discourses do inculcate brotherliness, and contain teaching on many of the duties of ordinary life. But a very little consideration will enable us to see that our Lord's teaching is not merely humanitarian. It takes all its force and effectiveness from the manner in which the thought of the Eternal God, the Father of all, is brought to bear upon every-day conduct."

5. Its conception of the office of the Christian minister in relation to social reforms. "The terms of their commission lay down the limits of what they are to do by Christ's authority; they have no commission to put the affairs of society right, or to eradicate the evils in this present naughty world. In the gospel of the grace of God, they have committed to them the supreme means of touching men personally, and inspiring them with high but practicable ideals. This is the grandest work to which any man can give himself; and it is a miserable thing if he fails to put his best energies into this task, and prefers instead to compete with journalists and politicians in guiding some project for social reform. It is to forsake the fountain of life, and to strain at accomplishing some apparent improvement by taking up implements that are less certain and less effective, even for securing human welfare, than the means of grace instituted by Christ himself. In his official capacity, as called to preach the Gospel of Christ, the minister is bound to set forth that which is good and to strive to attract men personally. The Old Testament prophetic office, with its denunciations of evil-doers, survived in Saint John the Baptist's time, and his bold rebuking of vice; but it is at all events a very subordinate

part of the Christian minister's duty, and one which is not to be discharged in a wholesale fashion without serious risk of alienating those whom it might have been possible to win. It is needful to look to the terms of Christ's commission, both as to the duties that are to be done and the manner of doing them. He sent his apostles on evangelistic work, and bade them administer the sacraments and exercise pastoral care; but he did not enjoin them to agitate for social reforms.

Since the task which is given us to do is spiritual, it can only be accomplished by spiritual strength and through spiritual means. We wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers. There is need of divine courage and divine wisdom; the strange bustle and confusion of modern life is a constant call to cease from bandying half-truths, and to seek for the help of that Divine Spirit who can clear our eyes from passion and greed, and by helping us to see the various elements in due proportion, can lead us into all truth."

The reviewer has quoted this passage in full because it is peculiarly representative of the tone and trend of the whole discussion, because it is the best summary within his knowledge of what should be the relation of Christianity to social questions, and specially because the position which it illustrates and commends is commonly, if not overlooked, yet misunderstood by the Church even more than by the world. One chief reason why the Church is shorn of her strength is that she so often substitutes the programme of social reform for the gospel of the grace of God.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

DE SYSTEMATE MORALI DISSERTATIO AD USUM SCHOLARUM COMPOSITA.  
Ab LUDOVICO WOUTERS, C.S.S.R. 8vo, pp. 38. Galopiae (Gulpen-Holland). M. Alberts. 1909.

To many this dissertation will be interesting as an exhibition of mediæval methods and of Romish casuistry. To us it seems likely to develop anything else than a vigorous moral life.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

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## GENERAL LITERATURE.

THE SCIENCE OF POETRY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. By HUDSON MAXIM. Funk & Wagnalls Co.: New York and London.

The Introduction to the volume tells us that its main object is "to provide a practical method for literary criticism and analysis . . . and a more practical and efficient means than we have had heretofore for the standardization of poetry." We are not at all sure that this object has been realized. The title of the book is not a fortunate one, for although there is, of course, a valid connection between literature

and language, poetry as a science and language as a philosophy are not strictly related subjects of investigation. They represent different provinces. The author discusses his topic under several successive chapters. In the first, "Foundation Principles", it is questionable whether the average reader would see the relation of "nerve stimuli" to the subject in hand, while far too much emphasis is laid on what is called "The Properties of Sound" or the vocal expression of poetry, as distinct from the written.

In chapters third and fourth, "What is Poetry", and "What Poetry is Not", the author goes over what he calls "the multitudinous indefinite definitions" of poetry, from Aristotle to Stedman, without being able to find one that is even approximately correct, while his misleading distinction between poetry and verse, that the one "is based on the meanings of words" and the other "on the sounds of words" cannot for a moment be accepted, and vitiates the entire volume. His own definition of poetry as "the expression of insensuous thought in sensuous terms by artistic trope" covers but a part of the area and aim of poetry. The author's own enlargement of this definition, as given on p. 43, too long to quote here, is a sufficient proof of the defect of the definition. In the remaining chapters, although the author's publishers have given us "The Standard Dictionary" with its three hundred thousand words, he finds no English vocables in that copious collection with which to explain his meaning, but prefers to introduce us to such terms as "Potentry", the "tonal property of speech"; "Tropetry", "a branch of arbitrary symbolism"; "Tro-Potentry", "the combination of these two"; "Tem-Potentry" and "Tro-Tempotentry", and even "Literatry" or "non-figurative" language. This is a nomenclature, we submit, that cannot be condoned, and we sympathize with the author as on through the volume he aims to carry the heavy weight of these cumbrous terms, by which the whole subject of poetry is hopelessly mystified. Some of the substantive merits of the book are beclouded and nullified by these terms, so that we finally lose sight of them. The diction and general style of the volume are thus very much impaired as to clearness, directness and simplicity by this needless phraseology, so that the author is really unjust to himself. If the reader will glance at the illustrations of the volume, he will find a series of pictorial representations that are nothing less than terrific and startling, forcing the question upon him whether he is indeed reading a book on such an aesthetic subject as poetry, or a book dealing with the mysteries of a Dantean Inferno. Among the fifteen illustrations following the frontispiece, there is but one, that of "Youth" that a man can examine with equanimity. Surely poetry is not such a spectacular and abnormal product as this with which to frighten children and older people, but what the author himself calls, "a natural phenomenon", and demanding, therefore, we submit, a more normal and natural method of interpretation. In a word, the author has given us a book, indicative of a wide range of reading and study and a good degree of thorough thinking, and yet greatly impaired as to its value to the literary world by faulty defini-

tion, totally wrong conceptions, and a terminology that would invalidate the currency and usefulness of any volume that was burdened with it.

Simplicity is the first law of life and literature.

*Princeton University.*

T. W. HUNT.

ADDRESS ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. An Address of the Representatives of the Religious Society of Friends for Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware. Issued Twelfth Month 18, 1908. 8vo, pp. 15. Philadelphia: Friends' Book Store, 304 Arch Street. 1909.

This is a terse and forcible presentation of the argument against capital punishment from the well-known standpoint of the Society of Friends. To us this standpoint seems radically wrong in at least these two respects: first it overlooks entirely the fact that the requirement of capital punishment for murder is as binding as ever, having been given to Noah the second head of the race, being based on a reason as permanent as man, and being reaffirmed in the New Testament, as in Romans xiii. 4; and, secondly, it ignores the fact that the protection of society and the reformation of the criminal are not the only ends of civil punishment, but that the first and chief end is the vindication of justice.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE. Series xxvi. Nos. 9-10. A STUDY OF THE TOPOGRAPHY AND MUNICIPAL HISTORY OF PRAENESTE. By Ralph Van Deman Magoffin, A.B., Fellow in Latin. 8vo, pp. 101. Also Nos. 11-12. BENEFICIARY FEATURES OF AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS. By JAMES B. KENNEDY, Ph.D., Professor of Political Economy in Wells College. 8vo, pp. 128. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1908.

These studies are original and valuable contributions in their respective departments; and their presentation, whether as regards the author or the publisher, leaves nothing to be desired. Happy is the university that numbers such scholars among its graduates students, and happy are the students whose university so appreciates their researches!

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

INTERNATIONALISM. A Primer of Internationalism, with special reference to University Debates. By WILBUR F. CRAFTS, Ph.D., Superintendent of the International Reform Bureau, Author of "Successful Men of To-Day", etc. 8vo, pp. 92. International Reform Bureau, 206 Pennsylvania Avenue, S. E. Washington, D. C.

"This is the first effort, so far as the author knows, towards formulating in a science all the official relations of nations to each other. It is hoped the little book may lead university men everywhere to increased study of international philanthropy and social ethics as

matters of which no educated man has a right to be uninformed." With Dr. Craft's statement of fact and expression of hope in the above quotation from his preface we find ourselves in hearty accord. While a few of the questions which he raises we should like to hold in suspense for the present, we agree unqualifiedly with his position that next to theology is the highest branch of the science of man, "that which deals with man in his widest relation, the hitherto unclassified science of *internationalism*".

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE COLLEGE FOR THE YEAR 1906-1907. Part I. Department of Instruction. Part II. Agricultural Experiment Station. 8vo, pp. 236. Harrisburg, Pa.: Harrisburg Publishing Company., State Printer. 1908.

These are very full and interesting reports of what would seem to be a most useful institution. This is specially true of the Report of the Agricultural Experiment Station. In connection with the departments of instruction we notice with regret the neglect of the culture studies, particularly of the Greek and Latin Classics; but we are glad to see that the head of the Department of Greek and Latin is sounding a very timely note of warning.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

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## PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

*American Journal of Theology*, Chicago, October: CARL E. SEASHORE, Play Impulse and Attitude in Religion; GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT, Greek Element in the Epistle to the Hebrews; IRVING KING, Religious Significance of the Psycho-Therapeutic Movement; WILLIAM HENRY ALLISON, Was Newman a Modernist?; JAMES BISSETT PRATT, A Mistake in Strategy; CLYDE WEBER VOTAW, Four Principles Underlying Religious Education; G. MALLOWS YOUNGMAN, Manuscripts of the Vulgate in the British Museum.

*Bibliotheca Sacra*, Oberlin, October: ARNOLD V. C. P. HUIZINGA, Authority; JAMES LINDSAY, Theory and Practice of Moral Virtue; ARCHIBALD EUGENE THOMSON, The Gethsemane Agony; THEODORE W. HUNT, The English Sonnet—The Sonnets of Shakespeare; M. O. SMITH, Res Gestae Exitus Israel; STEPHEN G. BARNES, The Christian Religion and Christian Miracles; HAROLD M. WIENER, The Swan-Song of the Wellhausen School; PARKE P. FLOURNOY, The Fourth Gospel at Yale and Chicago.

*Church Quarterly Review*, London, October: H. L. GOUDGE, Jewish View of the Synoptic Gospels; DARWELL STONE, Dr. Sanday's 'Christologies Ancient and Modern'; MRS. CREIGHTON, The World Missionary Conference; C. R. DAVEY BIGGS and W. C. BISHOP, Prospects and Principles of Prayer-Book Revision; A. C. HEADLAM, Training and Examination of Candidates for Orders; W. A. WIGRAM, The Assyrian Church;



E. W. WATSON, *The Church and the World; The Church Congress After Fifty Years.*

*The East and the West*, London, October: DR. BRENT, *The World Missionary Conference: an Interpretation*; ROBERT SPEER, *The Edinburgh Missionary Conference—II; "Unspiritual Work?" in the Mission Field*; MISS J. L. LATHAM, *Women's Education in India*; K. SREENIVASA RAO, *Christian Missions and Social Reform in India*; GEORGE WESTCOTT, *The Proposed College of Study in North India*; LESLIE JOHNSTON, *Modern Missionary Methods; a Scene in a Missionary Bazaar*; J. JOHNSTON, *Missionary Contributions to Science and Exploration*; A. WELLS, *the Development of Christianity*; STEPHEN S. THOMAS, *Coöperation for the Promotion of Unity; A Problem in Form of a Parable.*

*The Expositor*, London, December: F. W. MOZLEY, *Justification by Faith in St. James and St. Paul*; KIRSOPP LAKE, *Shorter Form of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans*; J. DE ZWAAN, *Psalms XLV*; ARTHUR CARR, *Further Notes on the Synoptic Problem*; I. GREGORY SMITH, *The Promises of Reward*; JAMES MOFFATT, *Materials for the Preacher.*

*The Expository Times*, Edinburgh, December: Notes on Recent Exposition; O. C. WHITEHOUSE, *Eberhard Schrader*; JAMES RUTHERFORD, *In the Study—Watching, Virginibus Puerisque, The Chivalry of Moses*; W. K. L. CLARKE, *Allegorical Element in the Fourth Gospel*; KIRSOPP LAKE, *2 Thessalonians and Professor Harnack*; JOHN KELMAN, *Pilgrim's Progress.*

*Harvard Theological Review*, Cambridge, October: GEORGE A. GORDON, *Some Things Worth While in Theology*; WARREN J. MOULTON, *Relation of the Gospel of Mark to Primitive Christian Tradition*; HOWARD N. BROWN, *Jesus and his Modern Critics*; FREDERIC PALMER, *Influence of Democracy upon Religion*; HINCKLEY G. MITCHELL, *Has Old Testament Criticism Collapsed?*; JAMES HARDY ROPES, *Some Aspects of the New Testament Miracles*; THOMAS W. GALLOWAY, *Does Evolutionary Philosophy offer any Constructive Argument for the Reality of God?*

*The Hibbert Journal*, Boston and London, October: PAUL SABATIER, *De la situation religieuse de l'église Catholique Romaine, en France, à l'heure actuelle*; GILBERT MURRAY, *Hellenistic Philosophy*; P. E. MATHESON, *Ideals in Education*; AMBROSE W. VERNON, *Present Crisis of the Christian Religion; A Vision of Unity*; A. M. F. COLE, *Fragments of a Dual Consciousness*; JAMES H. HYSLOP, *Philosophical Theories and Psychical Research*; THOMAS HOLMES, *Prisons and Prisoners*; M. A. R. TUKER, *Words of Institution at the Last Supper*; G. C. FIELD, *Fallacy of the Social Psychologist*; FRANCES H. LOW, *Principal Childs on Woman Suffrage*; HARTLEY B. ALEXANDER, *Belief in God and Immortality as Factors in Race Progress.*

*International Journal of Ethics*, Philadelphia, October: B. BOSANQUET, *Prediction of Human Conduct: a study of Bergson*; S. H. MELLONE, *Idealism of Rudolph Eucken*; J. A. LEIGHTON, *Personality and a Metaphysics of Value*; HELEN WODEHOUSE, *On Thinking about*

Oneself; HORACE M. KALLEN, Is Belief Essential in Religion?; ERNEST L. TALBERT, Two Modern Social Philosophies.

*Irish Theological Quarterly*, Dublin and New York, October: WILLIAM TURNER, Was John the Scot a Heretic?; W. T. CELESTINE SHEPARD, Teaching of the Fathers on Divorce; J. KELLEHER, Right to Rent and the Unearned Increment; CHARLES PLATER, A Plea for the Prophets; JOHN J. TOOHEY, Newman on the Criterion of Certitude; Philosophy and Sectarianism in Belfast University.

*Journal of Theological Studies*, London, October: J. H. BERNARD, Odes of Solomon; M. R. JAMES, New Text of the Apocalypse of Peter; A. SOUTER, Another Fragment of Pelagius; M. R. JAMES, The 'Epistola Apostolorum' in a New Text; W. V. HAGUE, Eschatology of the Apocryphal Scriptures; C. H. TURNER, Early Greek Commentators on the Gospel According to St. Matthew; H. STJ. THACKERAY, 'A New Name': Isaiah 65:15; R. H. KENNETT, Prophecy in Isaiah 9:1-7; C. F. BURNEY, Four and Seven as Divine Titles; J. K. FOTHERINGHAM, Astronomical Evidence for the Date of the Crucifixion.

*London Quarterly Review*, London, October: W. T. DAVISON, Church and the World in the Twentieth Century; J. AGAR BEET, Saving Faith; W. H. FINDLAY, Sight, Sound and Silence in Edinburgh; W. B. BRASH, The Teaching of Jesus—A Study of Method; CHARLES BONE, Windows in Chinese Minds; CLEMENT HARRIS, Music as Influenced by the Reformation.

*Lutheran Church Review*, Philadelphia, October: C. M. JACOBS, Augsburg Confession; H. OFFERMANN, Son of Man and Son of God; THEODORE E. SCHMAUK, Philosophy of the Unromantic; JOSEPH STUMP, Catechization: its Aim, Method and Apparatus; HENRY E. JACOBS, For the Work of the Ministry; M. S. WATERS, Modern, with Some Application to Christian, Education; LUTHER D. REED, Church Art; HENRY E. JACOBS, Examen Concilii Tridentini of Martin Chemnitz; ADOLPH HULT, Music Ideals of the Church; HUGO WENDEL, Convenient Arbitration; GEORGE DRACH and CALVIN F. KUDER, Beginning of Foreign Mission Work in the Lutheran Church in America.

*Lutheran Quarterly*, Gettysburg, October: HUBER G. BUEHLER, Bible as Literature; J. F. POLLOCK, Inspiration and Interpretation of the Scriptures; B. F. PRINCE, Our Attitude Toward the Carnegie Foundation; W. H. WYNN, Personality of Man in Bas-Relief; LUCY FORNEY BITTINGER, Study of Lives of the Saints; J. A. SINGMASTER, and A. R. WENTZ, Current Theological Thought.

*Methodist Review*, New York and Cincinnati, November-December: BORDEN P. BOWNE, Supremacy of Christ; E. R. HENDRIX, Literature of Saints; or, the Realism of Good; A. C. ARMSTRONG, Three Border Towns; H. R. CALKINS, Genius of Methodism and Doctrine of Imminent Appearing of Christ; WILLIAM BURT, Lest We Forget; H. K. CARROLL, Oratory in the World Missionary Conference; W. W. KING, Redemption of the Prayer-Meeting; A. H. GOODENOUGH, The Church to Meet the Need.

*Methodist Review Quarterly*, Nashville, October: A. W. WILSON, The

Atonement: The Unique Fitness of Christ; J. H. LIGHT, Sense at War with Soul in the "Idylls of the King"; ANDREW SLEDD, Reasons Why Colleges Fail to Educate; JOHN B. WHITFORD, Vision of Habakkuk; R. S. HYER, New Science of Psychical Research; MRS. F. L. TOWNSEND, "Marriage à la Mode": Its Message for Our Women; C. A. WARTERFIELD, Christianity and the Educational Ideal.

*Modern Puritan*, London, October: A. H. DRYSDALE, Hussite Wars of Religion; A. A. COOPER, At the Parting of the Ways; The Political Claims of the Papacy; D. M. MCINTYRE, Revival: Its Origin and Principles; P. C. AINSWORTH, "A Stranger in the Earth"; J. NISBET WALLACE, Breakfast Table-talk of Our Lord; Words of Wisdom; The Narrow Way—The Heavenly Measuring Reed.

*Monist*, Chicago, October: PAUL CARUS, Truth; WILLIAM B. SMITH, Silence of Josephus and Tacitus; LUCIEN ARREAT, Philosophy in France during the Last Decade; GEORGE B. HALSTED, Unverifiable Hypotheses of Science; PAUL CARUS, Formal Thought the Basis of Kenlore; HARTLEY B. ALEXANDER, Truth and Nature; C. PLANCK, Four-fold Magics; PAUL CARUS, Historicity of Jesus.

*Philosophical Review*, Lancaster and New York, November: G. N. DOLSON, Philosophy of Henri Bergson, I; B. H. BODE, Objective Idealism and Its Critics; EDWARD G. SPAULDING, Logical Structure of Self-Refuting Systems, II Ontological Absolutism; RADOSLAV A. TSANOFF, Professor Boodin on the Nature of Truth.

*Reformed Church Review*, Lancaster, October: JEFFERSON E. KERSHNER, Moral Value of College Work; WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER, Did Paul Understand Jesus?; S. Z. BEAM, The Church: Is It Loyal to Its Mission?; JULIUS F. VORNHOLT Knowledge of God; FRANKLIN H. MOYER, The Emmanuel Movement; GEORGE W. RICHARDS, Comparative Study of Morals of Apostolic and Modern Christian Congregations; EDWARD S. BROMER, Religious Education or the Changed Emphasis in Educational Religion.

*Review and Expositor*, Louisville, October: JAMES B. ANDERSON, Aspects of the Theologian's Relation to the Progress of Theology; CHAMPLIN BURRAGE, Collegiants or Rynsburgers of Holland; RUFUS W. WEAVER, The Emerging Issue; W. R. L. SMITH, Jesus and His Adversaries; J. L. KESLER, The Preacher and Biology; S. G. WOODROW, Sabatier's Theory of Religious Knowledge.

*Theological Quarterly*, St. Louis, October: Uniformity of Liturgy for Our English Churches; The Rise of Antichrist; Status of the English Work of the Missouri Synod.

*Union Seminary Magazine*, Richmond, October-November: RUSSELL CECIL, Power of Christian Character; THORNTON WHALING, Dr. Girardeau as a Philosopher; D. J. WOODS, Bible in Our Public Schools and Universities; SAMUEL A. KING, Grace of Adoption; D. N. YARBRO, The New Apologetics; E. C. GORDON, The Messianic Kingdom; J. ERNEST THACKER, Evangelism.

*Revue Bénédictine*, Paris, Octobre: D. D. DEBRUYNE, Quelques documents nouveaux pour l'histoire du texte africain des Évangiles

(suite et fin); D. J. CHAPMAN, Professor Hugo Koch on St. Cyprian; D. G. MORIN, Recueils perdus d'homélies de S. Césaire d'Arles; D. U. BERLIÈRE, Un projet de Congrégation liégeoise de l'Ordre de S. Benoit (1677-1690); D. A. WILMART, Le prétendu *Liber Officiorum* de s. Hilaire et l'Avent liturgique.

*Revue D'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, Louvain, Octobre: J. FLAMION, Les actes apocryphes de Pierre (suite, à suivre); FRÉDÉGAND CALLAËY, Les idées mystico-politiques d'un franciscain spirituel. Etude sur l'Arbor vitae d'Ubertain de Casale (suite et fin); P. RICHARD, Origines et développement de la Secrétairerie d'Etat apostolique (1417-1823) (suite et fin).

*Revue de Théologie et des Questions Religieuses*, Montauban, Septembre: CH. BRUSTON, Les origines de l'Eucharistie; A. WABNITZ, Le paradis du Hadès; JEAN FRIEDEL, Un argument tiré de l'Evolution: CH. BRUSTON, La conclusion de premier discours du prophète Esaïe; GUSTAVE BELOT, Les origines de l'idée de Dieu; HENRI BOIS, Réponse a M. Belot; L. PERRIER, L'Evolution, doctrine de liberté; P. FAREL, De titulo epistolae vulgo ad Hebraeos inscriptae.—Le problème de Dieu et la théologie chrétienne depuis la Réforme; PAUL VALLOTTON, Une vie de Jésus selon la foi et selon la science historique.

*Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, Lausanne, Mai-Juin: PIERRE BOVET, Le débat philosophique du moment: La définition pragmatique de la vérité; ED. LOGOZ, Augustin et le dogme; CH. BRUSTON, Les passages obscurs des épîtres pastorales; RODOLPHE EUCKEN, Science et religion.

*Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, Innsbruck, XXXIV Band, 4 Heft: JOSEF HONTHEIM, Die Gottesnamen in der Genesis; FRANZ RETT, Die Gewalt der Regularbeichtväter über Gelübde; HEINRICH BRUDERS, Mt. 16, 19; und Jo. 20, 22, 23 in frühchristlicher Auslegung. Tertullian.





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